at　I　venture　to　promise　that　it　will　be　difficult　for　anyone　to　bring　to　mind　criticisms　of　any　consequence　which　have　not　been　already　touched　upon。　　This　is　why　I　beg　those　who　read　these　Meditations　to　form　no　judgment　upon　them　unless　they　have　given　themselves　the　trouble　to　read　all　the　objections　as　well　as　the　replies　which　I　have　made　to　them。6
  Synopsis　of　the　Six　Following　Meditations。　　　　　　　　　　　　In　the　first　Meditation　I　set　forth　the　reasons　for　which　we　may；　generally　speaking；　doubt　about　all　things　and　especially　about　material　things；　at　least　so　long　as　we　have　no　other　foundations　for　the　sciences　than　those　which　we　have　hitherto　possessed。　　But　although　the　utility　of　a　Doubt　which　is　so　general　does　not　at　first　appear；　it　is　at　the　same　time　very　great；　inasmuch　as　it　delivers　us　from　every　kind　of　prejudice；　and　sets　out　for　us　a　very　simple　way　by　which　the　mind　may　detach　itself　from　the　senses；　and　finally　it　makes　it　impossible　for　us　ever　to　doubt　those　things　which　we　have　once　discovered　to　be　true。　　　　　　In　the　second　Meditation；　mind；　which　making　use　of　the　liberty　which　pertains　to　it；　takes　for　granted　that　all　those　things　of　whose　existence　it　has　the　least　doubt；　are　non…　existent；　recognises　that　it　is　however　absolutely　impossible　that　it　does　not　itself　exist。　　This　point　is　likewise　of　the　greatest　moment；　inasmuch　as　by　this　means　a　distinction　is　easily　drawn　between　the　things　which　pertain　to　mind　that　is　to　say　to　the　intellectual　nature　and　those　which　pertain　to　body。　　　　　　But　because　it　may　be　that　some　expect　from　me　in　this　place　a　statement　of　the　reasons　establishing　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　I　feel　that　I　should　here　make　known　to　them　that　having　aimed　at　writing　nothing　in　all　this　Treatise　of　which　I　do　not　possess　very　exact　demonstrations；　I　am　obliged　to　follow　a　similar　order　to　that　made　use　of　by　the　geometers；　which　is　to　begin　by　putting　forward　as　premises　all　those　things　upon　which　the　proposition　that　we　seek　depends；　before　coming　to　any　conclusion　regarding　it。　　Now　the　first　and　principal　matter　which　is　requisite　for　thoroughly　understanding　the　immortality　of　the　soul　is　to　form　the　clearest　possible　conception　of　it；　and　one　which　will　be　entirely　distinct　from　all　the　conceptions　which　we　may　have　of　body；　and　in　this　Meditation　this　has　been　done。　　In　addition　to　this　it　is　requisite　that　we　may　be　assured　that　all　the　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　are　true　in　the　very　way　in　which　we　think　them；　and　this　could　not　be　proved　previously　to　the　Fourth　Mediation。　　Further　we　must　have　a　distinct　conception　of　corporeal　nature；　which　is　given　partly　in　this　Second；　and　partly　in　the　Fifth　and　Sixth　Meditations。　　And　finally　we　should　conclude　from　all　this；　that　those　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　as　being　diverse　substances；　as　we　regard　mind　and　body　to　be；　are　really　substances　essentially　distinct　one　from　the　other；　and　this　is　the　conclusion　of　the　Sixth　Meditation。　　This　is　further　confirmed　in　this　same　Meditation　by　the　fact　that　we　cannot　conceive　of　body　excepting　in　so　far　as　it　is　divisible；　while　the　mind　cannot　be　conceived　of　excepting　as　indivisible。　　For　we　are　not　able　to　conceive　of　the　half　of　a　mind　as　we　can　do　of　the　smallest　of　all　bodies；　so　that　we　see　that　not　only　are　their　natures　different　but　even　in　some　respects　contrary　to　one　another。　　I　have　not　however　dealt　further　with　this　matter　in　this　treatise；　both　because　what　I　have　said　is　sufficient　to　show　clearly　enough　that　the　extinction　of　the　mind　does　not　follow　from　the　corruption　of　the　body；　and　also　to　give　men　the　hope　of　another　life　after　death；　as　also　because　the　premises　from　which　the　immortality　of　the　soul　may　be　deduced　depend　on　an　elucidation　of　a　complete　system　of　Physics。　　This　would　mean　to　establish　in　the　first　place　that　all　substances　generally　that　is　to　say　all　things　which　cannot　exist　without　being　created　by　God￥are　in　their　nature　incorruptible；　and　that　they　can　never　cease　to　exist　unless　God；　in　denying　to　them　his　concurrence；　reduce　them　to　nought；　and　secondly　that　body；　regarded　generally；　is　a　substance；　which　is　the　reason　why　it　also　cannot　perish；　but　that　the　human　body；　inasmuch　as　it　differs　from　other　bodies；　is　composed　only　of　a　certain　configuration　of　members　and　of　other　similar　accidents；　while　the　human　mind　is　not　similarly　composed　of　any　accidents；　but　is　a　pure　substance。　　For　although　all　the　accidents　of　mind　be　changed；　although；　for　instance；　it　think　certain　things；　will　others；　perceive　others；　etc。；　despite　all　this　it　does　not　emerge　from　these　changes　another　mind：　　the　human　body　on　the　other　hand　becomes　a　different　thing　from　the　sole　fact　that　the　figure　or　form　of　any　of　its　portions　is　found　to　be　changed。　From　this　it　follows　that　the　human　body　may　indeed　easily　enough　perish；　but　the　mind　＇or　soul　of　man　（I　make　no　distinction　between　them）＇　is　owing　to　its　nature　immortal。　　　　　　In　the　third　Meditation　it　seems　to　me　that　I　have　explained　at　sufficient　length　the　principal　argument　of　which　I　make　use　in　order　to　prove　the　existence　of　God。　　But　none　the　less；　because　I　did　not　wish　in　that　place　to　make　use　of　any　comparisons　derived　from　corporeal　things；　so　as　to　withdraw　as　much　as　I　could　the　minds　of　readers　from　the　senses；　there　may　perhaps　have　remained　many　obscurities　which；　however；　will；　I　hope；　be　entirely　removed　by　the　Replies　which　I　have　made　to　the　Objections　which　have　been　set　before　me。　　Amongst　others　there　is；　for　example；　this　one；　〃How　the　idea　in　us　of　a　being　supremely　perfect　possesses　so　much　objective　reality　＇that　is　to　say　participates　by　representation　in　so　many　degrees　of　being　and　perfection＇　that　it　necessarily　proceeds　from　a　cause　which　is　absolutely　perfect。〃　　This　is　illustrated　in　these　Replies　by　the　comparison　of　a　very　perfect　machine；　the　idea　of　which　is　found　in　the　mind　of　some　workman。　　For　as　the　objective　contrivance　of　this　idea　must　have　some　cause；　i。e。　either　the　science　of　the　workman　or　that　of　some　other　from　whom　he　has　received　the　idea；　it　is　similarly　impossible　that　the　idea　of　God　which　is　in　us　should　not　have　God　himself　as　its　cause。　　　　　　In　the　fourth　Meditation　it　is　shown　that　all　these　things　which　we　very　clearly　and　distinctly　perceive　are　true；　and　at　the　same　time　it　is　explained　in　what　the　nature　of　error　or　falsity　consists。　　This　must　of　necessity　be　known　both　for　the　confirmation　of　the　preceding　truths　and　for　the　better　comprehension　of　those　that　follow。　　（But　it　must　meanwhile　be　remarked　that　I　do　not　in　any　way　there　treat　of　sin￥that　is　to　say　of　the　error　which　is　committed　in　the　pursuit　of　good　and　evil；　but　only　of　that　which　arises　in　the　deciding　between　the　true　and　the　false。　　And　I　do　not　intend　to　speak　of　matters　pertaining　to　the　Faith　or　the　conduct　of　life；　but　only　of　those　which　concern　speculative　truths；　and　which　may　be　known　by　the　sole　aid　of　the　light　of　nature。）　　　　　　In　the　fifth　Meditation　corporeal　nature　generally　is　explained；　and　in　addition　to　this　the　existence　of　God　is　demonstrated　by　a　new　proof　in　which　there　may　possibly　be　certain　difficulties　also；　but　the　solution　of　these　will　be　seen　in　the　Replies　to　the　Objections。　　And　further　I　show　in　what　sense　it　is　true　to　say　that　the　certainty　of　geometrical　demonstrations　is　itself　dependent　on　the　knowledge　of　God。　　　　　　Finally　in　the　Sixth　I　distinguish　the　action　of　the　understanding7　from　that　of　the　imagination；8　the　marks　by　which　this　distinction　is　made　are　described。　　I　here　show　that　the　mind　of　man　is　really　distinct　from　the　body；　and　at　the　same　time　that　the　two　are　so　closely　joined　together　that　they　form；　so　to　speak；　a　single　thing。　　All　the　errors　which　proceed　from　the　senses　are　then　surveyed；　while　the　means　of　avoiding　them　are　demonstrated；　and　finally　all　the　reasons　from　which　we　may　deduce　the　existence　of　material　things　are　set　forth。　　Not　that　I　judge　them　to　be　very　useful　in　establishing　that　which　they　prove；　to　wit；　that　there　is　in　truth　a　world；　that　men　possess　bodies；　and　other　such　things　which　never　have　been　doubted　by　anyone　of　sense；　but　because　in　considering　these　closely　we　come　to　see　that　they　are　neither　so　strong　nor　so　evident　as　those　arguments　which　lead　us　to　the　knowledge　of　our　mind　and　of　God；　so　that　these　last　must　be　the　most　certain　and　most　evident　facts　which　can　fall　within　the　cognizance　of　the　human　mind。　　And　this　is　the　whole　matter　that　I　have　tried　to　prove　in　these　Meditations；　for　which　reason　I　here　omit　to　speak　of　many　other　questions　which　I　dealt　incidentally　in　this　discussion。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　MEDITATIONS　ON　THE　FIRST　PHILOSOPHY　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IN　WHICH　THE　EXISTENCE　OF　GOD　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　AND　THE　DISTINCTION　BETWEEN　MIND　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　AND　BODY　ARE　DEMONSTRATED。9　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　I。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　things　which　may　be　brought　within　the　sphere　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　doubtful。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　It　is　now　some　years　since　I　detected　how　many　were　the　false　beliefs　that　I　had　from　my　earliest　youth