to　have　a　moderate　degree　of　heat　or　warmth　in　them；　and　those；
  upon　whose　application　we　feel　a　like　degree　of　cold；　must　be
  thought　to　have　cold　in　them。
  。　They　must。
  。　Can　any　doctrine　be　true　that　necessarily　leads　a
  man　into　an　absurdity？
  。　Without　doubt　it　cannot。
  。　Is　it　not　an　absurdity　to　think　that　the　same　thing
  should　be　at　the　same　time　both　cold　and　warm？
  。　It　is。
  。　Suppose　now　one　of　your　hands　hot；　and　the　other
  cold；　and　that　they　are　both　at　once　put　into　the　same　vessel　of
  ｛179｝　water；　in　an　intermediate　state；　will　not　the　water　seem
  cold　to　one　hand；　and　warm　to　the　other？
  。　It　will。
  。　Ought　we　not　therefore；　by　your　principles；　to
  conclude　it　is　really　both　cold　and　warm　at　the　same　time；　that
  is；　according　to　your　own　concession；　to　believe　an　absurdity？
  。　I　confess　it　seems　so。
  。　Consequently；　the　principles　themselves　are　false；
  since　you　have　granted　that　no　true　principle　leads　to　an
  absurdity。
  。　But；　after　all；　can　anything　be　more　absurd　than　to
  say；　？
  。　To　make　the　point　still　clearer；　tell　me　whether；　in
  two　cases　exactly　alike；　we　ought　not　to　make　the　same　judgment？
  。。　We　ought。
  。　When　a　pin　pricks　your　finger；　doth　it　not　rend　and
  divide　the　fibres　of　your　flesh？
  。　It　doth。
  。　And　when　a　coal　burns　your　finger；　doth　it　any　more？
  。　It　doth　not。
  。　Since；　therefore；　you　neither　judge　the　sensation
  itself　occasioned　by　the　pin；　nor　anything　like　it　to　be　in　the
  pin；　you　should　not；　conformably　to　what　you　have　now　granted；
  judge　the　sensation　occasioned　by　the　fire；　or　anything　like　it；
  to　be　in　the　fire。
  。　Well；　since　it　must　be　so；　I　am　content　to　yield　this
  point；　and　acknowledge　that　heat　and　cold　are　only　sensations
  existing　in　our　minds。　But　there　still　remain　qualities　enough　to
  secure　the　reality　of　external　things。
  。　But　what　will　you　say；　Hylas；　if　it　shall　appear
  that　the　case　is　the　same　with　regard　to　all　other　sensible
  qualities；　and　that　they　can　no　more　be　supposed　to　exist　without
  the　mind；　than　heat　and　cold？
  。　Then　indeed　you　will　have　done　something　to　the
  purpose；　but　that　is　what　I　despair　of　seeing　proved。
  。　Let　us　examine　them　in　order。　What　think　you　of
  ；　do　they　exist　without　the　mind；　or　no？
  。　Can　any　man　in　his　senses　doubt　whether　sugar　is
  sweet；　or　wormwood　bitter？
  。　Inform　me；　Hylas。　Is　a　sweet　taste　a　particular　kind
  of　pleasure　or　pleasant　sensation；　or　is　it　not？　｛180｝
  。　It　is。
  。　And　is　not　bitterness　some　kind　of　uneasiness　or
  pain？
  。　I　grant　it。
  。　If　therefore　sugar　and　wormwood　are　unthinking
  corporeal　substances　existing　without　the　mind；　how　can　sweetness
  and　bitterness；　that　is；　Pleasure　and　pain；　agree　to　them？
  。　Hold；　Philonous；　I　now　see　what　it　was　delude　time。
  You　asked　whether　heat　and　cold；　sweetness　at　were　not　particular
  sorts　of　pleasure　and　pain；　to　which　simply；　that　they　were。
  Whereas　I　should　have　thus　distinguished：　those　qualities；　as
  perceived　by　us；　are　pleasures　or　pair　existing　in　the　external
  objects。　We　must　not　therefore　conclude　absolutely；　that　there　is
  no　heat　in　the　fire；　or　sweetness　in　the　sugar；　but　only　that
  heat　or　sweetness；　as　perceived　by　us；　are　not　in　the　fire　or
  sugar。　What　say　you　to　this？
  。　I　say　it　is　nothing　to　the　purpose。　Our　discourse
  proceeded　altogether　concerning　sensible　things；　which　you
  defined　to　be；　。　Whatever　other　qualities；　therefore；　you　speak　of　as
  distinct　from　these；　I　know　nothing　of　them；　neither　do　they　at
  all　belong　to　the　point　in　dispute。　You　may；　indeed；　pretend　to
  have　discovered　certain　qualities　which　you　do　not　perceive；　and
  assert　those　insensible　qualities　exist　in　fire　and　sugar。　But
  what　use　can　be　made　of　this　to　your　present　purpose；　I　am　at　a
  loss　to　conceive。　Tell　me　then　once　more；　do　you　acknowledge　that
  heat　and　cold；　sweetness　and　bitterness　（meaning　those　qualities
  which　are　perceived　by　the　senses）；　do　not　exist　without　the
  mind？
  。　I　see　it　is　to　no　purpose　to　hold　out；　so　I　give　up
  the　cause　as　to　those　mentioned　qualities。　Though　I　profess　it
  sounds　oddly；　to　say　that　sugar　is　not　sweet。
  。　But；　for　your　farther　satisfaction；　take　this　along
  with　you：　that　which　at　other　times　seems　sweet；　shall；　to　a
  distempered　palate；　appear　bitter。　And；　nothing　can　be　plainer
  than　that　divers　persons　perceive　different　tastes　in　the　same
  food；　since　that　which　one　man　delights　in；　another　abhors。　And
  how　could　this　be；　if　the　taste　was　something　really　inherent　in
  the　food？
  。　I　acknowledge　I　know　not　how。
  。　In　the　next　place；　　are　to　be　considered。
  And；　with　regard　to　these；　I　would　fain　know　whether　what　hath
  ｛181｝　been　said　of　tastes　doth　not　exactly　agree　to　them？　Are
  they　not　so　many　pleasing　or　displeasing　sensations？
  。　They　are。
  。　Can　you　then　conceive　it　possible　that　they　should
  exist　in　an　unperceiving　thing？
  。　I　cannot。
  。　Or；　can　you　imagine　that　filth　and　ordure　affect
  those　brute　animals　that　feed　on　them　out　of　choice；　with　the
  same　smells　which　we　perceive　in　them？
  。　By　no　means。
  。　May　we　not　therefore　conclude　of　smells；　as　of　the
  other　forementioned　qualities；　that　they　cannot　exist　in　any　but
  a　perceiving　substance　or　mind？
  。　I　think　so。
  。　Then　as　to　；　what　must　we　think　of　them：　are
  they　accidents　really　inherent　in　external　bodies；　or　not？
  。　That　they　inhere　not　in　the　sonorous　bodies　is　plain
  from　hence：　because　a　bell　struck　in　the　exhausted　receiver　of　an
  air…pump　sends　forth　no　sound。　The　air；　therefore；　must　be
  thought　the　subject　of　sound。
  。　What　reason　is　there　for　that；　Hylas？
  。　Because；　when　any　motion　is　raised　in　the　air；　we
  perceive　a　sound　greater　or　lesser；　according　to　the　air's
  motion；　but　without　some　motion　in　the　air；　we　never　hear　any
  sound　at　all。
  。　And　granting　that　we　never　hear　a　sound　but　when
  some　motion　is　produced　in　the　air；　yet　I　do　not　see　how　you　can
  infer　from　thence；　that　the　sound　itself　is　in　the　air。
  。　It　is　this　very　motion　in　the　external　air　that
  produces　in　the　mind　the　sensation　of　。　For；　striking　on
  the　drum　of　the　ear；　it　causeth　a　vibration；　which　by　the
  auditory　nerves　being　communicated　to　the　brain；　the　soul　is
  thereupon　affected　with　the　sensation　called　。
  。　What！　is　sound　then　a　sensation？
  。　I　tell　you；　as　perceived　by　us；　it　is　a　particular
  sensation　in　the　mind。
  。　And　can　any　sensation　exist　without　the　mind？
  。　No；　certainly。
  。　How　then　can　sound；　being　a　sensation；　exist　in　the
  air；　if　by　the　　you　mean　a　senseless　substance　existing
  without　the　mind？
  。　You　must　distinguish；　Philonous；　between　sound　as　it
  is　｛182｝　perceived　by　us；　and　as　it　is　in　itself；　or　（which　is
  the　same　thing）　between　the　sound　we　immediately　perceive；　and
  that　which　exists　without　us。　The　former；　indeed；　is　a　particular
  kind　of　sensation；　but　the　latter　is　merely　a　vibrative　or
  undulatory　motion　the　air。
  。　I　thought　I　had　already　obviated　that　distinction；
  by　answer　I　gave　when　you　were　applying　it　in　a　like　case　before。
  But；　to　say　no　more　of　that；　are　you　sure　then　that　sound　is
  really　nothing　but　motion？
  。　I　am。
  。　Whatever　therefore　agrees　to　real　sound；　may　with
  truth　be　attributed　to　motion？
  。　It　may。
  。　It　is　then　good　sense　to　speak　of　　as　of　a
  thing　that　is　；　；　；　。
  。　　see　you　are　resolved　not　to　understand　me。　Is　it
  not　evident　those　accidents　or　modes　belong　only　to　sensible
  sound；　or　　the　common　acceptation　of　the　word；　but　not
  to　　in　the　real　and　philosophic　sense；　which；　as　I　just
  now　told　you；　is　nothing　but　a　certain　motion　of　the　air？
  。　It　seems　then　there　are　two　sorts　of　sound　　the
  one　vulgar；　or　that　which　is　heard；　the　other　philosophical　and
  real？
  。　Even　so。
  。　And　the　latter　consists　in　motion？
  。　I　told　you　so　before。
  。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　to　which　of　the　senses；　think　you；
  the　idea　of　motion　belongs？　to　the　hearing？
  。　No；　certainly；　but　to　the　sight　and　touch。
  。　It　should　follow　then；　that；　according　to　you；　real
  sounds　may　possibly　be　；　but　never　。
  。　Look　you；　Philonous；　you　may；　if　you　please；　make　a
  jest　of　my　opinion；　but　that　will　not　alter　the　truth　of　things。
  I　own；　indeed；　the　inferences　you　draw　me　into　sound　something
  oddly；　but　common　language；　you　know；　is　framed　by；　and　for　the
  use　of　the　vulgar：　we　must　not　therefore　wonder　if　expressions