as　it　were；　take　possession　of　his　body；　so　that　it　may　be　the　instrument　of　his　soul。
  §　209
  （3）Purposive　action；　with　its　Means；　is　still　directed　outwards；　because　the　End　is
  also　not　identical　with　the　object；　and　must　consequently　first　be　mediated　with　it。
  The　Means　in　its　capacity　of　object　stands；　in　this　second　premise；　in　direct
  relation　to　the　other　extreme　of　the　syllogism；　namely；　the　material　or　objectivity
  which　is　presupposed。　This　relation　is　the　sphere　of　chemism　and　mechanism；
  which　have　now　become　the　servants　of　the　Final　Cause；　where　lies　their　truth
  and　free　notion。　Thus　the　Subjective　End；　which　is　the　power　ruling　these
  processes；　in　which　the　objective　things　wear　themselves　out　on　one　another；
  contrives　to　keep　itself　free　from　them；　and　to　preserve　itself　in　them。　Doing　so；　it
  appears　as　the　Cunning　of　reason。
  §　209n
  Reason　is　as　cunning　as　it　is　powerful。　Cunning　may　be　said　to　lie　in　the　intermediative　action
  which；　while　it　permits　the　objects　to　follow　their　own　bent　and　act　upon　one　another　till　they
  waste　away；　and　does　not　itself　directly　interfere　in　the　process；　is　nevertheless　only　working　out
  its　own　aims。　With　this　explanation；　Divine　Providence　may　be　said　to　stand　to　the　world　and　its
  process　in　the　capacity　of　absolute　cunning。　God　lets　men　do　as　they　please　with　their　particular
  passions　and　interests；　but　the　result　is　the　accomplishment　of…not　their　plans；　but　his；　and　these
  differ　decidedly　from　the　ends　primarily　sought　by　those　whom　he　employs。
  §　210
  The　Realised　End　is　thus　the　overt　unity　of　subjective　and　objective。　It　is
  however　essentially　characteristic　of　this　unity；　that　the　subjective　and　objective
  are　neutralised　and　cancelled　only　in　the　point　of　their　one…sidedness；　while　the
  objective　is　subdued　and　made　conformable　to　the　End；　as　the　free　notion；　and
  thereby　to　the　power　above　it。　The　End　maintains　itself　against　and　in　the
  objective：　for　it　is　no　mere　one…sided　subjective　or　particular；　it　is　also　the
  concrete　universal；　the　implicit　identity　of　both。　This　universal；　as　simply　reflected
  in　itself；　is　the　content　which　remains　unchanged　through　all　the　three　termini　of
  the　syllogism　and　their　movement。
  §　211
  In　Finite　Design；　however；　even　the　executed　End　has　the　same　radical　rift　or
  flaw　as　had　the　Means　and　the　initial　End。　We　have　got　therefore　only　a　form
  extraneously　impressed　on　a　pre…existing　material：　and　this　form；　by　reason　of　the
  limited　content　of　the　End；　is　also　a　contingent　characteristic。　The　End　achieved
  consequently　is　only　an　object；　which　again　becomes　a　Means　or　material　for
  other　Ends；　and　so　on　for　ever。
  §　212
  But　what　virtually　happens　in　the　realising　of　the　End　is　that　the　one…sided
  subjectivity　and　the　show　of　objective　independence　confronting　it　are　both
  cancelled。　In　laying　hold　of　the　means；　the　notion　constitutes　itself　the　very
  implicit　essence　of　the　object。　In　the　mechanical　and　chemical　processes；　the
  independence　of　the　object　has　been　already　dissipated　implicitly；　and　in　the
  course　of　their　movement　under　the　dominion　of　the　End；　the　show　of　that
  independence；　the　negative　which　confronts　the　Notion；　is　got　rid　of。　But　in　the
  fact　that　the　End　achieved　is　characterised　only　as　a　Means　and　a　material；　this
  object；　viz。　the　teleological；　is　there　and　then　put　as　implicitly　null；　and　only
  'ideal'。　This　being　so；　the　antithesis　between　form　and　content　has　also　vanished。
  While　the　End　by　the　removal　and　absorption　of　all　form…characteristics　coalesces
  with　itself；　the　form　as　self…identical　is　thereby　put　as　the　content；　so　that　the
  notion；　which　is　the　action　of　form；　has　only　itself　for　content。　Through　this
  process；　therefore；　there　is　made　explicitly　manifest　what　was　the　notion　of
  design：　viz。　the　implicit　unity　of　subjective　and　objective　is　now　realised。　And　this
  is　the　Idea。
  §　212n
  This　finitude　of　the　End　consists　in　the　circumstance；　that；　in　the　process　of　realising　it；　the　material；
  which　is　employed　as　a　means；　is　only　externally　subsumed　under　it　and　made　conformable　to　it。
  But；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　the　object　is　the　notion　implicitly：　and　thus　when　the　notion；　in　the　shape　of
  End；　is　realised　in　the　object；　we　have　but　the　manifestation　of　the　inner　nature　of　the　object　itself。
  Objectivity　is　thus；　as　it　were；　only　a　covering　under　which　the　notion　lies　concealed。　Within　the
  range　of　the　finite　we　can　never　see　or　experience　that　the　End　has　been　really　secured。　The
  consummation　of　the　infinite　End；　therefore；　consists　merely　in　removing　the　illusion　which　makes　it
  seem　yet　unaccomplished。　The　Good；　the　absolutely　Good；　is　eternally　accomplishing　itself　in　the
  world：　and　the　result　is　that　it　need　not　wait　upon　us；　but　is　already　by　implication；　as　well　as　in　full
  actuality；　accomplished。　This　is　the　illusion　under　which　we　live。　It　alone　supplies　at　the　same　time
  the　actualising　force　on　which　the　interest　in　the　world　reposes。
  In　the　course　of　its　process　the　Idea　creates　that　illusion；　by　setting　an　antithesis　to　confront　it；　and
  its　action　consists　in　getting　rid　of　the　illusion　which　it　has　created。　Only　out　of　this　error　does　the
  truth　arise。　In　this　fact　lies　the　reconciliation　with　error　and　with　finitude。　Error　or　other…being；
  when　superseded；　is　still　a　necessary　dynamic　element　of　truth：　for　truth　can　only　be　where　it
  makes　itself　its　own　result。
  Third　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
  C。　THE　IDEA
  Development　of　The　Idea
  ＇Life＇　…　＇Cognition＇　…　＇Absolute　Idea＇
  §213
  The　Idea　is　truth　in　itself　and　for　itself　—　the　absolute　unity　of　the　notion　and
  objectivity。　Its　'ideal'　content　is　nothing　but　the　notion　in　its　detailed　terms：　its
  'real'　content　is　only　the　exhibition　which　the　notion　gives　itself　in　the　form　of
  external　existence；　while　yet；　by　enclosing　this　shape　in　its　ideality；　it　keeps　it　in　its
  power；　and　so　keeps　itself　in　it。
  The　definition；　which　declares　the　Absolute　to　be　the　Idea；　is　itself　absolute。　All
  former　definitions　come　back　to　this。　The　Idea　is　the　And　yet；　again；　everything
  actual；　in　so　far　as　it　is　true；　is　the　Idea；　and　has　its　truth　by　and　in　virtue　of　the
  Idea　alone。　Every　individual　being　is　some　one　aspect　of　the　Idea：　for　which；
  therefore；　yet　other　actualities　are　needed；　which　in　their　turn　appear　to　have　a
  self…subsistence　of　their　own。　It　is　only　in　them　altogether　and　in　their　relation　that
  the　notion　is　realised。
  The　individual　by　itself　does　not　correspond　to　its　notion。　It　is　this　limitation　of　its
  existence　which　constitutes　the　finitude　and　the　ruin　of　the　individual。
  The　Idea　itself　is　not　to　be　taken　as　an　idea　of　something　or　other；　any　more　than
  the　notion　is　to　be　taken　as　merely　a　specific　notion。　The　Absolute　is　the　universal
  and　one　idea；　which；　by　an　act　of　'judgement'；　particularises　itself　to　the　system
  of　specific　ideas；　which　after　all　are　constrained　by　their　nature　to　come　back　to
  the　one　idea　where　their　truth　lies。　As　issued　out　of　this　'judgement'　the　Idea　is　in
  the　first　place　only　the　one　universal　substance：　but　its　developed　and　genuine
  actuality　is　to　be　as　a　subject　and　in　that　way　as　mind。
  Because　it　has　no　existence　for　starting…point　and　point　d'appui；　the　Idea　is
  frequently　treated　as　a　mere　logical　form。　Such　a　view　must　be　abandoned　to
  those　theories　which　ascribe　so…called　reality　and　genuine　actuality　to　the　existent
  thing　and　all　the　other　categories　which　have　not　yet　penetrated　as　far　as　the　Idea。
  It　is　no　less　false　to　imagine　the　Idea　to　be　mere　abstraction。　It　is　abstract
  certainly；　in　so　far　as　everything　untrue　is　consumed　in　it：　but　in　its　own　self　it　is
  essentially　concrete；　because　it　is　the　free　notion　giving　character　to　itself；　and　that
  character；　reality。　It　would　be　an　abstract　form；　only　if　the　notion；　which　is　its
  principle；　were　taken　as　an　abstract　unity；　and　not　as　the　negative　return　of　it　into
  self　and　as　the　subjectivity　which　it　really　is。
  §213n
  Truth　is　at　first　taken　to　mean　that　I　know　how　something　is。　This　is　truth；　however；　only　in
  reference　to　consciousness；　it　is　formal　truth；　bare　correctness。　Truth　in　the　deeper　sense　consists
  in　the　identity　between　objectivity　and　the　notion。　It　is　in　this　deeper　sense　of　truth　that　we　speak
  of　a　true　state；　or　of　a　true　work　of　art。　These　objects　are　true；　if　they　are　as　they　ought　to　be；　i。e。
  if　their　reality　corresponds　to　their　notion。　When　thus　viewed；　to　be　untrue　means　much　the　same
  as　to　be　bad。　A　bad　man　is　an　untrue　man；　a　man　who　does　not　behave　as　his　notion　or　his
  vocation　requires。　Nothing　however　can　subsist；　if　it　be　wholly　devoid　of　identity　between　the
  notion　and　reality。　Even　bad　and　untrue　things　have　being；　in　so　far　as　their　reality　still；　somehow；
  conforms　to　their　notion。　Whatever　is　thoroughly　b