period　of　authorship。　　They　are　substantially　the　same　in　the　twelfth　Book
  of　the　Laws　as　in　the　Meno　and　Phaedo；　and　since　the　Laws　were　written　in
  the　last　decade　of　his　life；　there　is　no　time　to　which　this　change　of
  opinions　can　be　ascribed。　　It　is　true　that　the　theory　of　Ideas　takes
  several　different　forms；　not　merely　an　earlier　and　a　later　one；　in　the
  various　Dialogues。　　They　are　personal　and　impersonal；　ideals　and　ideas；
  existing　by　participation　or　by　imitation；　one　and　many；　in　different　parts
  of　his　writings　or　even　in　the　same　passage。　　They　are　the　universal
  definitions　of　Socrates；　and　at　the　same　time　'of　more　than　mortal
  knowledge'　（Rep。）。　　But　they　are　always　the　negations　of　sense；　of　matter；
  of　generation；　of　the　particular：　　they　are　always　the　subjects　of
  knowledge　and　not　of　opinion；　and　they　tend；　not　to　diversity；　but　to
  unity。　　Other　entities　or　intelligences　are　akin　to　them；　but　not　the　same
  with　them；　such　as　mind；　measure；　limit；　eternity；　essence　（Philebus；
  Timaeus）：　　these　and　similar　terms　appear　to　express　the　same　truths　from　a
  different　point　of　view；　and　to　belong　to　the　same　sphere　with　them。　　But
  we　are　not　justified；　therefore；　in　attempting　to　identify　them；　any　more
  than　in　wholly　opposing　them。　　The　great　oppositions　of　the　sensible　and
  intellectual；　the　unchangeable　and　the　transient；　in　whatever　form　of　words
  expressed；　are　always　maintained　in　Plato。　　But　the　lesser　logical
  distinctions；　as　we　should　call　them；　whether　of　ontology　or　predication；
  which　troubled　the　pre…Socratic　philosophy　and　came　to　the　front　in
  Aristotle；　are　variously　discussed　and　explained。　　Thus　far　we　admit
  inconsistency　in　Plato；　but　no　further。　　He　lived　in　an　age　before　logic
  and　system　had　wholly　permeated　language；　and　therefore　we　must　not　always
  expect　to　find　in　him　systematic　arrangement　or　logical　precision：'poema
  magis　putandum。'　　But　he　is　always　true　to　his　own　context；　the　careful
  study　of　which　is　of　more　value　to　the　interpreter　than　all　the
  commentators　and　scholiasts　put　together。
  （3）　The　conclusions　at　which　Dr。　Jackson　has　arrived　are　such　as　might　be
  expected　to　follow　from　his　method　of　procedure。　　For　he　takes　words
  without　regard　to　their　connection；　and　pieces　together　different　parts　of
  dialogues　in　a　purely　arbitrary　manner；　although　there　is　no　indication
  that　the　author　intended　the　two　passages　to　be　so　combined；　or　that　when
  he　appears　to　be　experimenting　on　the　different　points　of　view　from　which　a
  subject　of　philosophy　may　be　regarded；　he　is　secretly　elaborating　a　system。
  By　such　a　use　of　language　any　premises　may　be　made　to　lead　to　any
  conclusion。　　I　am　not　one　of　those　who　believe　Plato　to　have　been　a　mystic
  or　to　have　had　hidden　meanings；　nor　do　I　agree　with　Dr。　Jackson　in　thinking
  that　'when　he　is　precise　and　dogmatic；　he　generally　contrives　to　introduce
  an　element　of　obscurity　into　the　expostion'　（J。　of　Philol。）。　　The　great
  master　of　language　wrote　as　clearly　as　he　could　in　an　age　when　the　minds　of
  men　were　clouded　by　controversy；　and　philosophical　terms　had　not　yet
  acquired　a　fixed　meaning。　　I　have　just　said　that　Plato　is　to　be　interpreted
  by　his　context；　and　I　do　not　deny　that　in　some　passages；　especially　in　the
  Republic　and　Laws；　the　context　is　at　a　greater　distance　than　would　be
  allowable　in　a　modern　writer。　　But　we　are　not　therefore　justified　in
  connecting　passages　from　different　parts　of　his　writings；　or　even　from　the
  same　work；　which　he　has　not　himself　joined。　　We　cannot　argue　from　the
  Parmenides　to　the　Philebus；　or　from　either　to　the　Sophist；　or　assume　that
  the　Parmenides；　the　Philebus；　and　the　Timaeus　were　'written
  simultaneously；'　or　'were　intended　to　be　studied　in　the　order　in　which　they
  are　here　named　（J。　of　Philol。）　　We　have　no　right　to　connect　statements
  which　are　only　accidentally　similar。　　Nor　is　it　safe　for　the　author　of　a
  theory　about　ancient　philosophy　to　argue　from　what　will　happen　if　his
  statements　are　rejected。　　For　those　consequences　may　never　have　entered
  into　the　mind　of　the　ancient　writer　himself；　and　they　are　very　likely　to　be
  modern　consequences　which　would　not　have　been　understood　by　him。　　'I　cannot
  think；'　says　Dr。　Jackson；　'that　Plato　would　have　changed　his　opinions；　but
  have　nowhere　explained　the　nature　of　the　change。'　　But　is　it　not　much　more
  improbable　that　he　should　have　changed　his　opinions；　and　not　stated　in　an
  unmistakable　manner　that　the　most　essential　principle　of　his　philosophy　had
  been　reversed？　　It　is　true　that　a　few　of　the　dialogues；　such　as　the
  Republic　and　the　Timaeus；　or　the　Theaetetus　and　the　Sophist；　or　the　Meno
  and　the　Apology；　contain　allusions　to　one　another。　　But　these　allusions　are
  superficial　and；　except　in　the　case　of　the　Republic　and　the　Laws；　have　no
  philosophical　importance。　　They　do　not　affect　the　substance　of　the　work。
  It　may　be　remarked　further　that　several　of　the　dialogues；　such　as　the
  Phaedrus；　the　Sophist；　and　the　Parmenides；　have　more　than　one　subject。　　But
  it　does　not　therefore　follow　that　Plato　intended　one　dialogue　to　succeed
  another；　or　that　he　begins　anew　in　one　dialogue　a　subject　which　he　has　left
  unfinished　in　another；　or　that　even　in　the　same　dialogue　he　always　intended
  the　two　parts　to　be　connected　with　each　other。　　We　cannot　argue　from　a
  casual　statement　found　in　the　Parmenides　to　other　statements　which　occur　in
  the　Philebus。　　Much　more　truly　is　his　own　manner　described　by　himself　when
  he　says　that　'words　are　more　plastic　than　wax'　（Rep。）；　and　'whither　the
  wind　blows；　the　argument　follows'。　　The　dialogues　of　Plato　are　like　poems；
  isolated　and　separate　works；　except　where　they　are　indicated　by　the　author
  himself　to　have　an　intentional　sequence。
  It　is　this　method　of　taking　passages　out　of　their　context　and　placing　them
  in　a　new　connexion　when　they　seem　to　confirm　a　preconceived　theory；　which
  is　the　defect　of　Dr。　Jackson's　procedure。　　It　may　be　compared；　though　not
  wholly　the　same　with　it；　to　that　method　which　the　Fathers　practised；
  sometimes　called　'the　mystical　interpretation　of　Scripture；'　in　which
  isolated　words　are　separated　from　their　context；　and　receive　any　sense
  which　the　fancy　of　the　interpreter　may　suggest。　　It　is　akin　to　the　method
  employed　by　Schleiermacher　of　arranging　the　dialogues　of　Plato　in
  chronological　order　according　to　what　he　deems　the　true　arrangement　of　the
  ideas　contained　in　them。　　（Dr。　Jackson　is　also　inclined；　having　constructed
  a　theory；　to　make　the　chronology　of　Plato's　writings　dependent　upon　it
  （See　J。　of　Philol。and　elsewhere。）。）　　It　may　likewise　be　illustrated　by　the
  ingenuity　of　those　who　employ　symbols　to　find　in　Shakespeare　a　hidden
  meaning。　　In　the　three　cases　the　error　is　nearly　the　same：words　are　taken
  out　of　their　natural　context；　and　thus　become　destitute　of　any　real
  meaning。
  （4）　According　to　Dr。　Jackson's　'Later　Theory；'　Plato's　Ideas；　which　were
  once　regarded　as　the　summa　genera　of　all　things；　are　now　to　be　explained　as
  Forms　or　Types　of　some　things　only；that　is　to　say；　of　natural　objects：
  these　we　conceive　imperfectly；　but　are　always　seeking　in　vain　to　have　a
  more　perfect　notion　of　them。　　He　says　（J。　of　Philol。）　that　'Plato　hoped　by
  the　study　of　a　series　of　hypothetical　or　provisional　classifications　to
  arrive　at　one　in　which　nature's　distribution　of　kinds　is　approximately
  represented；　and　so　to　attain　approximately　to　the　knowledge　of　the　ideas。
  But　whereas　in　the　Republic；　and　even　in　the　Phaedo；　though　less　hopefully；
  he　had　sought　to　convert　his　provisional　definitions　into　final　ones　by
  tracing　their　connexion　with　the　summum　genus；　the　（Greek）；　in　the
  Parmenides　his　aspirations　are　less　ambitious；'　and　so　on。　　But　where　does
  Dr。　Jackson　find　any　such　notion　as　this　in　Plato　or　anywhere　in　ancient
  philosophy？　　Is　it　not　an　anachronism；　gracious　to　the　modern　physical
  philosopher；　and　the　more　acceptable　because　it　seems　to　form　a　link
  between　ancient　and　modern　philosophy；　and　between　physical　and
  metaphysical　science；　but　really　unmeaning？
  （5）　To　this　'Later　Theory'　of　Plato's　Ideas　I　oppose　the　authority　of
  Professor　Zeller；　who　affirms　that　none　of　the　passages　to　which　Dr。
  Jackson　appeals　（Theaet。；　Phil。；　Tim。；　Parm。）　'in　the　smallest　degree　prove
  his　point'；　and　that　in　the　second　class　of　dialogues；　in　which　the　'Later
  Theory　of　Ideas'　is　supposed　to　be　found；　quite　as　clearly　as　in　the　first；
  are　admitted　Ideas；　not　only　of　natural　objects；　but　of　properties；
  relations；　works　of　art；　negative　notions　（Theae