part　of　the　sky　red；　and　another　blue；　and　that　my　reason　doth
  thence　evidently　conclude　there　must　be　some　cause　of　that
  diversity　of　colours；　yet　that　cause　cannot　be　said　to　be　a
  sensible　thing；　or　perceived　by　the　sense　of　seeing？
  。　It　doth。
  。　In　like　manner；　though　I　hear　variety　of　sounds；　yet
  I　cannot　be　said　to　hear　the　causes　of　those　sounds？
  。　You　cannot。
  。　And　when　by　my　touch　I　perceive　a　thing　to　be　hot
  and　heavy；　I　cannot　say；　with　any　truth　or　propriety；　that　I　feel
  the　cause　of　its　heat　or　weight？
  。　To　prevent　any　more　questions　of　this　kind；　I　tell
  you　once　for　all；　that　by　　I　mean　those　only
  which　are　perceived　by　sense；　and　that　in　truth　the　senses
  perceive　nothing　which　they　do　not　perceive　：　for
  they　make　no　｛175｝　inferences。　The　deducing　therefore　of　causes
  or　occasions　from　effects　and　appearances；　which　alone　are
  perceived　by　sense；　entirely　relates　to　reason。
  。　This　point　then　is　agreed　between　us　　That
  。　You　will　farther　inform　me；　whether　we　immediately
  perceive　by　sight　anything　beside　light；　and　colours；　and
  figures；　or　by　hearing；　anything　but　sounds；　by　the　palate；
  anything　beside　tastes；　by　the　smell；　beside　odours；　or　by　the
  touch；　more　than　tangible　qualities。
  。　We　do　not。
  。　It　seems；　therefore；　that　if　you　take　away　all
  sensible　qualities；　there　remains　nothing　sensible？
  。　I　grant　it。
  。　Sensible　things　therefore　are　｛250｝　nothing　else　but
  so　many　sensible　qualities；　or　combinations　of　sensible
  qualities？
  。　Nothing　else。
  。　　then　is　a　sensible　thing？
  。　Certainly。
  。　Doth　the　　of　sensible　things　consist　in
  being　perceived？　or；　is　it　something　distinct　from　their　being
  perceived；　and　that　bears　no　relation　to　the　mind？
  。　To　　is　one　thing；　and　to　be　　is
  another。
  。　I　speak　with　regard　to　sensible　things　only。　And　of
  these　I　ask；　whether　by　their　real　existence　you　mean　a
  subsistence　exterior　to　the　mind；　and　distinct　from　their　being
  perceived？
  。　I　mean　a　real　absolute　being；　distinct　from；　and
  without　any　relation　to；　their　being　perceived。
  。　Heat　therefore；　if　it　be　allowed　a　real　being；　must
  exist　without　the　mind？
  。　It　must。
  。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　is　this　real　existence　equally
  compatible　to　all　degrees　of　heat；　which　we　perceive；　or　is　there
  any　reason　why　we　should　attribute　it　to　some；　and　deny　it　to
  others？　And　if　there　be；　pray　let　me　know　that　reason。
  。　Whatever　degree　of　heat　we　perceive　by　sense；　we　may
  be　sure　the　same　exists　in　the　object　that　occasions　it。
  。　What！　the　greatest　as　well　as　the　least？
  。　　tell　you；　the　reason　is　plainly　the　same　in
  respect　of　both。　They　are　both　perceived　by　sense；　nay；　the
  greater　degree　of　heat　is　more　sensibly　perceived；　and
  consequently；　if　there　is　｛176｝　any　difference；　we　are　more
  certain　of　its　real　existence　than　we　can　be　of　the　reality　of　a
  lesser　degree。
  。　But　is　not　the　most　vehement　and　intense　degree　of
  heat　a　very　great　pain？
  。　No　one　can　deny　it。
  。　And　is　any　unperceiving　thing　capable　of　pain　or
  pleasure？
  。　No；　certainly。
  。　Is　your　material　substance　a　senseless　being；　or　a
  being　endowed　with　sense　and　perception？
  。　It　is　senseless　without　doubt。
  。　It　cannot　therefore　be　the　subject　of　pain？
  。　By　no　means。
  。　Nor　consequently　of　the　greatest　heat　perceived　by
  sense；　since　you　acknowledge　this　to　be　no　small　pain？
  。　I　grant　it。
  。　What　shall　we　say　then　of　your　external　object；　is
  it　a　material　Substance；　or　no？
  。　It　is　a　material　substance　with　the　sensible
  qualities　inhering　in　it。
  。　How　then　can　a　great　heat　exist　in　it；　since　you　own
  it　cannot　in　a　material　substance？　I　desire　you　would　clear　this
  point。
  。　Hold；　Philonous；　I　fear　I　was　out　in　yielding　intense
  heat　to　be　a　pain。　It　should　seem　rather；　that　pain　is　something
  distinct　from　heat；　and　the　consequence　or　effect　of　it。
  。　Upon　putting　your　hand　near　the　fire；　do　you
  perceive　one　simple　uniform　sensation；　or　two　distinct
  sensations？
  。　But　one　simple　sensation。
  。　Is　not　the　heat　immediately　perceived？；
  。　It　is。
  。　And　the　pain？
  。　True。
  。　Seeing　therefore　they　are　both　immediately　perceived
  at　the　same　time；　and　the　fire　affects　you　only　with　one　simple
  or　uncompounded　idea；　it　follows　that　this　same　simple　idea　is
  both　the　intense　heat　immediately　perceived；　and　the　pain；　and；
  consequently；　that　the　intense　heat　immediately　perceived　is
  nothing　distinct　from　a　particular　sort　of　pain。
  。　It　seems　so。
  。　Again；　try　in　your　thoughts；　Hylas；　if　you　can
  conceive　a　vehement　sensation　to　be　without　pain　or　pleasure。
  ｛177｝
  。　I　cannot。
  。　Or　can　you　frame　to　yourself　an　idea　of　sensible
  pain　or　pleasure　in　general；　abstracted　from　every　particular
  idea　of　heat；　cold；　tastes；　smells？　&c。
  。　I　do　not　find　that　I　can。
  。　Doth　it　not　therefore　follow；　that　sensible　pain　is
  nothing　distinct　from　those　sensations　or　ideas；　in　an　intense
  degree？
  。　It　is　undeniable；　and；　to　speak　the　truth；　I　begin　to
  suspect　a　very　great　heat　cannot　exist　but　in　a　mind　perceiving
  it。
  。　What！　are　you　then　in　that　sceptical　state　of
  suspense；　between　affirming　and　denying？
  。　I　think　I　may　be　positive　in　the　point。　A　very
  violent　and　painful　heat　cannot　exist　without　the　mind。
  。　It　hath　not　therefore　according　to　you；　any
  being？
  。　I　own　it。
  。　Is　it　therefore　certain；　that　there　is　no　body　in
  nature　really　hot？
  。　I　have　not　denied　there　is　any　real　heat　in　bodies。　I
  only　say；　there　is　no　such　thing　as　an　intense　real　heat。
  。　But；　did　you　not　say　before　that　all　degrees　of　heat
  were　equally　real；　or；　if　there　was　any　difference；　that　the
  greater　were　more　undoubtedly　real　than　the　lesser？
  。　True：　but　it　was　because　I　did　not　then　consider　the
  ground　there　is　for　distinguishing　between　them；　which　I　now
  plainly　see。　And　it　is　this：　because　intense　heat　is　nothing　else
  but　a　particular　kind　of　painful　sensation；　and　pain　cannot　exist
  but　in　a　perceiving　being；　it　follows　that　no　intense　heat　can
  really　exist　in　an　unperceiving　corporeal　substance。　But　this　is
  no　reason　wh'　we　should　deny　heat　in　an　inferior　degree　to　exist
  in　such　a　substance。
  。　But　how　shall　we　be　able　to　discern　those　degrees　of
  heat　which　exist　only　in　the　mind　from　those　which　exist　without
  it？
  。　That　is　no　difficult　matter。　You　know　the　least　pain
  cannot　exist　unperceived；　whatever；　therefore；　degree　of　heat　is
  a　pain　exists　only　in　the　mind。　But；　as　for　all　other　degrees　of
  heat；　nothing　obliges　us　to　think　the　same　of　them。
  。　I　think　you　granted　before　that　no　unperceiving
  being　was　capable　of　pleasure；　any　more　than　of　pain。
  。　I　did。　｛178｝
  。　And　is　not　warmth；　or　a　more　gentle　degree　of　heat
  than　what　causes　uneasiness；　a　pleasure？
  。　What　then？
  。　Consequently；　it　cannot　exist　without　the　mind　in　an
  unperceiving　substance；　or　body。
  。　So　it　seems。
  。　Since；　therefore；　as　well　those　degrees　of　heat　that
  are　not　painful；　as　those　that　are；　can　exist　only　in　a　thinking
  substance；　may　we　not　conclude　that　external　bodies　are
  absolutely　incapable　of　any　degree　of　heat　whatsoever？
  。　On　second　thoughts；　I　do　not　think　it　so　evident　that
  warmth　is　a　pleasure　as　that　a　great　degree　of　heat　is　a　pain。
  。　　do　not　pretend　that　warmth　is　as　great　a
  pleasure　as　heat　is　a　pain。　But；　if　you　grant　it　to　be　even　a
  small　pleasure；　it　serves　to　make　good　my　conclusion。
  。　I　could　rather　call　it　an　。　It　seems　to　be
  nothing　more　than　a　privation　of　both　pain　and　pleasure。　And　that
  such　a　quality　or　state　as　this　may　agree　to　an　unthinking
  substance；　I　hope　you　will　not　deny。
  。　If　you　are　resolved　to　maintain　that　warmth；　or　a
  gentle　degree　of　heat；　is　no　pleasure；　I　know　not　how　to　convince
  you　otherwise　than　by　appealing　to　your　own　sense。　But　what　think
  you　of　cold？
  。　The　same　that　I　do　of　heat。　An　intense　degree　of　cold
  is　a　pain；　for　to　feel　a　very　great　cold；　is　to　perceive　a　great
  uneasiness：　it　cannot　therefore　exist　without　the　mind；　but　a
  lesser　degree　of　cold　may；　as　well　as　a　lesser　degree　of　heat。
  。　Those　bodies；　therefore；　upon　whose　application　to
  our　own；　we　perceive　a　moderate　degree　of　heat；　must　be　concluded
  to　have　a　moderate　degree　of　heat　or　warmth　in　them；　and　those；
  upon　whose　application　we　feel　a　like　degree　of　cold；　must　be
  thoug