sections　of　society　in　this　way　also；　that　it　directly　connects　the　subjugated　population　with　the　hundred　court；　which　is　the　starting…point　of　free　judicial　organisation。　Twice　a　year　the　whole　of　this　population；　with　very　few　exceptions；　has　to　meet　in　the　hundred　in　order　to　verify　the　working　of　the　tithings。　Besides　this；　the　class　of　villains　must　appear　by　representatives　in　the　ordinary　tribunals　of　the　hundred　and　the　shire：　the　reeve　and　the　four　men；　mostly　unfree　men；*　with　their　important　duties　in　the　administration　of　justice；　serve　as　a　counterpoise　to　the　exclusive　employment　of　'liberi　et　legales　homines'　on　juries。　　　　　And　now　I　come　to　the　most　intricate　and　important　part　of　the　subject　　to　the　civil　rights　and　disabilities　of　the　villain。　After　what　has　been　said　of　the　villain　in　other　respects；　one　may　be　prepared　to　find　that　his　disabilities　were　by　no　means　so　complete　as　the　strict　operation　of　general　rules　would　have　required。　The　villain　was　able　in　many　cases　to　do　valid　civil　acts；　to　acquire　property　and　to　defend　it　in　his　own　name。　It　is　true　that；　both　in　theory　and　in　practice；　it　was　held　that　whatever　was　acquired　by　the　bondman　was　acquired　by　the　lord。　The　bondman　could　not　buy　anything　but　with　his　lord's　money；　as　he　had　no　money　or　chattels　of　his　own。*　But　the　working　of　these　rules　was　limited　by　the　medieval　doctrine　of　possession。　Land　or　goods　acquired　by　the　serf　do　not　eo　ipso　lapse　into　his　lord's　possession；　but　only　if　the　latter　has　taken　them　into　his　hand。*　If　the　lord　has　not　done　so　for　any　reason；　for　want　of　time；　or　carelessness；　or　because　he　did　not　choose　to　do　so；　the　bondman　is　as　good　as　the　owner　in　respect　of　third　persons。　He　can　give　away*　or　otherwise　alienate　land　or　chattels；　he　has　the　assize　of　novel　disseisin　to　defend　the　land；　and　leaves　the　assize　of　mort　d'ancestor　to　his　heirs。　In　this　case　it　would　be　no　good　plea　to　object　that　the　plaintiff　is　a　villain。　In　fact　this　objection　can　be　raised　by　a　third　person　only　with　the　addition　that；　as　villain；　the　plaintiff　does　not　hold　in　his　own　name；　but　in　the　name　of　his　lord。*　A　third　person　cannot　except　against　a　plaintiff　merely　on　the　ground　of　his　personal　status。　As　to　third　persons；　a　villain　is　said　to　be　free　and　capable　to　sue　all　actions。*　This　of　course　does　not　mean　that　he　has　any　action　for　recovering　or　defending　his　possession　of　the　tenements　which　he　holds　in　villainage；　but　this　disability　is　no　consequence　of　his　servile　blood；　for　he　shares　it　with　the　free　man　who　holds　in　villainage；　it　is　a　consequence　of　the　doctrine　that　the　possession　of　the　tenant　in　villainage　is　in　law　the　possession　of　him　who　has　the　freehold。　It　may　be　convenient　for　a　villain　as　defendant　to　shelter　himself　behind　the　authority　of　his　lord；*　and　it　was　difficult　to　prevent　him　from　doing　so；　although　some　attempts　were　made　by　the　courts　even　in　this　case　to　distinguish　whether　a　person　had　been　in　possession　as　a　dependant　or　not。　But　there　was　absolutely　nothing　to　prevent　a　villain　from　acting　in　every　respect　like　a　free　man　if　he　was　so　minded　and　was　not　interrupted　by　his　lord。　There　was　no　need　of　any　accessory　action　to　make　his　acts　complete　and　legal。*　Again　we　come　to　an　anomaly：　the　slave　is　free　against　everybody　but　his　lord。　　　　　Even　against　his　lord　the　bondman　had　some　standing　ground　for　a　civil　action。　It　has　rightly　been　maintained；　that　he　could　implead　his　master　in　consequence　of　an　agreement　with　him。　The　assertion　is　not　quite　easy　to　prove　however；　and　has　been　put　forward　too　sweepingly。*　At　first　sight　it　seems　even　that　the　old　law　books；　i。e。　those　of　Bracton　and　his　followers；　teach　the　opposite　doctrine。　They　deal　almost　exclusively　with　the　case　of　a　feoffment　made　by　the　lord　to　a　villain　and　his　heirs；　and　give　the　feoffee　an　action　only　on　the　ground　of　implied　manumission。　The　feoffor　enfranchises　his　serf　indirectly；　even　if　he　does　not　say　so　in　as　many　words；　because　he　has　spoken　of　the　feoffee's　heirs；　and　the　villain　has　no　other　heirs　besides　the　lord；*　The　action　eventually　proceeds　in　this　case；　because　it　is　brought　not　by　a　serf　but　by　a　freed　man。　One　difficult　passage　in　Bracton　points　another　way；　it　is　printed　in　a　foot…note。*　There　can　be　no　doubt；　that　in　it　Bracton　is　speaking　of　a　covenant　made　by　the　lord　not　with　a　free　man　or　a　freed　man；　but　with　a　villain。　This　comes　out　strongly　when　it　is　said；　that　the　lord；　and　not　the　villain；　has　the　assize　against　intruders；　and　when　the　author　puts　the　main　question　　is　the　feoffor　bound　to　hold　the　covenant　or　not？　The　whole　drift　of　the　quotation　can　be　understood　only　on　the　fundamental　assumption　that　we　have　lord　and　villain　before　us。　But　there　are　four　words　which　militate　against　this　obvious　explanation；　the　words　'sibi　et　heredibus　suis；'　We　know　what　their　meaning　is　　they　imply　enfranchisement　and　a　freehold　estate　of　inheritance。　They　involve　a　hopeless　contradiction　to　the　doctrine　previously　stated；　a　doctrine　which　might　be　further　supported　by　references　to　Britton；　Fleta　and　Bracton　himself。*　In　short；　if　we　accept　them；　we　can　hardly　get　out　of　confusion。　Were　our　text　of　Bracton　much　more　definitely　and　satisfactorily　settled　than　it　is；*　one　would　still　feel　tempted　to　strike　them　out；　as　it　is　we　have　a　text　studded　with　interpolations　and　errors；　and　it　seems　quite　certain　that　'sibi　et　heredibus　suis'　has　got　into　it　simply　because　the　compositor　of　Tottell's　edition　repeated　it　from　the　conclusion　of　the　sentence　immediately　preceding；　and　so　mixed　up　two　cases；　which　were　to　be　distinguished　by　this　very　qualification。　The　four　words　are　missing　in　all　the　MSS。　of　the　British　Museum；　the　Bodleian　and　the　Cambridge　University　Library；*　I　have　no　doubt　that　further　verification　will　only　confirm　my　opinion。　On　my　assumption　Bracton　clearly　distinguishes　between　two　possibilities。　In　one　case　the　deed　simply　binds　the　lord　as　to　a　particular　person；　in　the　other　it　binds　him　in　perpetuity；　and　in　this　latter　case；　as　there　ought　not　to　be　any　heirs　of　a　bondman　but　the　lord；　bondage　is　annihilated　by　the　deed。　It　is　not　annihilated　when　one　person　is　granted　a　certain　privilege　as　to　a　particular　piece　of　land；　and　in　every　other　respect　the　grantee　and　all　his　descendants　remain　unfree：*　　he　has　no　freehold；　but　he　has　a　special　covenant　to　fall　back　upon。　This　seems　to　lie　at　the　root　of　what　Bracton　calls　privileged　villainage　by　covenant　as　distinguished　from　villain　socage。*　　　　　The　reader　may　well　ask　whether　there　are　any　traces　of　such　an　institution　in　practice；　as　it　is　not　likely　that　Bracton　would　have　indulged　in　mere　theoretical　disquisitions　on　such　an　important　point。　Now　it　would　be　difficult　to　find　very　many　instances　in　point；　the　line　between　covenant　and　enfranchisement　was　so　easily　passed；　and　an　incautious　step　would　have　such　unpleasant　consequences　for　landlords；　that　they　kept　as　clear　as　possible　of　any　deeds　which　might　indirectly　destroy　their　claims　as　to　the　persons　of　their　villains。*　On　the　other　hand；　even　privileged　serfs　would　have　a　great　difficulty　in　vindicating　their　rights　on　the　basis　of　covenant　if　they　remained　at　the　same　time　under　the　sway　of　the　lord　in　general。　The　difficulties　on　both　sides　explain　why　Fleta　and　Britton　endorse　only　the　chief　point　of　Bracton's　doctrine；　namely；　the　implied　manumission；　and　do　not　put　the　alternative　as　to　a　covenant　when　heirs　are　not　mentioned。　Still　I　have　come　across　some　traces　in　legal　practice*　of　contracts　in　the　shape　of　the　one　discussed。　A　very　interesting　case　occurred　in　Norfolk　in　1227；　before　Martin　Pateshull　himself。　A　certain　Roger　of　Sufford　gave　a　piece　of　land　to　one　of　his　villains；　William　Tailor；　to　hold　freely　by　free　services；　and　when　Roger　died；　his　son　and　heir　William　of　Sufford　confirmed　the　lease。　When　it　pleased　the　lord　afterwards　to　eject　the　tenant；　this　latter　actually　brought　an　assize　of　novel　disseisin　and　recovered　possession。　Bracton's　marginal　note　to　the　case　runs　thus：　'Note；　that　the　son　of　a　villain　recovered　by　an　assize　of　novel　disseisin　a　piece　of　land　which　his　father　had　held　in　villainage；　because　the　lord　of　the　villain　by　his　charter　gave　it　to　the　son　＇i。e。　to　the　plaintiff＇；　even　without　manumission。'*　The　court　went　in　this　case　even　further　than　Bracton's　treatise　would　have　warranted：　the　villain　was　considered　as　having　the　freehold；　and　an　assize　of　novel　disseisin　was　granted；　but　although　such　a　treatment　of　the　case　was　perhaps　not　altogether　sound；　the　chief　point　on　which　the　contention　rested　is　brought　out　clearly　enough。　There　was　a　covenant；　and　in　consequence　an　action；　although　there　was　no　manumission；　and　it　is　to　this　point　that　the　marginal　note　draws　special　attention。*　　　　　Again；　we　find　in　the　beginning　of　Bracton's　treatise　a　remark*　which　is　quite　out　of　keeping　with　the　doctrine　that　the　villain　had　no　property　to　vindicate　against　his　lord；　it　is　contradicted　by　other　passages　in　the　same　book；　and　deserves　to　be　considered　the　more　carefully　on　that　account。　Our　author　is　enumerating　the　cases　in　which　the　serf　has　an　action　against　his　lord。　He　follows　Azo　closely；　and　mentions　injury　to　life　or　to　limb　as　one