He　granted　that　proposition　also。
  But　when　I　describe　something　and　you　describe　another　thing；　or　I　say　something　and　you　say　nothingis　there　any　contradiction？　　How　can　he　who　speaks　contradict　him　who　speaks　not？
  Here　Ctesippus　was　silent；　and　I　in　my　astonishment　said：　　What　do　you　mean；　Dionysodorus？　　I　have　often　heard；　and　have　been　amazed　to　hear；　this　thesis　of　yours；　which　is　maintained　and　employed　by　the　disciples　of　Protagoras；　and　others　before　them；　and　which　to　me　appears　to　be　quite　wonderful；　and　suicidal　as　well　as　destructive；　and　I　think　that　I　am　most　likely　to　hear　the　truth　about　it　from　you。　　The　dictum　is　that　there　is　no　such　thing　as　falsehood；　a　man　must　either　say　what　is　true　or　say　nothing。　　Is　not　that　your　position？
  He　assented。
  But　if　he　cannot　speak　falsely；　may　he　not　think　falsely？
  No；　he　cannot；　he　said。
  Then　there　is　no　such　thing　as　false　opinion？
  No；　he　said。
  Then　there　is　no　such　thing　as　ignorance；　or　men　who　are　ignorant；　for　is　not　ignorance；　if　there　be　such　a　thing；　a　mistake　of　fact？
  Certainly；　he　said。
  And　that　is　impossible？
  Impossible；　he　replied。
  Are　you　saying　this　as　a　paradox；　Dionysodorus；　or　do　you　seriously　maintain　no　man　to　be　ignorant？
  Refute　me；　he　said。
  But　how　can　I　refute　you；　if；　as　you　say；　to　tell　a　falsehood　is　impossible？
  Very　true；　said　Euthydemus。
  Neither　did　I　tell　you　just　now　to　refute　me；　said　Dionysodorus；　for　how　can　I　tell　you　to　do　that　which　is　not？
  O　Euthydemus；　I　said；　I　have　but　a　dull　conception　of　these　subtleties　and　excellent　devices　of　wisdom；　I　am　afraid　that　I　hardly　understand　them；　and　you　must　forgive　me　therefore　if　I　ask　a　very　stupid　question：　　if　there　be　no　falsehood　or　false　opinion　or　ignorance；　there　can　be　no　such　thing　as　erroneous　action；　for　a　man　cannot　fail　of　acting　as　he　is　actingthat　is　what　you　mean？
  Yes；　he　replied。
  And　now；　I　said；　I　will　ask　my　stupid　question：　　If　there　is　no　such　thing　as　error　in　deed；　word；　or　thought；　then　what；　in　the　name　of　goodness；　do　you　come　hither　to　teach？　　And　were　you　not　just　now　saying　that　you　could　teach　virtue　best　of　all　men；　to　any　one　who　was　willing　to　learn？
  And　are　you　such　an　old　fool；　Socrates；　rejoined　Dionysodorus；　that　you　bring　up　now　what　I　said　at　firstand　if　I　had　said　anything　last　year；　I　suppose　that　you　would　bring　that　up　toobut　are　non…plussed　at　the　words　which　I　have　just　uttered？
  Why；　I　said；　they　are　not　easy　to　answer；　for　they　are　the　words　of　wise　men：　　and　indeed　I　know　not　what　to　make　of　this　word　'nonplussed；'　which　you　used　last：　　what　do　you　mean　by　it；　Dionysodorus？　　You　must　mean　that　I　cannot　refute　your　argument。　　Tell　me　if　the　words　have　any　other　sense。
  No；　he　replied；　they　mean　what　you　say。　　And　now　answer。
  What；　before　you；　Dionysodorus？　I　said。
  Answer；　said　he。
  And　is　that　fair？
  Yes；　quite　fair；　he　said。
  Upon　what　principle？　I　said。　　I　can　only　suppose　that　you　are　a　very　wise　man　who　comes　to　us　in　the　character　of　a　great　logician；　and　who　knows　when　to　answer　and　when　not　to　answerand　now　you　will　not　open　your　mouth　at　all；　because　you　know　that　you　ought　not。
  You　prate；　he　said；　instead　of　answering。　　But　if；　my　good　sir；　you　admit　that　I　am　wise；　answer　as　I　tell　you。
  I　suppose　that　I　must　obey；　for　you　are　master。　　Put　the　question。
  Are　the　things　which　have　sense　alive　or　lifeless？
  They　are　alive。
  And　do　you　know　of　any　word　which　is　alive？
  I　cannot　say　that　I　do。
  Then　why　did　you　ask　me　what　sense　my　words　had？
  Why；　because　I　was　stupid　and　made　a　mistake。　　And　yet；　perhaps；　I　was　right　after　all　in　saying　that　words　have　a　sense；what　do　you　say；　wise　man？　　If　I　was　not　in　error；　even　you　will　not　refute　me；　and　all　your　wisdom　will　be　non…plussed；　but　if　I　did　fall　into　error；　then　again　you　are　wrong　in　saying　that　there　is　no　error；and　this　remark　was　made　by　you　not　quite　a　year　ago。　　I　am　inclined　to　think；　however；　Dionysodorus　and　Euthydemus；　that　this　argument　lies　where　it　was　and　is　not　very　likely　to　advance：　　even　your　skill　in　the　subtleties　of　logic；　which　is　really　amazing；　has　not　found　out　the　way　of　throwing　another　and　not　falling　yourself；　now　any　more　than　of　old。
  Ctesippus　said：　　Men　of　Chios；　Thurii；　or　however　and　whatever　you　call　yourselves；　I　wonder　at　you；　for　you　seem　to　have　no　objection　to　talking　nonsense。
  Fearing　that　there　would　be　high　words；　I　again　endeavoured　to　soothe　Ctesippus；　and　said　to　him：　　To　you；　Ctesippus；　I　must　repeat　what　I　said　before　to　Cleiniasthat　you　do　not　understand　the　ways　of　these　philosophers　from　abroad。　　They　are　not　serious；　but；　like　the　Egyptian　wizard；　Proteus；　they　take　different　forms　and　deceive　us　by　their　enchantments：　　and　let　us；　like　Menelaus；　refuse　to　let　them　go　until　they　show　themselves　to　us　in　earnest。　　When　they　begin　to　be　in　earnest　their　full　beauty　will　appear：　　let　us　then　beg　and　entreat　and　beseech　them　to　shine　forth。　　And　I　think　that　I　had　better　once　more　exhibit　the　form　in　which　I　pray　to　behold　them；　it　might　be　a　guide　to　them。　　I　will　go　on　therefore　where　I　left　off；　as　well　as　I　can；　in　the　hope　that　I　may　touch　their　hearts　and　move　them　to　pity；　and　that　when　they　see　me　deeply　serious　and　interested；　they　also　may　be　serious。　　You；　Cleinias；　I　said；　shall　remind　me　at　what　point　we　left　off。　　Did　we　not　agree　that　philosophy　should　be　studied？　and　was　not　that　our　conclusion？
  Yes；　he　replied。
  And　philosophy　is　the　acquisition　of　knowledge？
  Yes；　he　said。
  And　what　knowledge　ought　we　to　acquire？　　May　we　not　answer　with　absolute　truthA　knowledge　which　will　do　us　good？
  Certainly；　he　said。
  And　should　we　be　any　the　better　if　we　went　about　having　a　knowledge　of　the　places　where　most　gold　was　hidden　in　the　earth？
  Perhaps　we　should；　he　said。
  But　have　we　not　already　proved；　I　said；　that　we　should　be　none　the　better　off；　even　if　without　trouble　and　digging　all　the　gold　which　there　is　in　the　earth　were　ours？　　And　if　we　knew　how　to　convert　stones　into　gold；　the　knowledge　would　be　of　no　value　to　us；　unless　we　also　knew　how　to　use　the　gold？　　Do　you　not　remember？　I　said。
  I　quite　remember；　he　said。
  Nor　would　any　other　knowledge；　whether　of　money…making；　or　of　medicine；　or　of　any　other　art　which　knows　only　how　to　make　a　thing；　and　not　to　use　it　when　made；　be　of　any　good　to　us。　　Am　I　not　right？
  He　agreed。
  And　if　there　were　a　knowledge　which　was　able　to　make　men　immortal；　without　giving　them　the　knowledge　of　the　way　to　use　the　immortality；　neither　would　there　be　any　use　in　that；　if　we　may　argue　from　the　analogy　of　the　previous　instances？
  To　all　this　he　agreed。
  Then；　my　dear　boy；　I　said；　the　knowledge　which　we　want　is　one　that　uses　as　well　as　makes？
  True；　he　said。
  And　our　desire　is　not　to　be　skilful　lyre…makers；　or　artists　of　that　sort　far　otherwise；　for　with　them　the　art　which　makes　is　one；　and　the　art　which　uses　is　another。　　Although　they　have　to　do　with　the　same；　they　are　divided：　　for　the　art　which　makes　and　the　art　which　plays　on　the　lyre　differ　widely　from　one　another。　　Am　I　not　right？
  He　agreed。
  And　clearly　we　do　not　want　the　art　of　the　flute…maker；　this　is　only　another　of　the　same　sort？
  He　assented。
  But　suppose；　I　said；　that　we　were　to　learn　the　art　of　making　speeches　would　that　be　the　art　which　would　make　us　happy？
  I　should　say；　no；　rejoined　Cleinias。
  And　why　should　you　say　so？　I　asked。
  I　see；　he　replied；　that　there　are　some　composers　of　speeches　who　do　not　know　how　to　use　the　speeches　which　they　make；　just　as　the　makers　of　lyres　do　not　know　how　to　use　the　lyres；　and　also　some　who　are　of　themselves　unable　to　compose　speeches；　but　are　able　to　use　the　speeches　which　the　others　make　for　them；　and　this　proves　that　the　art　of　making　speeches　is　not　the　same　as　the　art　of　using　them。
  Yes；　I　said；　and　I　take　your　words　to　be　a　sufficient　proof　that　the　art　of　making　speeches　is　not　one　which　will　make　a　man　happy。　　And　yet　I　did　think　that　the　art　which　we　have　so　long　been　seeking　might　be　discovered　in　that　direction；　for　the　composers　of　speeches；　whenever　I　meet　them；　always　appear　to　me　to　be　very　extraordinary　men；　Cleinias；　and　their　art　is　lofty　and　divine；　and　no　wonder。　　For　their　art　is　a　part　of　the　great　art　of　enchantment；　and　hardly；　if　at　all；　inferior　to　it：　　and　whereas　the　art　of　the　enchanter　is　a　mode　of　charming　snakes　and　spiders　and　scorpions；　and　other　monsters　and　pests；　this　art　of　their's　acts　upon　dicasts　and　ecclesiasts　and　bodies　of　men；　for　the　charming　and　pacifying　of　them。　　Do　you　agree　with　me？
  Yes；　he　said；　I　think　that　you　are　quite　right。
  Whither　then　shall　we　go；　I　said；　and　to　what　art　shall　we　have　recourse？
  I　do　not　see　my　way；　he　said。
  But　I　think　that　I　do；　I　replied。
  And　what　is　your　notion？　asked　Cleinias。
  I　think　that　the　art　of　the　general　is　above　all　others　the　one　of　which　the　possession　is　most　likely　to　make　a　man　happy。
  I　do　not　think　so；　he　said。
  Why　not？　I　said。
  The　art　of　the　general　is　surely　an　art　of　hunting　mankind。
  What　of　that？　I　said。
  Why；　he　said；　no　art　of　hunting　extends　beyond　hunting　and　capturing；　and　when　the　prey　is　taken　the　huntsman　or　fisherman　cannot　use　it；　but