第 73 节
作者:桃桃逃      更新:2022-08-21 16:33      字数:9314
  much not executed as executed; the end in question put as unessential as much as
  essential; as actual and at the same time as merely possible。 This contradiction
  presents itself to imagination as an endless progress in the actualising of the Good;
  which is therefore set up and fixed as a mere 'ought'; or goal of perfection。 In
  point of form however this contradiction vanishes when the action supersedes the
  subjectivity of the purpose; and along with it the objectivity; with the contrast
  which makes both finite; abolishing subjectivity as a whole and not merely the
  one…sidedness of this form of it。 (For another new subjectivity of the kind; that is;
  a new generation of the contrast; is not distinct from that which is supposed to be
  past and gone。) This return into itself is at the same time the content's own
  'recollection' that it is the Good and the implicit identity of the two sides … it is a
  'recollection' of the presupposition of the theoretical attitude of mind (§ 224) that
  the objective world is its own truth and substantiality。
  § 234n
  While Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it is; Will takes steps to make the world
  what it ought to be。 Will looks upon the immediate and given present not as solid being; but as
  mere semblance without reality。 It is here that we meet those contradictions which are so
  bewildering from the standpoint of abstract morality。 This position in its 'practical' bearings is the
  one taken by the philosophy of Kant; and even by that of Fichte。 The Good; say these writers; has
  to be realised: we have to work in order to produce it: and Will is only the Good actualising itself。
  If the world then were as it ought to be; the action of Will would be at an end。 The Will itself
  therefore requires that its End should not be realised。 In these words; a correct expression is given
  to the finitude of Will。 But finitude was not meant to be the ultimate point: and it is the process of
  Will itself which abolishes finitude and the contradiction it involves。
  The reconciliation is achieved when Will in its result returns to the presupposition made by
  cognition。 In other words; it consists in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea。 Will knows
  the end to be its own; and Intelligence apprehends the world as the notion actual。 This is the right
  attitude of rational cognition。 Nullity and transitoriness constitute only the superficial features and
  not the real essence of the world。 That essence is the notion in posse and in esse: and thus the
  world is itself the idea。 All unsatisfied endeavour ceases; when we recognise that the final purpose
  of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself。 Generally speaking; this is the
  man's way of looking; while the young imagine that the world is utterly sunk in wickedness; and
  that the first thing needful is a thorough transformation。 The religious mind; on the contrary; views
  the world as ruled by Divine Providence; and therefore correspondent with what it ought to be。
  But this harmony between the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not torpid and rigidly stationary。 Good;
  the final end of the world; has being; only while it constantly produces itself。 And the world of
  spirit and the world of nature continue to have this distinction; that the latter moves only in a
  recurring cycle; while the former certainly also makes progress。
  §235
  Thus the truth of the Good is laid down as the unity of the theoretical and
  practical idea in the doctrine that the Good is radically and really achieved; that
  the objective world is in itself and for itself the Idea; just as it at the same time
  eternally lays itself down as End; and by action brings about its actuality。 This life
  which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition; and which by
  the activity of the notion has become identical with it; is the Speculative or
  Absolute Idea。
  (c) The Absolute Idea
  §236
  The Idea; as unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea; is the notion of the Idea
  … a notion whose object (Gegenstand) is the Idea as such; and for which the
  objective (Objekt) is Idea … an Object which embraces all characteristics in its
  unity。 This unity is consequently the absolute and all truth; the Idea which thinks
  itself … and here at least as a thinking or Logical Idea。
  § 236n
  The Absolute Idea is; in the first place; the unity of the theoretical and practical idea; and thus at
  the same time the unity of the idea of life with the idea of cognition。 In cognition we had the idea in
  a biased; one…sided shape。 The process of cognition has issued in the overthrow of this bias and
  the restoration of that unity; which as unity; and in its immediacy; is in the first instance the Idea of
  Life。 The defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or natural: whereas cognition is in an
  equally one…sided way the merely conscious idea; or the idea for itself。 The unity and truth of these
  two is the Absolute Idea; which is both in itself and for itself。 Hitherto we have had the idea in
  development through its various grades as our object; but now the idea comes to be its own
  object。 This is the noisis noiseos which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea。
  § 237
  Seeing that there is in it no transition; or presupposition; and in general no specific
  character other than what is fluid and transparent; the Absolute Idea is for itself
  the pure form of the notion; which contemplates its contents as its own self。 It is
  its own content; in so far as it ideally distinguishes itself from itself; and the one
  of the two things distinguished is a self…identity in which however is contained the
  totality of the form as the system of terms describing its content。 This content is
  the system of Logic。 All that is at this stage left as form for the idea is the Method
  of this content … the specific consciousness of the value and currency of the
  'moments' in its development。
  § 237n
  To speak of the absolute idea may suggest the conception that we are at length reaching the right
  thing and the sum of the whole matter。 It is certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of
  senseless declamation about the idea absolute。 But its true content is only the whole system of
  which we have been hitherto studying the development。 It may also be said in this strain that the
  absolute idea is the universal; but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which the
  particular content is a stranger; but as the absolute form; into which all the categories; the whole
  fullness of the content it has given being to; have retired。 The absolute idea may in this respect be
  compared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child; but for whom it is pregnant with
  the significance of a lifetime。 Even if the child understands the truths of religion; he cannot but
  imagine them to be something outside of which lies the whole of life and the whole of the world。
  The same may be said to be the case with human life as a whole and the occurrences with which it
  is fraught。 All work is directed only to the aim or end; and when it is attained; people are surprised
  to find nothing else but just the very thing which they had wished for。 The interest lies in the whole
  movement。 When a man traces up the steps of his life; the end may appear to him very restricted:
  but in it the whole decursus vitae is comprehended。 So; too; the content of the absolute idea is
  the whole breadth of ground which has passed under our view up to this point。 Last of all comes
  the discovery that the whole evolution is what constitutes the content and the interest。 It is indeed
  the prerogative of the philosopher to see that everything; which; taken apart; is narrow and
  restricted; receives its value by its connection with the whole; and by forming an organic element
  of the idea。 Thus it is that we have had the content already; and what we have now is the
  knowledge that the content is the living development of the idea。 This simple retrospect is
  contained in the form of the idea。 Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image of the absolute;
  but at first in a limited way; and thus it is forced onwards to the whole; the evolution of which is
  what we termed Method。
  §238
  The several steps or stages of the Speculative Method are; first of all; (a) the
  Beginning; which is Being or Immediacy: self…subsistent; for the simple reason
  that it is the beginning。 But looked at from the speculative idea; Being is its
  self…specialising act; which as the absolute negativity or movement of the notion
  makes a judgement and puts itself as its own negative。 Being; which to the
  beginning as beginning seems mere abstract affirmation; is thus rather negation;
  dependency; derivation; and presupposition。 But it is the notion of which Being is
  the negation: and the notion is completely self…identical in its otherness; and is the
  certainty of itself。 Being ther