relations；　works　of　art；　negative　notions　（Theaet。；　Parm。；　Soph。）；　and　that
  what　Dr。　Jackson　distinguishes　as　the　first　class　of　dialogues　from　the
  second　equally　assert　or　imply　that　the　relation　of　things　to　the　Ideas；　is
  one　of　participation　in　them　as　well　as　of　imitation　of　them　（Prof。
  Zeller's　summary　of　his　own　review　of　Dr。　Jackson；　Archiv　fur　Geschichte
  der　Philosophie。）
  In　conclusion　I　may　remark　that　in　Plato's　writings　there　is　both　unity；
  and　also　growth　and　development；　but　that　we　must　not　intrude　upon　him
  either　a　system　or　a　technical　language。
  Balliol　College；
  October；　1891。
  NOTE
  The　chief　additions　to　the　Introductions　in　the　Third　Edition　consist　of
  Essays　on　the　following　subjects：
  1。　　Language。
  2。　　The　decline　of　Greek　Literature。
  3。　　The　'Ideas'　of　Plato　and　Modern　Philosophy。
  4。　　The　myths　of　Plato。
  5。　　The　relation　of　the　Republic；　Statesman　and　Laws。
  6。　　The　legend　of　Atlantis。
  7。　　Psychology。
  8。　　Comparison　of　the　Laws　of　Plato　with　Spartan　and　Athenian　Laws　and
  Institutions。
  CHARMIDES。
  INTRODUCTION。
  The　subject　of　the　Charmides　is　Temperance　or　（Greek）；　a　peculiarly　Greek
  notion；　which　may　also　be　rendered　Moderation　（Compare　Cic。　Tusc。　'（Greek）；
  quam　soleo　equidem　tum　temperantiam；　tum　moderationem　appellare；　nonnunquam
  etiam　modestiam。'）；　Modesty；　Discretion；　Wisdom；　without　completely
  exhausting　by　all　these　terms　the　various　associations　of　the　word。　　It　may
  be　described　as　'mens　sana　in　corpore　sano；'　the　harmony　or　due　proportion
  of　the　higher　and　lower　elements　of　human　nature　which　'makes　a　man　his　own
  master；'　according　to　the　definition　of　the　Republic。　　In　the　accompanying
  translation　the　word　has　been　rendered　in　different　places　either
  Temperance　or　Wisdom；　as　the　connection　seemed　to　require：　　for　in　the
  philosophy　of　Plato　（Greek）　still　retains　an　intellectual　element　（as
  Socrates　is　also　said　to　have　identified　（Greek）　with　（Greek）：　　Xen。　Mem。）
  and　is　not　yet　relegated　to　the　sphere　of　moral　virtue；　as　in　the
  Nicomachean　Ethics　of　Aristotle。
  The　beautiful　youth；　Charmides；　who　is　also　the　most　temperate　of　human
  beings；　is　asked　by　Socrates；　'What　is　Temperance？'　　He　answers
  characteristically；　（1）　'Quietness。'　　'But　Temperance　is　a　fine　and　noble
  thing；　and　quietness　in　many　or　most　cases　is　not　so　fine　a　thing　as
  quickness。'　　He　tries　again　and　says　（2）　that　temperance　is　modesty。　　But
  this　again　is　set　aside　by　a　sophistical　application　of　Homer：　　for
  temperance　is　good　as　well　as　noble；　and　Homer　has　declared　that　'modesty
  is　not　good　for　a　needy　man。'　　（3）　Once　more　Charmides　makes　the　attempt。
  This　time　he　gives　a　definition　which　he　has　heard；　and　of　which　Socrates
  conjectures　that　Critias　must　be　the　author：　　'Temperance　is　doing　one's
  own　business。'　　But　the　artisan　who　makes　another　man's　shoes　may　be
  temperate；　and　yet　he　is　not　doing　his　own　business；　and　temperance　defined
  thus　would　be　opposed　to　the　division　of　labour　which　exists　in　every
  temperate　or　well…ordered　state。　　How　is　this　riddle　to　be　explained？
  Critias；　who　takes　the　place　of　Charmides；　distinguishes　in　his　answer
  between　'making'　and　'doing；'　and　with　the　help　of　a　misapplied　quotation
  from　Hesiod　assigns　to　the　words　'doing'　and　'work'　an　exclusively　good
  sense：　　Temperance　is　doing　one's　own　business；（4）　is　doing　good。
  Still　an　element　of　knowledge　is　wanting　which　Critias　is　readily　induced
  to　admit　at　the　suggestion　of　Socrates；　and；　in　the　spirit　of　Socrates　and
  of　Greek　life　generally；　proposes　as　a　fifth　definition；　（5）　Temperance　is
  self…knowledge。　　But　all　sciences　have　a　subject：　　number　is　the　subject　of
  arithmetic；　health　of　medicinewhat　is　the　subject　of　temperance　or
  wisdom？　　The　answer　is　that　（6）　Temperance　is　the　knowledge　of　what　a　man
  knows　and　of　what　he　does　not　know。　　But　this　is　contrary　to　analogy；　there
  is　no　vision　of　vision；　but　only　of　visible　things；　no　love　of　loves；　but
  only　of　beautiful　things；　how　then　can　there　be　a　knowledge　of　knowledge？
  That　which　is　older；　heavier；　lighter；　is　older；　heavier；　and　lighter　than
  something　else；　not　than　itself；　and　this　seems　to　be　true　of　all　relative
  notionsthe　object　of　relation　is　outside　of　them；　at　any　rate　they　can
  only　have　relation　to　themselves　in　the　form　of　that　object。　　Whether　there
  are　any　such　cases　of　reflex　relation　or　not；　and　whether　that　sort　of
  knowledge　which　we　term　Temperance　is　of　this　reflex　nature；　has　yet　to　be
  determined　by　the　great　metaphysician。　　But　even　if　knowledge　can　know
  itself；　how　does　the　knowledge　of　what　we　know　imply　the　knowledge　of　what
  we　do　not　know？　　Besides；　knowledge　is　an　abstraction　only；　and　will　not
  inform　us　of　any　particular　subject；　such　as　medicine；　building；　and　the
  like。　　It　may　tell　us　that　we　or　other　men　know　something；　but　can　never
  tell　us　what　we　know。
  Admitting　that　there　is　a　knowledge　of　what　we　know　and　of　what　we　do　not
  know；　which　would　supply　a　rule　and　measure　of　all　things；　still　there
  would　be　no　good　in　this；　and　the　knowledge　which　temperance　gives　must　be
  of　a　kind　which　will　do　us　good；　for　temperance　is　a　good。　　But　this
  universal　knowledge　does　not　tend　to　our　happiness　and　good：　　the　only　kind
  of　knowledge　which　brings　happiness　is　the　knowledge　of　good　and　evil。　　To
  this　Critias　replies　that　the　science　or　knowledge　of　good　and　evil；　and
  all　the　other　sciences；　are　regulated　by　the　higher　science　or　knowledge　of
  knowledge。　　Socrates　replies　by　again　dividing　the　abstract　from　the
  concrete；　and　asks　how　this　knowledge　conduces　to　happiness　in　the　same
  definite　way　in　which　medicine　conduces　to　health。
  And　now；　after　making　all　these　concessions；　which　are　really　inadmissible；
  we　are　still　as　far　as　ever　from　ascertaining　the　nature　of　temperance；
  which　Charmides　has　already　discovered；　and　had　therefore　better　rest　in
  the　knowledge　that　the　more　temperate　he　is　the　happier　he　will　be；　and　not
  trouble　himself　with　the　speculations　of　Socrates。
  In　this　Dialogue　may　be　noted　（1）　The　Greek　ideal　of　beauty　and　goodness；
  the　vision　of　the　fair　soul　in　the　fair　body；　realised　in　the　beautiful
  Charmides；　（2）　The　true　conception　of　medicine　as　a　science　of　the　whole　as
  well　as　the　parts；　and　of　the　mind　as　well　as　the　body；　which　is　playfully
  intimated　in　the　story　of　the　Thracian；　（3）　The　tendency　of　the　age　to
  verbal　distinctions；　which　here；　as　in　the　Protagoras　and　Cratylus；　are
  ascribed　to　the　ingenuity　of　Prodicus；　and　to　interpretations　or　rather
  parodies　of　Homer　or　Hesiod；　which　are　eminently　characteristic　of　Plato
  and　his　contemporaries；　（4）　The　germ　of　an　ethical　principle　contained　in
  the　notion　that　temperance　is　'doing　one's　own　business；'　which　in　the
  Republic　（such　is　the　shifting　character　of　the　Platonic　philosophy）　is
  given　as　the　definition；　not　of　temperance；　but　of　justice；　（5）　The
  impatience　which　is　exhibited　by　Socrates　of　any　definition　of　temperance
  in　which　an　element　of　science　or　knowledge　is　not　included；　（6）　The
  beginning　of　metaphysics　and　logic　implied　in　the　two　questions：　　whether
  there　can　be　a　science　of　science；　and　whether　the　knowledge　of　what　you
  know　is　the　same　as　the　knowledge　of　what　you　do　not　know；　and　also　in　the
  distinction　between　'what　you　know'　and　'that　you　know；'　（Greek；）　here　too
  is　the　first　conception　of　an　absolute　self…determined　science　（the　claims
  of　which；　however；　are　disputed　by　Socrates；　who　asks　cui　bono？）　as　well　as
  the　first　suggestion　of　the　difficulty　of　the　abstract　and　concrete；　and
  one　of　the　earliest　anticipations　of　the　relation　of　subject　and　object；
  and　of　the　subjective　element　in　knowledgea　'rich　banquet'　of
  metaphysical　questions　in　which　we　'taste　of　many　things。'　　（7）　And　still
  the　mind　of　Plato；　having　snatched　for　a　moment　at　these　shadows　of　the
  future；　quickly　rejects　them：　　thus　early　has　he　reached　the　conclusion
  that　there　can　be　no　science　which　is　a　'science　of　nothing'　（Parmen。）。
  （8）　The　conception　of　a　science　of　good　and　evil　also　first　occurs　here；　an
  anticipation　of　the　Philebus　and　Republic　as　well　as　of　moral　philosophy　in
  later　ages。
  The　dramatic　interest　of　the　Dialogue　chiefly　centres　in　the　youth
  Charmides；　with　whom　Socrates　talks　in　the　kindly　spirit　of　an　elder。　　His
  childlike　simplicity　and　ingenuousness