No；　just　that。
  But　is　knowledge　or　want　of　knowledge　of　health　the　same　as　knowledge　or
  want　of　knowledge　of　justice？
  Certainly　not。
  The　one　is　medicine；　and　the　other　is　politics；　whereas　that　of　which　we
  are　speaking　is　knowledge　pure　and　simple。
  Very　true。
  And　if　a　man　knows　only；　and　has　only　knowledge　of　knowledge；　and　has　no
  further　knowledge　of　health　and　justice；　the　probability　is　that　he　will
  only　know　that　he　knows　something；　and　has　a　certain　knowledge；　whether
  concerning　himself　or　other　men。
  True。
  Then　how　will　this　knowledge　or　science　teach　him　to　know　what　he　knows？
  Say　that　he　knows　health；not　wisdom　or　temperance；　but　the　art　of
  medicine　has　taught　it　to　him；and　he　has　learned　harmony　from　the　art　of
  music；　and　building　from　the　art　of　building；neither；　from　wisdom　or
  temperance：　　and　the　same　of　other　things。
  That　is　evident。
  How　will　wisdom；　regarded　only　as　a　knowledge　of　knowledge　or　science　of
  science；　ever　teach　him　that　he　knows　health；　or　that　he　knows　building？
  It　is　impossible。
  Then　he　who　is　ignorant　of　these　things　will　only　know　that　he　knows；　but
  not　what　he　knows？
  True。
  Then　wisdom　or　being　wise　appears　to　be　not　the　knowledge　of　the　things
  which　we　do　or　do　not　know；　but　only　the　knowledge　that　we　know　or　do　not
  know？
  That　is　the　inference。
  Then　he　who　has　this　knowledge　will　not　be　able　to　examine　whether　a
  pretender　knows　or　does　not　know　that　which　he　says　that　he　knows：　　he　will
  only　know　that　he　has　a　knowledge　of　some　kind；　but　wisdom　will　not　show
  him　of　what　the　knowledge　is？
  Plainly　not。
  Neither　will　he　be　able　to　distinguish　the　pretender　in　medicine　from　the
  true　physician；　nor　between　any　other　true　and　false　professor　of
  knowledge。　　Let　us　consider　the　matter　in　this　way：　　If　the　wise　man　or　any
  other　man　wants　to　distinguish　the　true　physician　from　the　false；　how　will
  he　proceed？　　He　will　not　talk　to　him　about　medicine；　and　that；　as　we　were
  saying；　is　the　only　thing　which　the　physician　understands。
  True。
  And；　on　the　other　hand；　the　physician　knows　nothing　of　science；　for　this
  has　been　assumed　to　be　the　province　of　wisdom。
  True。
  And　further；　since　medicine　is　science；　we　must　infer　that　he　does　not　know
  anything　of　medicine。
  Exactly。
  Then　the　wise　man　may　indeed　know　that　the　physician　has　some　kind　of
  science　or　knowledge；　but　when　he　wants　to　discover　the　nature　of　this　he
  will　ask；　What　is　the　subject…matter？　　For　the　several　sciences　are
  distinguished　not　by　the　mere　fact　that　they　are　sciences；　but　by　the
  nature　of　their　subjects。　　Is　not　that　true？
  Quite　true。
  And　medicine　is　distinguished　from　other　sciences　as　having　the　subject…
  matter　of　health　and　disease？
  Yes。
  And　he　who　would　enquire　into　the　nature　of　medicine　must　pursue　the
  enquiry　into　health　and　disease；　and　not　into　what　is　extraneous？
  True。
  And　he　who　judges　rightly　will　judge　of　the　physician　as　a　physician　in
  what　relates　to　these？
  He　will。
  He　will　consider　whether　what　he　says　is　true；　and　whether　what　he　does　is
  right；　in　relation　to　health　and　disease？
  He　will。
  But　can　any　one　attain　the　knowledge　of　either　unless　he　have　a　knowledge
  of　medicine？
  He　cannot。
  No　one　at　all；　it　would　seem；　except　the　physician　can　have　this　knowledge；
  and　therefore　not　the　wise　man；　he　would　have　to　be　a　physician　as　well　as
  a　wise　man。
  Very　true。
  Then；　assuredly；　wisdom　or　temperance；　if　only　a　science　of　science；　and　of
  the　absence　of　science　or　knowledge；　will　not　be　able　to　distinguish　the
  physician　who　knows　from　one　who　does　not　know　but　pretends　or　thinks　that
  he　knows；　or　any　other　professor　of　anything　at　all；　like　any　other　artist；
  he　will　only　know　his　fellow　in　art　or　wisdom；　and　no　one　else。
  That　is　evident；　he　said。
  But　then　what　profit；　Critias；　I　said；　is　there　any　longer　in　wisdom　or
  temperance　which　yet　remains；　if　this　is　wisdom？　　If；　indeed；　as　we　were
  supposing　at　first；　the　wise　man　had　been　able　to　distinguish　what　he　knew
  and　did　not　know；　and　that　he　knew　the　one　and　did　not　know　the　other；　and
  to　recognize　a　similar　faculty　of　discernment　in　others；　there　would
  certainly　have　been　a　great　advantage　in　being　wise；　for　then　we　should
  never　have　made　a　mistake；　but　have　passed　through　life　the　unerring　guides
  of　ourselves　and　of　those　who　are　under　us；　and　we　should　not　have
  attempted　to　do　what　we　did　not　know；　but　we　should　have　found　out　those
  who　knew；　and　have　handed　the　business　over　to　them　and　trusted　in　them；
  nor　should　we　have　allowed　those　who　were　under　us　to　do　anything　which
  they　were　not　likely　to　do　well；　and　they　would　be　likely　to　do　well　just
  that　of　which　they　had　knowledge；　and　the　house　or　state　which　was　ordered
  or　administered　under　the　guidance　of　wisdom；　and　everything　else　of　which
  wisdom　was　the　lord；　would　have　been　well　ordered；　for　truth　guiding；　and
  error　having　been　eliminated；　in　all　their　doings；　men　would　have　done
  well；　and　would　have　been　happy。　　Was　not　this；　Critias；　what　we　spoke　of
  as　the　great　advantage　of　wisdomto　know　what　is　known　and　what　is　unknown
  to　us？
  Very　true；　he　said。
  And　now　you　perceive；　I　said；　that　no　such　science　is　to　be　found　anywhere。
  I　perceive；　he　said。
  May　we　assume　then；　I　said；　that　wisdom；　viewed　in　this　new　light　merely　as
  a　knowledge　of　knowledge　and　ignorance；　has　this　advantage：that　he　who
  possesses　such　knowledge　will　more　easily　learn　anything　which　he　learns；
  and　that　everything　will　be　clearer　to　him；　because；　in　addition　to　the
  knowledge　of　individuals；　he　sees　the　science；　and　this　also　will　better
  enable　him　to　test　the　knowledge　which　others　have　of　what　he　knows
  himself；　whereas　the　enquirer　who　is　without　this　knowledge　may　be　supposed
  to　have　a　feebler　and　weaker　insight？　　Are　not　these；　my　friend；　the　real
  advantages　which　are　to　be　gained　from　wisdom？　　And　are　not　we　looking　and
  seeking　after　something　more　than　is　to　be　found　in　her？
  That　is　very　likely；　he　said。
  That　is　very　likely；　I　said；　and　very　likely；　too；　we　have　been　enquiring
  to　no　purpose；　as　I　am　led　to　infer；　because　I　observe　that　if　this　is
  wisdom；　some　strange　consequences　would　follow。　　Let　us；　if　you　please；
  assume　the　possibility　of　this　science　of　sciences；　and　further　admit　and
  allow；　as　was　originally　suggested；　that　wisdom　is　the　knowledge　of　what　we
  know　and　do　not　know。　　Assuming　all　this；　still；　upon　further
  consideration；　I　am　doubtful；　Critias；　whether　wisdom；　such　as　this；　would
  do　us　much　good。　　For　we　were　wrong；　I　think；　in　supposing；　as　we　were
  saying　just　now；　that　such　wisdom　ordering　the　government　of　house　or　state
  would　be　a　great　benefit。
  How　so？　he　said。
  Why；　I　said；　we　were　far　too　ready　to　admit　the　great　benefits　which
  mankind　would　obtain　from　their　severally　doing　the　things　which　they　knew；
  and　committing　the　things　of　which　they　are　ignorant　to　those　who　were
  better　acquainted　with　them。
  Were　we　not　right　in　making　that　admission？
  I　think　not。
  How　very　strange；　Socrates！
  By　the　dog　of　Egypt；　I　said；　there　I　agree　with　you；　and　I　was　thinking　as
  much　just　now　when　I　said　that　strange　consequences　would　follow；　and　that
  I　was　afraid　we　were　on　the　wrong　track；　for　however　ready　we　may　be　to
  admit　that　this　is　wisdom；　I　certainly　cannot　make　out　what　good　this　sort
  of　thing　does　to　us。
  What　do　you　mean？　he　said；　I　wish　that　you　could　make　me　understand　what
  you　mean。
  I　dare　say　that　what　I　am　saying　is　nonsense；　I　replied；　and　yet　if　a　man
  has　any　feeling　of　what　is　due　to　himself；　he　cannot　let　the　thought　which
  comes　into　his　mind　pass　away　unheeded　and　unexamined。
  I　like　that；　he　said。
  Hear；　then；　I　said；　my　own　dream；　whether　coming　through　the　horn　or　the
  ivory　gate；　I　cannot　tell。　　The　dream　is　this：　　Let　us　suppose　that　wisdom
  is　such　as　we　are　now　defining；　and　that　she　has　absolute　sway　over　us；
  then　each　action　will　be　done　according　to　the　arts　or　sciences；　and　no　one
  professing　to　be　a　pilot　when