from　jostling　one　another　more　than　is　unavoidable；　may　be　attempted　by　hopes　and　fears　derived　from　three　sources　　the　law；　religion　and　public　opinion。　To　these　three　powers；　considered　as　binding　human　conduct；　he　gave　the　name　of　sanctions。　the　political　sanction；　operating　by　the　rewards　and　penalties　of　the　law；　the　religious　sanction；　by　those　expected　from　the　Ruler　of　the　Universe；　and　the　popular　which　he　characteristically　calls　also　the　moral　sanction；　operating　through　the　pains　and　pleasures　arising　from　the　favour　or　disfavour　of　our　fellow…creatures。　　　　　Such　is　Bentham's　theory　of　the　world。　And　now；　in　a　spirit　neither　of　apology　nor　of　censure；　but　of　calm　appreciation；　we　are　to　inquire　how　far　this　view　of　human　nature　and　life　will　carry　any　one：　how　much　it　will　accomplish　in　morals；　and　how　much　in　political　and　social　philosophy：　what　it　will　do　for　the　individual；　and　what　for　society。　　　　　It　will　do　nothing　for　the　conduct　of　the　individual；　beyond　prescribing　some　of　the　more　obvious　dictates　of　worldly　prudence；　and　outward　probity　and　beneficence。　There　is　no　need　to　expatiate　on　the　deficiencies　of　a　system　of　ethics　which　does　not　pretend　to　aid　individuals　in　the　formation　of　their　own　character。　which　recognizes　no　such　wish　as　that　of　self　culture；　we　may　even　say　no　such　power；　as　existing　in　human　nature；　and　if　it　did　recognize；　could　furnish　little　assistance　to　that　great　duty；　because　it　overlooks　the　existence　of　about　half　of　the　whole　number　of　mental　feelings　which　human　beings　are　capable　of；　including　all　those　of　which　the　direct　objects　are　states　of　their　own　mind。　　　　　Morality　consists　of　two　parts。　One　of　these　is　self…education；　the　training；　by　the　human　being　himself；　of　his　affections　and　will。　That　department　is　a　blank　in　Bentham's　system。　The　other　and　co…equal　part；　the　regulation　of　his　outward　actions；　must　be　altogether　halting　and　imperfect　without　the　first；　for　how　can　we　judge　in　what　manner　many　an　action　will　affect　even　the　worldly　interests　of　ourselves　or　others；　unless　we　take　in；　as　part　of　the　question；　its　influence　on　the　regulation　of　our；　or　their；　affections　and　desires？　A　moralist　on　Bentham's　principles　may　get　as　far　as　this；　that　he　ought　not　to　slay；　burn；　or　steal；　but　what　will　be　his　qualifications　for　regulating　the　nicer　shades　of　human　behaviour；　or　for　laying　down　even　the　greater　moralities　as　to　those　facts　in　human　life　which　tend　to　influence　the　depths　of　the　character　quite　independently　of　any　influence　on　worldly　circumstances　　such；　for　instance；　as　the　sexual　relations；　or　those　of　family　in　general；　or　any　other　social　and　sympathetic　connexions　of　an　intimate　kind？　The　moralities　of　these　questions　depend　essentially　on　considerations　which　Bentham　never　so　much　as　took　into　the　account；　and　when　he　happened　to　be　in　the　right；　it　was　always；　and　necessarily；　on　wrong　or　insufficient　grounds。　　　　　It　is　fortunate　for　the　world　that　Bentham's　taste　lay　rather　in　the　direction　of　jurisprudential　than　of　properly　ethical　inquiry。　Nothing　expressly　of　the　latter　kind　has　been　published　under　his　name；　except　the　'Deontology'　　a　book　scarcely　ever；　in　our　experience；　alluded　to　by　any　admirer　of　Bentham　without　deep　regret　that　it　ever　saw　the　light。　We　did　not　expect　from　Bentham　correct　systematic　views　of　ethics；　or　a　sound　treatment　of　any　question　the　moralities　of　which　require　a　profound　knowledge　of　the　human　heart；　but　we　did　anticipate　that　the　greater　moral　questions　would　have　been　boldly　plunged　into；　and　at　least　a　searching　criticism　produced　of　the　received　opinions；　we　did　not　expect　that　the　petite　morale　almost　alone　would　have　been　treated；　and　that　with　the　most　pedantic　minuteness；　and　on　the　quid　pro　quo　principles　which　regulate　trade。　The　book　has　not　even　the　value　which　would　belong　to　an　authentic　exhibition　of　the　legitimate　consequences　of　an　erroneous　line　of　thought；　for　the　style　proves　it　to　have　been　so　entirely　rewritten；　that　it　is　impossible　to　tell　how　much　or　how　little　of　it　is　Bentham's。　The　collected　edition；　now　in　progress；　will　not；　it　is　said；　include　Bentham's　religious　writings；　these；　although　we　think　most　of　them　of　exceedingly　small　value；　are　at　least　his；　and　the　world　has　a　right　to　whatever　light　they　throw　upon　the　constitution　of　his　mind。　But　the　omission　of　the　'Deontology'　would　be　an　act　of　editorial　discretion　which　we　should　seem　entirely　justifiable。　　　　　If　Bentham's　theory　of　life　can　do　so　little　for　the　individual；　what　can　it　do　for　society？　　　　　It　will　enable　a　society　which　has　attained　a　certain　state　of　spiritual　development；　and　the　maintenance　of　which　in　that　state　is　otherwise　provided　for；　to　prescribe　the　rules　by　which　it　may　protect　its　material　interests。　It　will　do　nothing　（except　sometimes　as　an　instrument　in　the　hands　of　a　higher　doctrine）　for　the　spiritual　interests　of　society；　nor　does　it　suffice　of　itself　even　for　the　material　interests。　That　which　alone　causes　any　material　interests　to　exist；　which　alone　enables　any　body　of　human　beings　to　exist　as　a　society；　is　national　character：　that　it　is；　which　causes　one　nation　to　succeed　in　what　it　attempts；　another　to　fail；　one　nation　to　understand　and　aspire　to　elevated　things；　another　to　grovel　in　mean　ones；　which　makes　the　greatness　of　one　nation　lasting；　and　dooms　another　to　early　and　rapid　decay。　The　true　teacher　of　the　fitting　social　arrangements　for　England；　France；　or　America；　is　the　one　who　can　point　out　how　the　English；　French　or　American　character　can　be　improved；　and　how　it　has　been　made　what　it　is。　A　philosophy　of　laws　and　institutions；　not　founded　on　a　philosophy　of　national　character；　is　an　absurdity。　But　what　could　Bentham's　opinion　be　worth　on　national　character？　How　could　he；　whose　mind　contained　so　few　and　so　poor　types　of　individual　character；　rise　to　that　higher　generalization？　All　he　can　do　is　but　to　indicate　means　by　which；　in　any　given　state　of　the　national　mind；　the　material　interests　of　society　can　be　protected；　saving　the　question；　of　which　others　must　judge；　whether　the　use　of　those　means　would　have；　on　the　national　character；　any　injurious　influence。　　　　　We　have　arrived；　then；　at　a　sort　of　estimate　of　what　a　philosophy　like　Bentham's　can　do。　It　can　teach　the　means　of　organizing　and　regulating　the　merely　business　part　of　the　social　arrangements。　Whatever　can　be　understood　or　whatever　done　without　reference　to　moral　influences；　his　philosophy　is　equal　to；　where　those　influences　require　to　be　taken　into　account；　it　is　at　fault。　He　committed　the　mistake　of　supposing　that　the　business　part　of　human　affairs　was　the　whole　of　them；　all　at　least　that　the　legislator　and　the　moralist　had　to　do　with。　Not　that　he　disregarded　moral　influences　when　he　perceived　them；　but　his　want　of　imagination；　small　experience　of　human　feelings；　and　ignorance　of　the　filiation　and　connexion　of　feelings　with　one　another；　made　this　rarely　the　case。　　　　　The　business　part　is　accordingly　the　only　province　of　human　affairs　which　Bentham　has　cultivated　with　any　success；　into　which　he　had　introduced　any　considerable　number　of　comprehensive　and　luminous　practical　principles。　That　is　the　field　of　his　greatness；　and　there　he　is　indeed　great。　He　has　swept　away　the　accumulated　cobwebs　of　centuries　　he　has　untied　knots　which　the　efforts　of　the　ablest　thinkers；　age　after　age；　had　only　drawn　tighter；　and　it　is　not　exaggeration　to　say　of　him　that　over　a　great　part　of　the　field　he　was　the　first　to　shed　the　light　of　reason。　　　　　We　turn　with　pleasure　from　what　Bentham　could　not　do；　to　what　he　did。　It　is　an　ungracious　task　to　call　a　great　benefactor　of　mankind　to　account　for　not　being　a　greater　　to　insist　upon　the　errors　of　a　man　who　has　originated　more　new　truths；　has　given　to　the　world　more　sound　practical　lessons；　than　it　ever　received；　except　in　a　few　glorious　instances；　from　any　other　individual。　The　unpleasing　part　of　our　work　is　ended。　We　are　now　to　show　the　greatness　of　the　man；　the　grasp　which　his　intellect　took　of　the　subjects　with　which　it　was　fitted　to　deal；　the　giant's　task　which　was　before　him；　and　the　hero's　courage　and　strength　with　which　he　achieved　it。　Nor　let　that　which　he　did　be　deemed　of　small　account　because　its　province　was　limited：　man　has　but　the　choice　to　go　a　little　way　in　many　paths；　or　a　great　way　in　only　one。　The　field　of　Bentham's　labours　was　like　the　space　between　two　parallel　lines；　narrow　to　excess　in　one　direction；　in　another　it　reached　to　infinity。　　　　　Bentham's　speculations；　as　we　are　already　aware；　began　with　law；　and　in　that　department　he　accomplished　his　greatest　triumphs。　He　found　the　philosophy　of　law　a　chaos；　he　left　it　a　science；　he　found　the　practice　of　the　law　an　Augean　stable；　he　turned　the　river　into　it　which　is　mining　and　sweeping　away　mound　after　mound　of　its　rubbish。　　　　　Without　joining　in　the　exaggerated　invectives　against　lawyers；　which　Bentham　sometimes　permitted　to　himself；　or　making　one　portion　of　society　alone　accountable　for　the　fault　of　all；　we　may　say　that　circumstances　had　made　English　lawyers　in　a　peculiar　degree　liable　to　the　reproach　of　Voltaire；　who　defines　lawyers　the　'conservators　of　ancient　barbarous　usages'。　The　basis　of　the　English　law　was；　and　still　is；　the　feudal