y　to　prove；　not　for　their　own　sakes；　because　they　are　acknowledged；　but　that　an　opening　may　be　made　for　the　reception　of　other　truths　which　depend　upon　them。　It　is　in　this　manner　we　provide　for　the　reception　of　first　principles；　which；　once　received；　prepare　the　way　for　admission　of　all　other　truths。'　To　which　may　be　added；　that　in　this　manner　also　we　discipline　the　mind　for　practising　the　same　sort　of　dissection　upon　questions　more　complicated　and　of　more　doubtful　issue。　　　　　It　is　a　sound　maxim；　and　one　which　all　close　thinkers　have　felt；　but　which　no　one　before　Bentham　ever　so　consistently　applied；　that　error　lurks　in　generalities：　that　the　human　mind　is　not　capable　of　embracing　a　complex　whole；　until　it　has　surveyed　and　catalogued　the　parts　of　which　that　whole　is　made　up；　that　abstractions　are　not　realities　per　se；　but　an　abridged　mode　of　expressing　facts；　and　that　the　only　practical　mode　of　dealing　with　them　is　to　trace　them　back　to　the　facts　（whether　of　experience　or　of　consciousness）　of　which　they　are　the　expression。　Proceeding　on　this　principle；　Bentham　makes　short　work　with　the　ordinary　modes　of　moral　and　political　reasoning。　These；　it　appeared　to　him；　when　hunted　to　their　source；　for　the　most　part　terminated　in　phrases。　In　politics；　liberty；　social　order；　constitution；　law　of　nature；　social　compact；　etc。；　were　the　catchwords：　ethics　had　its　analogous　ones。　Such　were　the　arguments　on　which　the　gravest　questions　of　morality　and　policy　were　made　to　turn；　not　reasons；　but　allusions　to　reasons；　sacramental　expressions；　by　which　a　summary　appeal　was　made　to　some　general　sentiment　of　mankind；　or　to　some　maxim　in　familiar　use；　which　might　be　true　or　not；　but　the　limitations　of　which　no　one　had　ever　critically　examined。　And　this　satisfied　other　people；　but　not　Bentham。　He　required　something　more　than　opinion　as　a　reason　for　opinion。　Whenever　he　found　a　phrase　used　as　an　argument　for　or　against　anything；　he　insisted　upon　knowing　what　it　meant；　whether　it　appealed　to　any　standard；　or　gave　intimation　of　any　matter　of　fact　relevant　to　the　question；　and　if　he　could　not　find　that　it　did　either；　he　treated　it　as　an　attempt　on　the　part　of　the　disputant　to　impose　his　own　individual　sentiment　on　other　people；　without　giving　them　a　reason　for　it；　a　'　contrivance　for　avoiding　the　obligation　of　appealing　to　any　external　standard；　and　for　prevailing　upon　the　reader　to　accept　of　the　author's　sentiment　and　opinion　as　a　reason；　and　that　a　sufficient　one；　for　itself。　Bentham　shall　speak　for　himself　on　this　subject：　the　passage　is　from　his　first　systematic　work；　'Introduction　to　the　Principles　of　Morals　and　Legislation'；　and　we　could　scarcely　quote　anything　more　strongly　exemplifying　both　the　strength　and　weakness　of　his　mode　of　philosophizing。
  It　is　curious　enough　to　observe　the　variety　of　inventions　men　have　hit　upon；　and　the　variety　of　phrases　they　have　brought　forward；　in　order　to　conceal　from　the　world；　and；　if　possible；　from　themselves；　this　very　general　and　therefore　very　pardonable　self…sufficiency。　　　　　1。　One　man　says；　he　has　a　thing　made　on　purpose　to　tell　him　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong；　and　that　is　called　a　'moral　sense'。。　and　then　he　goes　to　work　at　his　ease；　and　says；　such　a　thing　is　right；　and　such　a　thing　is　wrong　　why？　'Because　my　moral　sense　tells　me　it　is。'　　　　　2。　Another　man　comes　and　alters　the　phrase：　leaving　out　moral；　and　putting　in　common　in　the　room　of　it。　He　then　tells　you　that　his　common　sense　tells　him　what　is　right　and　wrong；　as　surely　as　the　other's　moral　sense　did；　meaning　by　common　sense　a　sense　of　some　kind　or　other；　which；　he　says；　is　possessed　by　all　mankind：　the　sense　of　those　whose　sense　is　not　the　same　as　the　author's　being　struck　out　as　not　worth　taking。　This　contrivance　does　better　than　the　other；　for　a　moral　sense　being　a　new　thing；　a　man　may　feel　about　him　a　good　while　without　being　able　to　find　it　out：　but　common　sense　is　as　old　as　the　creation；　and　there　is　no　man　but　would　be　ashamed　to　be　thought　not　to　have　as　much　of　it　as　his　neighbours。　It　has　another　great　advantage：　by　appearing　to　share　power；　it　lessens　envy；　for　when　a　man　gets　up　upon　this　ground；　in　order　to　anathematize　those　who　differ　from　him；　it　is　not　by　a　sic　volo　sic　jubeo；　but　by　a　velitis　jubeatis。　　　　　3。　Another　man　comes；　and　says；　that　as　to　a　moral　sense　indeed；　he　cannot　find　that　he　has　any　such　thing：　that；　however；　he　has　an　understanding；　which　will　do　quite　as　well。　This　understanding；　he　says；　is　the　standard　of　right　and　wrong：　it　tells　him　so　and　so。　All　good　and　wise　men　understand　as　he　does：　if　other　men's　understandings　differ　in　any　part　from　his；　so　much　the　worse　for　them：　it　is　a　sure　sign　they　are　either　defective　or　corrupt。　　　　　4。　Another　man　says；　that　there　is　an　eternal　and　immutable　Rule　of　Right：　that　the　rule　of　right　dictates　so　and　so：　and　then　he　begins　giving　you　his　sentiments　upon　anything　that　comes　uppermost：　and　these　sentiments　（you　are　to　take　for　granted）　are　so　many　branches　of　the　eternal　rule　of　right。　　　　　5。　Another　man；　or　perhaps　the　same　man　（it　is　nO　matter）；　says　that　there　are　certain　practices　conformable　and　others　repugnant；　to　the　Fitness　of　Things；　and　then　he　tells　you；　at　his　leisure；　what　practices　are　conformable；　and　what　repugnant：　just　as　he　happens　to　like　a　practice　or　dislike　it。　　　　　6。　A　great　multitude　of　people　are　continually　talking　of　the　Law　of　Nature；　and　then　they　go　on　giving　you　their　sentiments　about　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong：　and　these　sentiments；　you　are　to　understand；　are　so　many　chapters　and　sections　of　the　Law　of　Nature。　　　　　7。　Instead　of　the　phrase；　Law　of　Nature；　you　have　sometimes　Law　of　Reason；　Right　Reason；　Natural　Justice；　Natural　Equity；　Good　Order。　Any　of　them　will　do　equally　well。　This　latter　is　most　used　in　politics。　The　three　last　are　much　more　tolerable　than　the　others；　because　they　do　not　very　explicitly　claim　to　be　anything　more　than　phrases：　they　insist　but　feebly　upon　their　being　looked　upon　as　so　many　positive　standards　of　themselves；　and　seem　content　to　be　taken；　upon　occasion；　for　phrases　expressive　of　the　conformity　of　the　thing　in　question　to　the　proper　standards；　whatever　that　may　be。　On　most　occasions；　however；　it　will　be　better　to　say　utility。　utility　is　clearer　as　referring　more　explicitly　to　pain　and　pleasure。　　　　　8。　We　have　one　philosopher；　who　says；　there　is　no　harm　in　anything　in　the　world　but　in　telling　a　lie；　and　that　if；　for　example；　you　were　to　murder　your　own　father；　this　would　only　be　a　particular　way　of　saying；　he　was　not　your　father。　Of　course　when　this　philosopher　sees　anything　that　he　does　not　like；　he　says；　it　is　a　particular　way　of　telling　a　lie。　It　is　saying；　that　the　act　ought　to　be　done；　or　may　be　done；　when；　in　truth；　it　ought　not　be　done。　　　　　9。　The　fairest　and　openest　of　them　all　is　that　sort　of　man　who　speaks　out；　and　says；　I　am　of　the　number　of　the　Elect：　now　God　himself　takes　care　to　inform　the　Elect　what　is　right：　and　that　with　so　good　effect；　and　let　them　strive　ever　so；　they　cannot　help　not　only　knowing　it　but　practising　it。　If　therefore　a　man　wants　to　know　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong；　he　has　nothing　to　do　but　to　come　to　me。
  Few　will　contend　that　this　is　a　perfectly　fair　representation　of　the　animus　of　those　who　employ　the　various　phrases　so　amusingly　animadverted　on；　but　that　the　phrases　contain　no　argument；　save　what　is　grounded　on　the　very　feelings　they　are　adduced　to　justify；　is　a　truth　which　Bentham　had　the　eminent　merit　of　first　pointing　out。　　　　　It　is　the　introduction　into　the　philosophy　of　human　conduct；　of　this　method　of　detail　　of　this　practice　of　never　reasoning　about　wholes　until　they　have　been　resolved　into　their　parts；　nor　about　abstractions　until　they　have　been　translated　into　realities　　that　constitutes　the　originality　of　Bentham　in　philosophy；　and　makes　him　the　great　reformer　of　the　moral　and　political　branch　of　it。　To　what　he　terms　the　'exhaustive　method　of　classification'；　which　is　but　one　branch　of　this　more　general　method；　he　himself　ascribes　everything　original　in　the　systematic　and　elaborate　work　from　which　we　have　quoted。　The　generalities　of　his　philosophy　itself　have　little　or　no　novelty：　to　ascribe　any　to　the　doctrine　that　general　utility　is　the　foundation　of　morality；　would　imply　great　ignorance　of　the　history　of　philosophy；　of　general　literature；　and　of　Bentham's　own　writings。　He　derived　the　idea；　as　he　says　himself；　from　Helvetius；　and　it　was　the　doctrine　no　less；　of　the　religious　philosophers　of　that　age；　prior　to　Reid　and　Beattie。　We　never　saw　an　abler　defence　of　the　doctrine　of　utility　than　in　a　book　written　in　refutation　of　Shaftesbury；　and　now　little　read　　Brown's　'Essays　on　the　Characteristics'；　and　in　Johnson's　celebrated　review　of　Soame　Jenyns；　the　same　doctrine　is　set　forth　as　that　both　of　the　author　and　of　the　reviewer。　In　all　ages　of　philosophy　one　of　its　schools　has　been　utilitarian　　not　only　from　the　time　of　Epicurus；　but　long　before。　It　was　by　mere　accident　that　this　opinion　became　connected　in　Bentham　with　his　peculiar　method。　The　utilitarian　philosophers　antecedent　to　him　had　no　more　claims　to　the　method　than　their　antagonists。　To　refer；　for　instance；　to　the　Epicurean　philosophy；　according　to　the　most　complete　view　we　have　of　the　mora