emen　are　not　serious；　but　are　only　playing　with　you。　　For　if　a　man　had　all　that　sort　of　knowledge　that　ever　was；　he　would　not　be　at　all　the　wiser；　he　would　only　be　able　to　play　with　men；　tripping　them　up　and　oversetting　them　with　distinctions　of　words。　　He　would　be　like　a　person　who　pulls　away　a　stool　from　some　one　when　he　is　about　to　sit　down；　and　then　laughs　and　makes　merry　at　the　sight　of　his　friend　overturned　and　laid　on　his　back。　　And　you　must　regard　all　that　has　hitherto　passed　between　you　and　them　as　merely　play。　　But　in　what　is　to　follow　I　am　certain　that　they　will　exhibit　to　you　their　serious　purpose；　and　keep　their　promise　（I　will　show　them　how）；　for　they　promised　to　give　me　a　sample　of　the　hortatory　philosophy；　but　I　suppose　that　they　wanted　to　have　a　game　with　you　first。　　And　now；　Euthydemus　and　Dionysodorus；　I　think　that　we　have　had　enough　of　this。　　Will　you　let　me　see　you　explaining　to　the　young　man　how　he　is　to　apply　himself　to　the　study　of　virtue　and　wisdom？　　And　I　will　first　show　you　what　I　conceive　to　be　the　nature　of　the　task；　and　what　sort　of　a　discourse　I　desire　to　hear；　and　if　I　do　this　in　a　very　inartistic　and　ridiculous　manner；　do　not　laugh　at　me；　for　I　only　venture　to　improvise　before　you　because　I　am　eager　to　hear　your　wisdom：　　and　I　must　therefore　ask　you　and　your　disciples　to　refrain　from　laughing。　　And　now；　O　son　of　Axiochus；　let　me　put　a　question　to　you：　　Do　not　all　men　desire　happiness？　　And　yet；　perhaps；　this　is　one　of　those　ridiculous　questions　which　I　am　afraid　to　ask；　and　which　ought　not　to　be　asked　by　a　sensible　man：　　for　what　human　being　is　there　who　does　not　desire　happiness？
  There　is　no　one；　said　Cleinias；　who　does　not。
  Well；　then；　I　said；　since　we　all　of　us　desire　happiness；　how　can　we　be　happy？that　is　the　next　question。　　Shall　we　not　be　happy　if　we　have　many　good　things？　　And　this；　perhaps；　is　even　a　more　simple　question　than　the　first；　for　there　can　be　no　doubt　of　the　answer。
  He　assented。
  And　what　things　do　we　esteem　good？　　No　solemn　sage　is　required　to　tell　us　this；　which　may　be　easily　answered；　for　every　one　will　say　that　wealth　is　a　good。
  Certainly；　he　said。
  And　are　not　health　and　beauty　goods；　and　other　personal　gifts？
  He　agreed。
  Can　there　be　any　doubt　that　good　birth；　and　power；　and　honours　in　one's　own　land；　are　goods？
  He　assented。
  And　what　other　goods　are　there？　I　said。　　What　do　you　say　of　temperance；　justice；　courage：　　do　you　not　verily　and　indeed　think；　Cleinias；　that　we　shall　be　more　right　in　ranking　them　as　goods　than　in　not　ranking　them　as　goods？　　For　a　dispute　might　possibly　arise　about　this。　　What　then　do　you　say？
  They　are　goods；　said　Cleinias。
  Very　well；　I　said；　and　where　in　the　company　shall　we　find　a　place　for　wisdomamong　the　goods　or　not？
  Among　the　goods。
  And　now；　I　said；　think　whether　we　have　left　out　any　considerable　goods。
  I　do　not　think　that　we　have；　said　Cleinias。
  Upon　recollection；　I　said；　indeed　I　am　afraid　that　we　have　left　out　the　greatest　of　them　all。
  What　is　that？　he　asked。
  Fortune；　Cleinias；　I　replied；　which　all；　even　the　most　foolish；　admit　to　be　the　greatest　of　goods。
  True；　he　said。
  On　second　thoughts；　I　added；　how　narrowly；　O　son　of　Axiochus；　have　you　and　I　escaped　making　a　laughing…stock　of　ourselves　to　the　strangers。
  Why　do　you　say　so？
  Why；　because　we　have　already　spoken　of　good…fortune；　and　are　but　repeating　ourselves。
  What　do　you　mean？
  I　mean　that　there　is　something　ridiculous　in　again　putting　forward　good…　fortune；　which　has　a　place　in　the　list　already；　and　saying　the　same　thing　twice　over。
  He　asked　what　was　the　meaning　of　this；　and　I　replied：　　Surely　wisdom　is　good…fortune；　even　a　child　may　know　that。
  The　simple…minded　youth　was　amazed；　and；　observing　his　surprise；　I　said　to　him：　　Do　you　not　know；　Cleinias；　that　flute…players　are　most　fortunate　and　successful　in　performing　on　the　flute？
  He　assented。
  And　are　not　the　scribes　most　fortunate　in　writing　and　reading　letters？
  Certainly。
  Amid　the　dangers　of　the　sea；　again；　are　any　more　fortunate　on　the　whole　than　wise　pilots？
  None；　certainly。
  And　if　you　were　engaged　in　war；　in　whose　company　would　you　rather　take　the　riskin　company　with　a　wise　general；　or　with　a　foolish　one？
  With　a　wise　one。
  And　if　you　were　ill；　whom　would　you　rather　have　as　a　companion　in　a　dangerous　illnessa　wise　physician；　or　an　ignorant　one？
  A　wise　one。
  You　think；　I　said；　that　to　act　with　a　wise　man　is　more　fortunate　than　to　act　with　an　ignorant　one？
  He　assented。
  Then　wisdom　always　makes　men　fortunate：　　for　by　wisdom　no　man　would　ever　err；　and　therefore　he　must　act　rightly　and　succeed；　or　his　wisdom　would　be　wisdom　no　longer。
  We　contrived　at　last；　somehow　or　other；　to　agree　in　a　general　conclusion；　that　he　who　had　wisdom　had　no　need　of　fortune。　　I　then　recalled　to　his　mind　the　previous　state　of　the　question。　　You　remember；　I　said；　our　making　the　admission　that　we　should　be　happy　and　fortunate　if　many　good　things　were　present　with　us？
  He　assented。
  And　should　we　be　happy　by　reason　of　the　presence　of　good　things；　if　they　profited　us　not；　or　if　they　profited　us？
  If　they　profited　us；　he　said。
  And　would　they　profit　us；　if　we　only　had　them　and　did　not　use　them？　　For　example；　if　we　had　a　great　deal　of　food　and　did　not　eat；　or　a　great　deal　of　drink　and　did　not　drink；　should　we　be　profited？
  Certainly　not；　he　said。
  Or　would　an　artisan；　who　had　all　the　implements　necessary　for　his　work；　and　did　not　use　them；　be　any　the　better　for　the　possession　of　them？　　For　example；　would　a　carpenter　be　any　the　better　for　having　all　his　tools　and　plenty　of　wood；　if　he　never　worked？
  Certainly　not；　he　said。
  And　if　a　person　had　wealth　and　all　the　goods　of　which　we　were　just　now　speaking；　and　did　not　use　them；　would　he　be　happy　because　he　possessed　them？
  No　indeed；　Socrates。
  Then；　I　said；　a　man　who　would　be　happy　must　not　only　have　the　good　things；　but　he　must　also　use　them；　there　is　no　advantage　in　merely　having　them？
  True。
  Well；　Cleinias；　but　if　you　have　the　use　as　well　as　the　possession　of　good　things；　is　that　sufficient　to　confer　happiness？
  Yes；　in　my　opinion。
  And　may　a　person　use　them　either　rightly　or　wrongly？
  He　must　use　them　rightly。
  That　is　quite　true；　I　said。　　And　the　wrong　use　of　a　thing　is　far　worse　than　the　non…use；　for　the　one　is　an　evil；　and　the　other　is　neither　a　good　nor　an　evil。　　You　admit　that？
  He　assented。
  Now　in　the　working　and　use　of　wood；　is　not　that　which　gives　the　right　use　simply　the　knowledge　of　the　carpenter？
  Nothing　else；　he　said。
  And　surely；　in　the　manufacture　of　vessels；　knowledge　is　that　which　gives　the　right　way　of　making　them？
  He　agreed。
  And　in　the　use　of　the　goods　of　which　we　spoke　at　firstwealth　and　health　and　beauty；　is　not　knowledge　that　which　directs　us　to　the　right　use　of　them；　and　regulates　our　practice　about　them？
  He　assented。
  Then　in　every　possession　and　every　use　of　a　thing；　knowledge　is　that　which　gives　a　man　not　only　good…fortune　but　success？
  He　again　assented。
  And　tell　me；　I　said；　O　tell　me；　what　do　possessions　profit　a　man；　if　he　have　neither　good　sense　nor　wisdom？　　Would　a　man　be　better　off；　having　and　doing　many　things　without　wisdom；　or　a　few　things　with　wisdom？　　Look　at　the　matter　thus：　　If　he　did　fewer　things　would　he　not　make　fewer　mistakes？　if　he　made　fewer　mistakes　would　he　not　have　fewer　misfortunes？　and　if　he　had　fewer　misfortunes　would　he　not　be　less　miserable？
  Certainly；　he　said。
  And　who　would　do　leasta　poor　man　or　a　rich　man？
  A　poor　man。
  A　weak　man　or　a　strong　man？
  A　weak　man。
  A　noble　man　or　a　mean　man？
  A　mean　man。
  And　a　coward　would　do　less　than　a　courageous　and　temperate　man？
  Yes。
  And　an　indolent　man　less　than　an　active　man？
  He　assented。
  And　a　slow　man　less　than　a　quick；　and　one　who　had　dull　perceptions　of　seeing　and　hearing　less　than　one　who　had　keen　ones？
  All　this　was　mutually　allowed　by　us。
  Then；　I　said；　Cleinias；　the　sum　of　the　matter　appears　to　be　that　the　goods　of　which　we　spoke　before　are　not　to　be　regarded　as　goods　in　themselves；　but　the　degree　of　good　and　evil　in　them　depends　on　whether　they　are　or　are　not　under　the　guidance　of　knowledge：　　under　the　guidance　of　ignorance；　they　are　greater　evils　than　their　opposites；　inasmuch　as　they　are　more　able　to　minister　to　the　evil　principle　which　rules　them；　and　when　under　the　guidance　of　wisdom　and　prudence；　they　are　greater　goods：　　but　in　themselves　they　are　nothing？
  That；　he　replied；　is　obvious。
  What　then　is　the　result　of　what　has　been　said？　　Is　not　this　the　result　that　other　things　are　indifferent；　and　that　wisdom　is　the　only　good；　and　ignorance　the　only　evil？
  He　assented。
  Let　us　consider　a　further　point；　I　said：　　Seeing　that　all　men　desire　happiness；　and　happiness；　as　has　been　shown；　is　gained　by　a　use；　and　a　right　use；　of　the　things　of　life；　and　the　right　use　of　them；　and　good…　fortune　in　the　use　of　them；　is　given　by　knowledge；the　inference　is　that　everybody　ought　by　all　means　to　try　and　make　himself　as　wise　as　he　can？
  Yes；　he　said。
  And　when　a　man　thinks　that　he　ought　to　obtain　this　treasure；　far　more　than　money；　from　a　father　or　a　guardian　or　a　friend　or　a　suitor；　whether　citizen　or　strangerthe　eager　desire　and