ere　does　in　fact　prevail　a　much　greater　unanimity　among　thinking　persons；　than　might　be　supposed　from　their　diametrical　divergence　on　the　great　questions　of　moral　metaphysics。　As　mankind　are　much　more　nearly　of　one　nature；　than　of　one　opinion　about　their　own　nature；　they　are　more　easily　brought　to　agree　in　their　intermediate　principles；　vera　illa　et　media　axiomata；　as　Bacon　says；　than　in　their　first　principles：　and　the　attempt　to　make　the　bearings　of　actions　upon　the　ultimate　end　more　evident　than　they　can　be　made　by　referring　them　to　the　intermediate　ends；　and　to　estimate　their　value　by　a　direct　reference　to　human　happiness；　generally　terminates　in　attaching　most　importance；　not　to　those　effects　which　are　really　the　greatest；　but　to　those　which　can　most　easily　be　pointed　to　and　individually　identified。　Those　who　adopt　utility　as　a　standard　can　seldom　apply　it　truly　except　through　the　secondary　principles；　those　who　reject　it；　generally　do　no　more　than　erect　those　secondary　principles　into　first　principles。　It　is　when　two　or　more　of　the　secondary　principles　conflict；　that　a　direct　appeal　to　some　first　principle　becomes　necessary；　and　then　commences　the　practical　importance　of　the　utilitarian　controversy；　which　is；　in　other　respects；　a　question　of　arrangement　and　logical　subordination　rather　than　of　practice；　important　principally　in　a　purely　scientific　point　of　view；　for　the　sake　of　the　systematic　unity　and　coherency　of　ethical　philosophy。　It　is　probable；　however；　that　to　the　principle　of　utility　we　owe　all　that　Bentham　did；　that　it　was　necessary　for　him　to　find　a　first　principle　which　he　could　receive　as　self…evident；　and　to　which　he　could　attach　all　his　other　doctrines　as　logical　consequences：　that　to　him　systematic　unity　was　an　indispensable　condition　of　his　confidence　in　his　Own　intellect。　And　there　is　something　further　to　be　remarked。　Whether　happiness　be　or　be　not　the　end　to　which　morality　should　be　referred　　that　it　be　referred　to　an　end　of　some　sort；　and　not　left　in　the　dominion　of　vague　feeling　or　inexplicable　internal　conviction；　that　it　be　made　a　matter　of　reason　and　calculation；　and　not　merely　of　sentiment；　is　essential　to　the　very　idea　of　moral　philosophy；　is；　in　fact；　what　renders　argument　or　discussion　on　moral　questions　possible。　That　the　morality　of　actions　depends　on　the　consequences　which　they　tend　to　produce；　is　the　doctrine　of　rational　persons　of　all　schools；　that　the　good　or　evil　of　those　consequences　is　measured　solely　by　pleasure　or　pain；　is　all　of　the　doctrine　of　the　school　of　utility；　which　is　peculiar　to　it。　　　　　In　so　far　as　Bentham's　adoption　of　the　principle　of　utility　induced　him　to　fix　his　attention　upon　the　consequences　of　actions　as　the　consideration　determining　their　morality；　so　far　he　was　indisputably　in　the　right　path：　though　to　go　far　in　it　without　wandering；　there　was　needed　a　greater　knowledge　of　the　formation　of　character；　and　of　the　consequences　of　actions　upon　the　agent's　own　frame　of　mind；　than　Bentham　possessed。　His　want　of　power　to　estimate　this　class　of　consequences；　together　with　his　want　of　the　degree　of　modest　deference　which；　from　those　who　have　not　competent　experience　of　their　own；　is　due　to　the　experience　of　others　on　that　part　of　the　subject；　greatly　limit　the　value　of　his　speculations　on　questions　of　practical　ethics。　　　　　He　is　chargeable　also　with　another　error；　which　it　would　be　improper　to　pass　over；　because　nothing　has　tended　more　to　place　him　in　opposition　to　the　common　feelings　of　mankind；　and　to　give　to　his　philosophy　that　cold；　mechanical　and　ungenial　air　which　characterizes　the　popular　idea　of　a　Benthamite。　This　error；　or　rather　one…sidedness；　belongs　to　him　not　as　a　utilitarian；　but　as　a　moralist　by　profession；　and　in　common　with　almost　all　professed　moralists；　whether　religious　or　philosophical：　it　is　that　of　treating　the　moral　view　of　actions　and　characters；　which　is　unquestionably　the　first　and　most　important　mode　of　looking　at　them；　as　if　it　were　the　sole　one：　whereas　it　is　only　one　of　three；　by　all　of　which　our　sentiments　towards　the　human　being　may　be；　ought　to　be；　and　without　entirely　crushing　our　own　nature　cannot　but　be；　materially　influenced。　Every　human　action　has　three　aspects：　its　moral　aspect；　or　that　of　its　right　and　wrong。　its　aesthetic　aspect；　or　that　of　its　beauty；　its　sympathetic　aspect；　or　that　of　its　loveableness。　The　first　addresses　itself　to　our　reason　and　conscience；　the　second　to　our　imagination；　the　third　to　our　human　fellow…feeling。　According　to　the　first；　we　approve　or　disapprove；　according　to　the　second；　we　admire；　or　despise；　according　to　the　third；　we　love；　pity　or　dislike。　The　morality　of　an　action　depends　on　its　foreseeable　consequences；　its　beauty；　and　its　loveableness；　or　the　reverse；　depend　on　the　qualities　which　it　is　evidence　of。　Thus；　a　lie　is　wrong；　because　its　effect　is　to　mislead；　and　because　it　tends　to　destroy　the　confidence　of　man　in　man；　it　is　also　mean；　because　it　is　cowardly　　because　it　proceeds　from　not　daring　to　face　the　consequences　of　telling　the　truth　　or　at　best　is　evidence　of　want　of　that　power　to　compass　our　ends　by　straightforward　means；　which　is　conceived　as　properly　belonging　to　every　person　not　deficient　in　energy　or　in　understanding。　The　action　of　Brutus　in　sentencing　his　sons　was　right；　because　it　was　executing　a　law　essential　to　the　freedom　of　his　country；　against　persons　of　whose　guilt　there　was　no　doubt：　it　was　admirable；　because　it　evinced　a　rare　degree　of　patriotism；　courage　and　self…control；　but　there　was　nothing　loveable　in　it；　it　affords　either　no　presumption　in　regard　to　loveable　qualities；　or　a　presumption　of　their　deficiency。　If　one　of　the　sons　had　engaged　in　the　conspiracy　from　affection　for　the　other；　his　action　would　have　been　loveable；　though　neither　moral　nor　admirable。　It　is　not　possible　for　any　sophistry　to　confound　these　three　modes　of　viewing　an　action；　but　it　is　very　possible　to　adhere　to　one　of　them　exclusively；　and　lose　sight　of　the　rest。　Sentimentality　consists　in　setting　the　last　two　of　the　three　above　the　first；　the　error　of　moralists　in　general；　and　of　Bentham；　is　to　sink　the　two　latter　entirely。　This　is　pre…eminently　the　case　with　Bentham：　he　both　wrote　and　felt　as　if　the　moral　standard　ought　not　only　to　be　paramount　（which　it　ought）；　but　to　be　alone；　as　if　it　ought　to　be　the　sole　master　of　all　our　actions；　and　even　of　all　our　sentiments；　as　if　either　to　admire　or　like；　or　despise　or　dislike　a　person　for　any　action　which　neither　does　good　nor　harm；　or　which　does　not　do　a　good　or　a　harm　proportioned　to　the　sentiment　entertained；　were　an　injustice　and　a　prejudice。　He　carried　this　so　far；　that　there　were　certain　phrases　which；　being　expressive　of　what　he　considered　to　be　this　groundless　liking　or　aversion；　he　could　not　bear　to　hear　pronounced　in　his　presence。　Among　these　phrases　were　those　of　good　and　bad　taste。　He　thought　it　an　insolent　piece　of　dogmatism　in　one　person　to　praise　or　condemn　another　in　a　matter　of　taste：　as　if　men's　likings　and　dislikings；　on　things　in　themselves　indifferent；　were　not　full　of　the　most　important　inferences　as　to　every　point　of　their　character；　as　if　a　person's　tastes　did　not　show　him　to　be　wise　or　a　fool；　cultivated　or　ignorant；　gentle　or　rough；　sensitive　or　callous；　generous　or　sordid；　benevolent　or　selfish；　conscientious　or　depraved。　　　　　Connected　with　the　same　topic　are　Bentham's　peculiar　opinions　on　poetry。　Much　more　has　been　said　than　there　is　any　foundation　for；　about　his　contempt　for　the　pleasures　of　imagination；　and　for　the　fine　arts。　Music　was　throughout　life　his　favourite　amusement；　painting；　sculpture　and　the　other　arts　addressed　to　the　eye；　he　was　so　far　from　holding　in　any　contempt；　that　he　occasionally　recognizes　them　as　means　employable　for　important　social　ends；　though　his　ignorance　of　the　deeper　springs　of　human　character　prevented　him　（as　it　prevents　most　Englishmen）　from　suspecting　how　profoundly　such　things　enter　into　the　moral　nature　of　man；　and　into　the　education　both　of　the　individual　and　of　the　race。　But　towards　poetry　in　the　narrower　sense；　that　which　employs　the　language　of　words；　he　entertained　no　favour。　Words；　he　thought；　were　perverted　from　their　proper　office　when　they　were　employed　in　uttering　anything　but　precise　logical　truth。　He　says；　somewhere　in　his　works；　that；　'quantity　of　pleasure　being　equal；　push…pin　is　as　good　as　poetry'　　but　this　is　only　a　paradoxical　way　of　stating　what　he　would　equally　have　said　of　the　things　which　he　most　valued　and　admired。　Another　aphorism　is　attributed　to　him；　which　is　much　more　characteristic　of　his　view　of　this　subject：　'All　poetry　is　misrepresentation'。　Poetry；　he　thought；　consisted　essentially　in　exaggeration　for　effect：　in　proclaiming　some　one　view　of　a　thing　very　emphatically；　and　suppressing　all　the　limitations　and　qualifications。　This　trait　of　character　seems　to　us　a　curious　example　of　what　Mr　Carlyle　strikingly　calls　'the　completeness　of　limited　men'。　Here　is　a　philosopher　who　is　happy　within　his　narrow　boundary　as　no　man　of　indefinite　range　ever　was：　who　flatters　himself　that　he　is　so　completely　emancipated　from　the　essential　law　of　poor　human　intellect；　by　which　it　can　only　see　one　thing　at　a　time　well；　that　he　can　even　turn　round　upon　the　imperfection　and　lay　a　solemn　interdict　u