Since　in　nature　the　idea　is　as　the　negative　of　itself　or　is　external　to　itself　nature　is　not　merely
  external　in　relation　to　this　idea；　but　the　externality　constitutes　the　determination　in　which　nature　as
  nature　exists。
  §　193。
  In　this　externality　the　determinations　of　the　concept　have　the　appearance　of　an　indifferent
  subsistence　and　isolation　in　regards　to　each　other。　The　concept　therefore　exists　as　an　inward
  entity。　Hence　nature　exhibits　no　freedom　in　its　existence；　but　only　necessity　and　contingency。
  For　this　reason　nature；　in　the　determinate　existence；　which　makes　it　nature；　is　not　to　be　deified；　nor
  are　the　sun；　moon；　animals；　plants；　and　so　on；　to　be　regarded　and　adduced　as　the　works　of　God；
  more　excellent　than　human　actions　and　events。　Nature　in　itself　in　the　idea；　is　divine；　but　in　the
  specific　mode　by　which　it　is　nature　it　is　suspended。　As　it　is；　the　being　of　nature　does　not
  correspond　to　its　concept；　its　existing　actuality　therefore　has　no　truth；　its　abstract　essence　is　the
  negative；　as　the　ancients　conceived　of　matter　in　general　as　the　non…ens。　But　because；　even　in　this
  element；　nature　is　a　representation　of　the　idea；　one　may　very　well　admire　in　it　the　wisdom　of　God。
  If　however；　as　Vanini　said；　a　stalk　of　straw　suffices　to　demonstrate　God's　being；　then　every
  representation　of　the　spirit；　the　slightest　fancy　of　the　mind；　the　play　of　its　most　capricious　whim；
  every　word；　offers　a　ground　for　the　knowledge　of　God's　being　that　is　superior　to　any　single　object
  of　nature。　In　nature；　not　only　is　the　play　of　forms　unbound　and　unchecked　in　contingency；　but　each
  figure　for　itself　lacks　the　concept　of　itself。　The　highest　level　to　which　nature　drives　its　existence　is
  life；　but　as　only　a　natural　idea　this　is　at　the　mercy　of　the　unreason　of　externality；　and　individual
  vitality　is　in　each　moment　of　its　existence　entangled　with　an　individuality　which　is　other　to　it；
  whereas　in　every　expression　of　the　spirit　is　contained　the　moment　of　free；　universal　self…relation。　…
  Nature　in　general　is　justly　determined　as　the　decline　of　the　idea　from　itself　because　in　the　element
  of　externality　it　has　the　determination　of　the　inappropriateness　of　itself　with　itself。…A　similar
  misunderstanding　is　to　regard　human　works　of　art　as　inferior　to　natural　things；　on　the　grounds　that
  works　of　art　must　take　their　material　from　outside；　and　that　they　are　not　alive。…It　is　as　if　the　spiritual
  form　did　not　contain　a　higher　level　of　life；　and　were　not　more　worthy　of　the　spirit　than　the　natural
  form；　and　as　if　in　all　ethical　things　what　can　be　called　matter　did　not　belong　solely　to　the　spirit　…
  Nature　remains；　despite　all　the　contingency　of　its　existence；　obedient　to　eternal　laws；　but　surely　this
  is　also　true　of　the　realm　of　selfconsciousness；　a　fact　which　can　already　be　seen　in　the　belief　that
  providence　governs　human　affairs。　Or　are　the　determinations　of　this　providence　in　the　field　of
  human　affairs　only　contingent　and　irrational？　But　if　the　contingency　of　spirit；　the　free　will；　leads　to
  evil；　is　this　not　still　infinitely　higher　than　the　regular　behaviour　of　the　stars；　or　the　innocence　of　the
  plants？
  §　194。
  Nature　is　to　be　viewed　as　a　system　of　stages；　in　which　one　stage　necessarily　arises　from　the　other
  and　is　the　truth　closest　to　the　other　from　which　it　results；　though　not　in　such　a　way　that　the　one
  would　naturally　generate　the　other；　but　rather　in　the　inner　idea　which　constitutes　the　ground　of
  nature。
  It　has　been　an　awkward　conception　in　older　and　also　more　recent　philosophy　of　nature　to　see　the
  progression　and　the　transition　of　one　natural　form　and　sphere　into　another　as　an　external；　actual
  production　which；　however；　in　order　to　be　made　clearer；　is　relegated　to　the　darkness　of　the　past。
  Precisely　this　externality　is　characteristic　of　nature：　differences　are　allowed　to　fall　apart　and　to
  appear　as　existences　indifferent　to　each　other；　and　the　dialectical　concept；　which　leads　the　stages
  further；　is　the　interior　which　emerges　only　in　the
  spirit。　Certainly　the　previously　favoured　teleological　view　provided　the　basis　for　the　relation　to　the
  concept；　and；　in　the　same　way；　the　relation　to　the　spirit；　but　it　focused　only　on　external
  purposiveness…（cf　§　151）　and　viewed　the　spirit　as　if　it　were　entangled　in　finite　and　natural
  purposes。　Due　to　the　vapidity　of　such　finite　purposes；　purposes　for　which　natural　things　were
  shown　to　be　useful；　the　teleological　view　has　been　discredited　for　exhibiting　the　wisdom　of　God。
  The　view　of　the　usefulness　of　natural　things　has　the　implicit　truth　that　these　things　are　not　in　and　for
  themselves　an　absolute　goal；　nevertheless；　it　is　unable　to　determine　whether　such　things　are
  defective　or　inadequate。　For　this　determination　it　is　necessary　to　posit　that　the　immanent　moment
  of　its　idea；　which　brings　about　its　transiency　and　transition　into　another　existence；　produces　at　the
  same　time　a　transformation　into　a　higher　concept。
  §　195。
  Nature　is；　in　itself　a　living　whole。　The　movement　of　its　idea　through　its　sequence　of　stages　is　more
  precisely　this：　the　idea　posits　itself　as　that　which　it　is　in　itself；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　it　goes　into
  itself　out　of　that　immediacy　and　externality　which　is　death　in　order　to　go　into　itself；　yet　further；　it
  suspends　this　determinacy　of　the　idea；　in　which　it　is　only　life；　and　becomes　spirit；　which　is　its　truth。
  §　196。
  The　idea　as　nature　is：　（1）　as　universal；　ideal　being　outside　of　itself　space　and　time；　（2）　as　real　and
  mutual　being　apart　from　itself　particular　or　material　existence；　…　inorganic　nature；　（3）　as　living
  actuality；　organic　nature。　The　three　sciences　can　thus　be　named　mathematics；　physics；　and
  physiology。
  I
  Mathematics
  §　197。
  （1）　The　first　or　immediate　determination　of　nature　is　the　abstract　generality　of　its
  self…externality；…its　unmediated　indifference；　space。　It　is　the　wholly　ideal　juxtaposition；　because　it　is
  being　outside　of　itself　and　absolutely　continuous；　because　this　being　apart　from　itself　is　still　entirely
  abstract；　and　has　no　specific　difference　within　itself。
  Much　has　been　said；　from　different　theoretical　positions；　about　the　nature　of　space。　I　will　mention
  only　the　Kantian　determination　that　space　is；　like　time；　a　form　of　sensory　intuition。　It　has　also
  become　customary　to　establish　fundamentally　that　space　must　be　regarded　only　as　something
  subjective　in　representation。　Disregarding　what；　in　the　Kantian　conception；　belongs　to　subjective
  idealism　and　its　determinations　（cf　§　5）；　the　correct　determination　remains　that　space　is　a　mere
  form；　i。e。；　an　abstraction；　that　of　immediate　externality。…To　speak　of　points　of　space；　as　if　they
  constituted　the　positive　element　of　space；　is　inadmissible；　since　space；　on　account　of　its　lack　of
  differentiation；　is　only　the　possibility　and　not　the　positing　of　that　which　is　negative　and　therefore
  absolutely　continuous。　The　point　is　therefore　rather　the　negation　of　space。…This　also　settles　the
  question　of　the　infinitude　of　space。　Space　is　in　general　pure　quantity　（§　53f）；　though　no　longer　as　a
  logical　determination；　but　rather　as　existing　immediately　and　externally。　Nature；　consequently；　does
  not　begin　with　quality　but　with　quantity；　because　its　determination　is　not；　like　logical　being；　the
  absolute　first　and　immediate；　but　essentially　a　mediated　being；　a　being　external　to　and　other　than
  itself
  §　198。
  Space　has；　as　the　concept　in　general　（and　more　determinate　than　an　indifferent　self…externality）　its
  differences　within　it：　（a）　in　its　indifference　these　are　immediately　the　three　dimensions；　which　are
  merely　diverse　and　quite　indeterminate。
  But　geometry　is　not　required　to　deduce　that　space　necessarily　has　precisely　three　dimensions；　for　it
  is　not　a　philosophical　science；　and　may　therefore　presuppose　space　as　its　object。　Moreover；　even
  apart　from　this；　no　thought　is　given　to　the　demonstration　of　such　a　necessity。　The　necessity　rests　on
  the　nature　of　the　concept；　whose　determinations；　however；　because　they　depict　themselves　in
  these　first　elements　of　being　apart　from　themselves；　in　abstract　quantity；　are　only　entirely　superficial
  and　a　completely　empty　difference。　One　can　also；　therefore；　not　say　how　height；　length；　and　width
  differ　from　each　other；　because　they　only　ought　to　be　different；　but　are　not　yet　differences。…Height
  has　its　more　precise　determination　as　direction　according　to　the　center　of　the　earth；　but　this　does
  not　at　all　concern　the　nature　of　space　for　itself　Following　from　this　point　it　is　equally　as　indifferent
  whether　this　direction　is　called　height　or　depth；　or　length　or　breadth；　which　is　also　often　called
  depth。
  §　199。
  （b）　But　the　difference　of　space　is　essentially　a　determinate；　qualitative　difference。　As　such　it　is　（a）
  first；　the　negation　of　space　itself　because　this　is　immediate　and　undifferentiated　self…externality；　the
  point。　（b）　The　negation　as　negation；　however；　is　itself　spatial；　and　the　relation　of　the　point　to　space
  is