But　I　am　in　the　habit　of　imagining　many　other　things　besides　this　corporeal　nature　which　is　the　object　of　pure　mathematics；　to　wit；　the　colours；　sounds；　scents；　pain；　and　other　such　things；　although　less　distinctly。　　And　inasmuch　as　I　perceive　these　things　much　better　through　the　senses；　by　the　medium　of　which；　and　by　the　memory；　they　seem　to　have　reached　my　imagination；　I　believe　that；　in　order　to　examine　them　more　conveniently；　it　is　right　that　I　should　at　the　same　time　investigate　the　nature　of　sense　perception；　and　that　I　should　see　if　from　the　ideas　which　I　apprehend　by　this　mode　of　thought；　which　I　call　feeling；　I　cannot　derive　some　certain　proof　of　the　existence　of　corporeal　objects。　　　　　　And　first　of　all　I　shall　recall　to　my　memory　those　matters　which　I　hitherto　held　to　be　true；　as　having　perceived　them　through　the　senses；　and　the　foundations　on　which　my　belief　has　rested；　in　the　next　place　I　shall　examine　the　reasons　which　have　since　obliged　me　to　place　them　in　doubt；　in　the　last　place　I　shall　consider　which　of　them　I　must　now　believe。　　　　　　First　of　all；　then；　I　perceived　that　I　had　a　head；　hands；　feet；　and　all　other　members　of　which　this　body￥which　I　considered　as　a　part；　or　possibly　even　as　the　whole；　of　myself￥is　composed。　　Further　I　was　sensible　that　this　body　was　placed　amidst　many　others；　from　which　it　was　capable　of　being　affected　in　many　different　ways；　beneficial　and　hurtful；　and　I　remarked　that　a　certain　feeling　of　pleasure　accompanied　those　that　were　beneficial；　and　pain　those　which　were　harmful。　　And　in　addition　to　this　pleasure　and　pain；　I　also　experienced　hunger；　thirst；　and　other　similar　appetites；　as　also　certain　corporeal　inclinations　towards　joy；　sadness；　anger；　and　other　similar　passions。　　And　outside　myself；　in　addition　to　extension；　figure；　and　motions　of　bodies；　I　remarked　in　them　hardness；　heat；　and　all　other　tactice　qualities；　and；　further；　light　and　colour；　and　scents　and　sounds；　the　variety　of　which　gave　me　the　means　of　distinguishing　the　sky；　the　earth；　the　sea；　and　generally　all　the　other　bodies；　one　from　the　other。　And　certainly；　considering　the　ideas　of　all　these　qualities　which　presented　themselves　to　my　mind；　and　which　alone　I　perceived　properly　or　immediately；　it　was　not　without　reason　that　I　believed　myself　to　perceive　objects　quite　different　from　my　thought；　to　wit；　bodies　from　which　those　ideas　proceeded；　for　I　found　by　experience　that　these　ideas　presented　themselves　to　me　without　my　consent　being　requisite；　so　that　I　could　not　perceive　any　object；　however　desirous　I　might　be；　unless　it　were　present　to　the　organs　of　sense；　and　it　was　not　in　my　power　not　to　perceive　it；　when　it　was　present。　　And　because　the　ideas　which　I　received　through　the　senses　were　much　more　lively；　more　clear；　and　even；　in　their　own　way；　more　distinct　than　any　of　those　which　I　could　of　myself　frame　in　meditation；　or　than　those　I　found　impressed　on　my　memory；　it　appeared　as　though　they　could　not　have　proceeded　from　my　mind；　so　that　they　must　necessarily　have　been　produced　in　me　by　some　other　things。　　And　having　no　knowledge　of　those　objects　excepting　the　knowledge　which　the　ideas　themselves　gave　me；　nothing　was　more　likely　to　occur　to　my　mind　than　that　the　objects　were　similar　to　the　ideas　which　were　caused。　　And　because　I　likewise　remembered　that　I　had　formerly　made　use　of　my　senses　rather　than　my　reason；　and　recognised　that　the　ideas　which　I　formed　of　myself　were　not　so　distinct　as　those　which　I　perceived　through　the　senses；　and　that　they　were　most　frequently　even　composed　of　portions　of　these　last；　I　persuaded　myself　easily　that　I　had　no　idea　in　my　mind　which　had　not　formerly　come　to　me　through　the　senses。　　Nor　was　it　without　some　reason　that　I　believed　that　this　body　（which　be　a　certain　special　right　I　call　my　own）　belonged　to　me　more　properly　and　more　strictly　than　any　other；　for　in　fact　I　could　never　be　separated　from　it　as　from　other　bodies；　I　experienced　in　it　and　on　account　of　it　all　my　appetites　and　affections；　and　finally　I　was　touched　by　the　feeling　of　pain　and　the　titillation　of　pleasure　in　its　parts；　and　not　in　the　parts　of　other　bodies　which　were　separated　from　it。　　But　when　I　inquired；　why；　from　some；　I　know　not　what；　painful　sensation；　there　follows　sadness　of　mind；　and　from　the　pleasurable　sensation　there　arises　joy；　or　why　this　mysterious　pinching　of　the　stomach　which　I　call　hunger　causes　me　to　desire　to　eat；　and　dryness　of　throat　causes　a　desire　to　drink；　and　so　on；　I　could　give　no　reason　excepting　that　nature　taught　me　so；　for　there　is　certainly　no　affinity　（that　I　at　least　can　understand）　between　the　craving　of　the　stomach　and　the　desire　to　eat；　any　more　than　between　the　perception　of　whatever　causes　pain　and　the　thought　of　sadness　which　arises　from　this　perception。　　And　in　the　same　way　it　appeared　to　me　that　I　had　learned　from　nature　all　the　other　judgments　which　I　formed　regarding　the　objects　of　my　senses；　since　I　remarked　that　these　judgments　were　formed　in　me　before　I　had　the　leisure　to　weigh　and　consider　any　reasons　which　might　oblige　me　to　make　them。　　　　　　But　afterwards　many　experiences　little　by　little　destroyed　all　the　faith　which　I　had　rested　in　my　senses；　for　I　from　time　to　time　observed　that　those　towers　which　from　afar　appeared　to　me　to　be　round；　more　closely　observed　seemed　square；　and　that　colossal　statues　raised　on　the　summit　of　these　towers；　appeared　as　quite　tiny　statues　when　viewed　from　the　bottom；　and　so　in　an　infinitude　of　other　cases　I　found　error　in　judgments　founded　on　the　external　senses。　　And　not　only　in　those　founded　on　the　external　senses；　but　even　in　those　founded　on　the　internal　as　well；　for　is　there　anything　more　intimate　or　more　internal　than　pain？　　And　yet　I　have　learned　from　some　persons　whose　arms　or　legs　have　been　cut　off；　that　they　sometimes　seemed　to　feel　pain　in　the　part　which　had　been　amputated；　which　made　me　think　that　I　could　not　be　quite　certain　that　it　was　a　certain　member　which　pained　me；　even　although　I　felt　pain　in　it。　　And　to　those　grounds　of　doubt　I　have　lately　added　two　others；　which　are　very　general；　the　first　is　that　I　never　have　believed　myself　to　feel　anything　in　waking　moments　which　I　cannot　also　sometimes　believe　myself　to　feel　when　I　sleep；　and　as　I　do　not　think　that　these　things　which　I　seem　to　feel　in　sleep；　proceed　from　objects　outside　of　me；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　I　should　have　this　belief　regarding　objects　which　I　seem　to　perceive　while　awake。　　The　other　was　that　being　still　ignorant；　or　rather　supposing　myself　to　be　ignorant；　of　the　author　of　my　being；　I　saw　nothing　to　prevent　me　from　having　been　so　constituted　by　nature　that　I　might　be　deceived　even　in　matters　which　seemed　to　me　to　be　most　certain。　　And　as　to　the　grounds　on　which　I　was　formerly　persuaded　of　the　truth　of　sensible　objects；　I　had　not　much　trouble　in　replying　to　them。　　For　since　nature　seemed　to　cause　me　to　lean　towards　many　things　from　which　reason　repelled　me；　I　did　not　believe　that　I　should　trust　much　to　the　teachings　of　nature。　　And　although　the　ideas　which　I　receive　by　the　senses　do　not　depend　on　my　will；　I　did　not　think　that　one　should　for　that　reason　conclude　that　they　proceeded　from　things　different　from　myself；　since　possibly　some　faculty　might　be　discovered　in　me￥though　hitherto　unknown　to　me￥which　produced　them。　　　　　　But　now　that　I　begin　to　know　myself　better；　and　to　discover　more　clearly　the　author　of　my　being；　I　do　not　in　truth　think　that　I　should　rashly　admit　all　the　matters　which　the　senses　seem　to　teach　us；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　I　do　not　think　that　I　should　doubt　them　all　universally。　　　　　　And　first　of　all；　because　I　know　that　all　things　which　I　apprehend　clearly　and　distinctly　can　be　created　by　God　as　I　apprehend　them；　it　suffices　that　I　am　able　to　apprehend　one　thing　apart　from　another　clearly　and　distinctly　in　order　to　be　certain　that　the　one　is　different　from　the　other；　since　they　may　be　made　to　exist　in　separation　at　least　by　the　omnipotence　of　God；　and　it　does　not　signify　by　what　power　this　separation　is　made　in　order　to　compel　me　to　judge　them　to　be　different：　and；　therefore；　just　because　I　know　certainly　that　I　exist；　and　that　meanwhile　I　do　not　remark　that　any　other　thing　necessarily　pertains　to　my　nature　or　essence；　excepting　that　I　am　a　thinking　thing；　I　rightly　conclude　that　my　essence　consists　solely　in　the　fact　that　I　am　a　thinking　thin　＇or　a　substance　whose　whole　essence　or　nature　is　to　think＇。　　And　although　possibly　（or　rather　certainly；　as　I　shall　say　in　a　moment）　I　possess　a　body　with　which　I　am　very　intimately　conjoined；　yet　because；　on　the　one　side；　I　have　a　clear　and　distinct　idea　of　myself　inasmuch　as　I　am　only　a　thinking　and　unextended　thing；　and　as；　on　the　other；　I　possess　a　distinct　idea　of　body；　inasmuch　as　it　is　only　an　extended　and　unthinking　thing；　it　is　certain　that　this　I　＇that　is　to　say；　my　soul　by　which　I　am　what　I　am＇；　is　entirely　and　absolutely　distinct　from　my　body；　and　can　exist　without　it。　　　　　　I　further　find　in　myself　faculties　imploying　modes　of　thinking　peculiar　to　themselves；　to　wit；　the　faculties　of　imagination　and　feeling；　without　which　I　can　easily　conceive　myself　clearly　and　distinctly　as　a　complete　being；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　they　cannot　be　so　conceived　apart　from　me；　that　is　without　an　intellig