第 2 节
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朝令夕改 更新:2022-11-28 19:02 字数:9322
transitory condensation。
Despite its conjectural side; by virtue of which it to some
extent escapes the severest form of criticism; history has not
been free from this universal revision。 There is no longer a
single one of its phases of which we can say that it is certainly
known。 What appeared to be definitely acquired is now once more
put in question。
Among the events whose study seemed completed was the French
Revolution。 Analysed by several generations of writers; one
might suppose it to be perfectly elucidated。 What new thing can
be said of it; except in modification of some of its details?
And yet its most positive defenders are beginning to hesitate in
their judgments。 Ancient evidence proves to be far from
impeccable。 The faith in dogmas once held sacred is shaken。 The
latest literature of the Revolution betrays these uncertainties。
Having related; men are more and more chary of drawing
conclusions。
Not only are the heroes of this great drama discussed without
indulgence; but thinkers are asking whether the new dispensation
which followed the ancien regime would not have established
itself naturally; without violence; in the course of progressive
civilisation。 The results obtained no longer seem in
correspondence either with their immediate cost or with the
remoter consequences which the Revolution evoked from the
possibilities of history。
Several causes have led to the revision of this tragic period。
Time has calmed passions; numerous documents have gradually
emerged from the archives; and the historian is learning to
interpret them independently。
But it is perhaps modern psychology that has most effectually
influenced our ideas; by enabling us more surely to read men and
the motives of their conduct。
Among those of its discoveries which are henceforth applicable to
history we must mention; above all; a more profound understanding
of ancestral influences; the laws which rule the actions of the
crowd; data relating to the disaggregation of personality; mental
contagion; the unconscious formation of beliefs; and the
distinction between the various forms of logic。
To tell the truth; these applications of science; which are
utilised in this book; have not been so utilised hitherto。
Historians have generally stopped short at the study of
documents; and even that study is sufficient to excite the doubts
of which I have spoken。
The great events which shape the destinies of peoples
revolutions; for example; and the outbreak of religious beliefs
are sometimes so difficult to explain that one must limit oneself
to a mere statement。
From the time of my first historical researches I have been
struck by the impenetrable aspect of certain essential phenomena;
those relating to the genesis of beliefs especially; I felt
convinced that something fundamental was lacking that was
essential to their interpretation。 Reason having said all it
could say; nothing more could be expected of it; and other means
must be sought of comprehending what had not been elucidated。
For a long time these important questions remained obscure to me。
Extended travel; devoted to the study of the remnants of vanished
civilisations; had not done much to throw light upon them。
Reflecting upon it continually; I was forced to recognise that
the problem was composed of a series of other problems; which I
should have to study separately。 This I did for a period of
twenty years; presenting the results of my researches in a
succession of volumes。
One of the first was devoted to the study of the psychological
laws of the evolution of peoples。 Having shown that the
historic racesthat is; the races formed by the hazards of
historyfinally acquired psychological characteristics as stable
as their anatomical characteristics; I attempted to explain how a
people transforms its institutions; its languages; and its arts。
I explained in the same work why it was that individual
personalities; under the influence of sudden variations of
environment; might be entirely disaggregated。
But besides the fixed collectivities formed by the peoples; there
are mobile and transitory collectivities known as crowds。 Now
these crowds or mobs; by the aid of which the great movements of
history are accomplished; have characteristics absolutely
different from those of the individuals who compose them。 What
are these characteristics; and how are they evolved? This new
problem was examined in The Psychology of the Crowd。
Only after these studies did I begin to perceive certain
influences which had escaped me。
But this was not all。 Among the most important factors of
history one was preponderantthe factor of beliefs。 How are
these beliefs born; and are they really rational and voluntary;
as was long taught? Are they not rather unconscious and
independent of all reason? A difficult question; which I dealt
with in my last book; Opinions and Beliefs。
So long as psychology regards beliefs as voluntary and rational
they will remain inexplicable。 Having proved that they are
usually irrational and always involuntary; I was able to propound
the solution of this important problem; how it was that beliefs
which no reason could justify were admitted without
difficulty by the most enlightened spirits of all ages。
The solution of the historical difficulties which had so long
been sought was thenceforth obvious。 I arrived at the conclusion
that beside the rational logic which conditions thought; and was
formerly regarded as our sole guide; there exist very different
forms of logic: affective logic; collective logic; and mystic
logic; which usually overrule the reason and engender the
generative impulses of our conduct。
This fact well established; it seemed to me evident that if a
great number of historical events are often uncomprehended; it is
because we seek to interpret them in the light of a logic which
in reality has very little influence upon their genesis。
All these researches; which are here summed up in a few lines;
demanded long years for their accomplishment。 Despairing of
completing them; I abandoned them more than once to return to
those labours of the laboratory in which one is always sure of
skirting the truth and of acquiring fragments at least of
certitude。
But while it is very interesting to explore the world of material
phenomena; it is still more so to decipher men; for which reason
I have always been led back to psychology。
Certain principles deduced from my researches appearing likely to
prove fruitful; I resolved to apply them to the study of concrete
instances; and was thus led to deal with the Psychology of
Revolutionsnotably that of the French Revolution。
Proceeding in the analysis of our great Revolution; the
greater part of the opinions determined by the reading of books
deserted me one by one; although I had considered them
unshakable。
To explain this period we must consider it as a whole; as many
historians have done。 It is composed of phenomena simultaneous
but independent of one another。
Each of its phases reveals events engendered by psychological
laws working with the regularity of clockwork。 The actors in
this great drama seem to move like the characters of a previously
determined drama。 Each says what he must say; acts as he is
bound to act。
To be sure; the actors in the revolutionary drama differed from
those of a written drama in that they had not studied their
parts; but these were dictated by invisible forces。
Precisely because they were subjected to the inevitable
progression of logics incomprehensible to them we see them as
greatly astonished by the events of which they were the heroes as
are we ourselves。 Never did they suspect the invisible powers
which forced them to act。 They were the masters neither of their
fury nor their weakness。 They spoke in the name of reason;
pretending to be guided by reason; but in reality it was by no
means reason that impelled them。
‘‘The decisions for which we are so greatly reproached;'' wrote
Billaud…Varenne; ‘‘were more often than otherwise not intended or
desired by us two days or even one day beforehand: the crisis
alone evoked them。''
Not that we must consider the events of the Revolution as
dominated by an imperious fatality。 The readers of our works
will know that we recognise in the man of superior qualities the
role of averting fatalities。 But he can dissociate himself
only from a few of such; and is often powerless before the
sequence of events which even at their origin could scarcely be
ruled。 The scientist knows how to destroy the microbe before it
has time to act; but he knows himself powerless to prevent the
evolution of the resulting malady。
When any question gives rise to violently contradictory opinions
we may be sur