Three　Dialogues　Between　Hylas　and　Philonous
  George　Berkeley
  1713
  THREE　DIALOGUES
  Between
  HYLAS　AND　PHILONOUS
  The　Design　of　which　is　Plainly　to　Demonstrate　the　Reality　and
  Perfection　of
  HUMAN　KNOWLEDGE
  The　Incorporeal　Nature　of　the
  SOUL
  And　the　Immediate　Providence　of　a
  DEITY
  In　Opposition　to
  SCEPTICS　AND　ATHEISTS
  Also　to　Open　a　Method　for　Rendering　the　Sciences　More　Easy；
  Useful；　and　Compendious
  THE　FIRST　DIALOGUE
  。　Good　morrow；　Hylas：　I　did　not　expect　to　find
  you　abroad　so　early。
  。　It　is　indeed　something　unusual；　but　my　thoughts
  were　so　taken　up　with　a　subject　I　was　discoursing　of　last　night；
  that　finding　I　could　not　sleep；　I　resolved　to　rise　and　take　a
  turn　in　the　garden。
  。　It　happened　well；　to　let　you　see　what　innocent　and
  agreeable　pleasures　you　lose　every　morning。　Can　there　be　a
  pleasanter　time　of　the　day；　or　a　more　delightful　season　of　the
  year？　That　purple　sky；　those　wild　but　sweet　notes　of　birds；　the
  fragrant　bloom　upon　the　trees　and　flowers；　the　gentle　influence
  of　the　rising　sun；　these　and　a　thousand　nameless　beauties　of
  nature　inspire　the　soul　with　secret　transports；　its　faculties　too
  being　at　this　time　fresh　and　lively；　are　fit　for　those
  meditations；　which　the　solitude　of　a　garden　and　tranquillity　of
  the　morning　naturally　dispose　us　to。　But　I　am　afraid　I　interrupt
  your　thoughts：　for　you　seemed　very　intent　on　something。
  。　It　is　true；　I　was；　and　shall　be　obliged　to　you　if　you
  will　permit　me　to　go　on　in　the　same　vein；　not　that　I　would　by　any
  means　deprive　myself　of　your　company；　for　my　thoughts　always　flow
  more　easily　in　conversation　with　a　friend；　than　when　I　am　alone：
  but　my　request　is；　that　you　would　suffer　me　to　impart　my
  reflexions　to　you。
  。　With　all　my　heart；　it　is　what　I　should　have
  requested　myself　if　you　had　not　prevented　me。
  。　I　was　considering　the　odd　fate　of　those　men　who　have
  in　all　ages；　through　an　affectation　of　being　distinguished　from
  the　vulgar；　or　some　unaccountable　turn　of　thought；　pretended
  either　to　believe　nothing　at　all；　or　to　believe　the　most
  extravagant　things　in　the　world。　This　however　might　be　borne；　if
  their　paradoxes　and　scepticism　did　not　draw　after　them　some
  consequences　of　general　disadvantage　to　mankind。　But　the　mischief
  lieth　｛172｝　here；　that　when　men　of　less　leisure　see　them　who　are
  supposed　to　have　spent　their　whole　time　in　the　pursuits　of
  knowledge　professing　an　entire　ignorance　of　all　things；　or
  advancing　such　notions　as　are　repugnant　to　plain　and　commonly
  received　principles；　they　will　be　tempted　to　entertain　suspicions
  concerning　the　most　important　truths；　which　they　had　hitherto
  held　sacred　and　unquestionable。
  。　I　entirely　agree　with　you；　as　to　the　ill　tendency　of
  the　affected　doubts　of　some　philosophers；　and　fantastical
  conceits　of　others。　I　am　even　so　far　gone　of　late　in　this　way　of
  thinking；　that　I　have　quitted　several　of　the　sublime　notions　I
  had　got　in　their　schools　for　vulgar　opinions。　And　I　give　it　you
  on　my　word；　since　this　revolt　from　metaphysical　notions　to　the
  plain　dictates　of　nature　and　common　sense；　I　find　my
  understanding　strangely　enlightened；　so　that　I　can　now　easily
  comprehend　a　great　many　things　which　before　were　all　mystery　and
  riddle。
  。　I　am　glad　to　find　there　was　nothing　in　the　accounts　I
  heard　of　you。
  。　Pray；　what　were　those？
  。　You　were　represented；　in　last　night's　conversation；
  as　one　who　maintained　the　most　extravagant　opinion　that　ever
  entered　into　the　mind　of　man；　to　wit；　that　there　is　no　such　thing
  as　　in　the　world。
  。　That　there　is　no　such　thing　as　what　；　I　am　seriously　persuaded：　but；　if　I
  were　made　to　see　anything　absurd　or　sceptical　in　this；　I　should
  then　have　the　same　reason　to　renounce　this　that　I　imagine　I　have
  now　to　reject　the　contrary　opinion。
  。　What　I　can　anything　be　more　fantastical；　more
  repugnant　to　Common　Sense；　or　a　more　manifest　piece　of
  Scepticism；　than　to　believe　there　is　no　such　thing　as　？
  。　Softly；　good　Hylas。　What　if　it　should　prove　that
  you；　who　hold　there　is；　are；　by　virtue　of　that　opinion；　a　greater
  sceptic；　and　maintain　more　paradoxes　and　repugnances　to　Common
  Sense；　than　I　who　believe　no　such　thing？
  。　You　may　as　soon　persuade　me；　the　part　is　greater　than
  the　whole；　as　that；　in　order　to　avoid　absurdity　and　Scepticism；　I
  should　ever　be　obliged　to　give　up　my　opinion　in　this　point。
  。　Well　then；　are　you　content　to　admit　that　opinion　for
  true；　which　upon　examination　shall　appear　most　agreeable　to
  Common　Sense；　and　remote　from　Scepticism？
  。　With　all　my　heart。　Since　you　are　for　raising　disputes
  ｛173｝　about　the　plainest　things　in　nature；　I　am　content　for　once
  to　hear　what　you　have　to　say。
  。　Pray；　Hylas；　what　do　you　mean　by　a　？
  。　I　mean　what　all　men　mean　　one　that　doubts　of
  everything。
  。　He　then　who　entertains　no　doubts　concerning　some
  particular　point；　with　regard　to　that　point　cannot　be　thought　a
  sceptic。
  。　I　agree　with　you。
  。　Whether　doth　doubting　consist　in　embracing　the
  affirmative　or　negative　side　of　a　question？
  。　In　neither；　for　whoever　understands　English　cannot
  but　know　that　　signifies　a　suspense　between　both。
  。　He　then　that　denies　any　point；　can　no　more　be　said
  to　doubt　of　it；　than　he　who　affirmeth　it　with　the　same　degree　of
  assurance。
  。　True。
  。　And；　consequently；　for　such　his　denial　is　no　more　to
  be　esteemed　a　sceptic　than　the　other。
  。　I　acknowledge　it。
  。　How　cometh　it　to　pass　then；　Hylas；　that　you
  pronounce　me　；　because　I　deny　what　you　affirm；　to　wit；
  the　existence　of　Matter？　Since；　for　aught　you　can　tell；　I　am　as
  peremptory　in　my　denial；　as　you　in　your　affirmation。
  。　Hold；　Philonous；　I　have　been　a　little　out　in　my
  definition；　but　every　false　step　a　man　makes　in　discourse　is　not
  to　be　insisted　on。　I　said　indeed　that　a　　was　one　who
  doubted　of　everything；　but　I　should　have　added；　or　who　denies　the
  reality　and　truth　of　things。
  。　What　things？　Do　you　mean　the　principles　and　theorems
  of　sciences？　But　these　you　know　are　universal　intellectual
  notions；　and　consequently　independent　of　Matter。　The　denial
  therefore　of　this　doth　not　imply　the　denying　them。
  。　I　grant　it。　But　are　there　no　other　things？　What　think
  you　of　distrusting　the　senses；　of　denying　the　real　existence　of
  sensible　things；　or　pretending　to　know　nothing　of　them。　Is　not
  this　sufficient　to　denominate　a　man　a　？
  。　Shall　we　therefore　examine　which　of　us　it　is　that
  denies　the　reality　of　sensible　things；　or　professes　the　greatest
  ignorance　of　them；　since；　if　I　take　you　rightly；　he　is　to　be
  ｛174｝　esteemed　the　greatest　？
  。　That　is　what　I　desire。
  。　What　mean　you　by　Sensible　Things？
  。　Those　things　which　are　perceived　by　the　senses。　Can
  you　imagine　that　I　mean　anything　else？
  。　Pardon　me；　Hylas；　if　I　am　desirous　clearly　to
  apprehend　your　notions；　since　this　may　much　shorten　our　inquiry。
  Suffer　me　then　to　ask　you　this　farther　question。　Are　those　things
  only　perceived　by　the　senses　which　are　perceived　immediately？　Or；
  may　those　things　properly　be　said　to　be　　which　are
  perceived　mediately；　or　not　without　the　intervention　of　others？
  。　I　do　not　sufficiently　understand　you。
  。　In　reading　a　book；　what　I　immediately　perceive　are
  the　letters；　but　mediately；　or　by　means　of　these；　are　suggested
  to　my　mind　the　notions　of　God；　virtue；　truth；　&c。　Now；　that　the
  letters　are　truly　sensible　things；　or　perceived　by　sense；　there
  is　no　doubt：　but　I　would　know　whether　you　take　the　things
  suggested　by　them　to　be　so　too。
  。　No；　certainly：　it　were　absurd　to　think　　or
  sensible　things；　though　they　may　be　signified　and
  suggested　to　the　mind　by　sensible　marks；　with　which　they　have　an
  arbitrary　connexion。
  。　It　seems　then；　that　by　　you　mean
  those　only　which　can　be　perceived　　by　sense？
  。　Right。
  。　Doth　it　not　follow　from　this；　that　though　I　see　one
  part　of　the　sky　red；　and　another　blue；　an