The　Judgment　is　usually　taken　in　a　subjective　sense　as　an　operation　and　a　form；
  occurring　merely　in　self…conscious　thought。　This　distinction；　however；　has　no
  existence　on　purely　by　which　the　judgment　is　taken　in　the　quite　universal
  signification　that　all　things　are　a　judgment。　That　is　to　say；　they　are　individuals
  which　are　a　universality　or　inner　nature　in　themselves　…　a　universal　which　is
  individualised。　Their　universality　and　individuality　are　distinguished；　but　the　one　is
  at　the　same　time　identical　with　the　other。
  The　interpretation　of　the　judgment；　according　to　which　it　is　assumed　to　be　merely
  subjective；　as　if　we　ascribed　a　predicate　to　a　subject　is　contradicted　by　the
  decidedly　objective　expression　of　the　judgment。　The　rose　is　red；　Gold　is　a　metal。
  It　is　not　by　us　that　something　is　first　ascribed　to　them。　A　judgment　is　however
  distinguished　from　a　proposition。　The　latter　contains　a　statement　about　the
  subject；　which　does　not　stand　to　it　in　any　universal　relationship；　but　expresses
  some　single　action；　or　some　state；　or　the　like。　Thus；　'Caesar　was　born　at　Rome　in
  such　and　such　a　year　waged　war　in　Gaul　for　ten　years；　crossed　the　Rubicon；　etc。'；
  are　propositions；　but　not　judgments。　Again　it　is　absurd　to　say　that　such　statements
  as　'I　slept　well　last　night'　or　'Present　arms！'　maybe　turned　into　the　form　of　a
  judgment。　'A　carriage　is　passing　by'　should　be　a　judgment；　and　a　subjective　one　at
  best；　only　if　it　were　doubtful；　whether　the　passing　object　was　a　carriage；　or
  whether　it　and　not　rather　the　point　of　observation　was　in　motion：　in　short；　only　if
  it　were　desired　to　specify　a　conception　which　was　still　short　of　appropriate
  specification。
  §　168
  The　judgment　is　an　expression　of　finitude。　Things　from　its　point　of　view　are　said
  to　be　finite；　because　they　are　a　judgment；　because　their　definite　being　and　their
  universal　nature　（their　body　and　their　soul）；　though　united　indeed　（otherwise　the
  things　would　be　nothing）；　are　still　elements　in　the　constitution　which　are　already
  different　and　also　in　any　case　separable。
  §　169
  The　abstract　terms　of　the　judgment；　'The　individual　is　the　Universal'；　present　the
  subject　（as　negatively　self…relating）　as　what　is　immediately　concrete；　while　the
  predicate　is　what　is　abstract；　indeterminate；　in　short；　the　universal。　But　the　two
  elements　are　connected　together　by　an　'is'：　and　thus　the　predicate　（in　its
  universality）　must　also　contain　the　speciality　of　the　subject；　must；　in　short；　have
  particularity：　and　so　is　realised　the　identity　between　subject　and　predicate；　which；
  being　thus　unaffected　by　this　difference　in　form；　is　the　content。
  It　is　the　predicate　which　first　gives　the　subject；　which　till　then　was　on　its　own
  account　a　bare　mental　representation　or　an　empty　name；　its　specific　character　and
  content。　In　judgments　like　'God　is　the　most　real　of　all　things'；　or　'The　Absolute　is
  the　self…identical'；　God　and　the　Absolute　are　mere　names；　what　they　are　we　only
  learn　in　the　predicate。　What　the　subject　may　be　in　other　respects；　as　a　concrete
  thing；　is　no　concern　of　this　judgment。　（Cf。　§　31。）
  §　169n
  To　define　the　subject　as　that　of　which　something　is　said；　and　the　predicate　as　what　is　said　about　it；
  is　mere　trifling。　It　gives　no　information　about　the　distinction　between　the　two。　In　point　of　thought；
  the　subject　is　primarily　the　individual；　and　the　predicate　the　universal。　As　the　judgment　receives
  further　development；　the　subject　ceases　to　be　merely　the　immediate　individual；　and　the　predicate
  merely　the　abstract　universal：　the　former　acquires　the　additional　significations　of　particular　and
  universal；　the　latter　the　additional　significations　of　particular　and　individual。　Thus　while　the　same
  names　are　given　to　the　two　terms　of　the　judgment；　their　meaning　passes　through　a　series　of
  changes。
  §　170
  We　now　go　closer　into　the　speciality　of　subject　and　predicate。　The　subject　as
  negative　self…relation　（§§　163；　166）　is　the　stable　sub…stratum　in　which　the
  predicate　has　its　subsistence　and　where　it　is　ideally　present。　The　predicate；　as　the
  phrase　is；　inheres　in　the　subject。　Further；　as　the　subject　is　in　general　and
  immediately　concrete；　the　specific　connotation　of　the　predicate　is　only　one　of　the
  numerous　characters　of　the　subject。　Thus　the　subject　is　ampler　and　wider　than
  the　predicate。
  Conversely；　the　predicate　as　universal　is　self…subsistent；　and　indifferent　whether
  this　subject　is　or　not。　The　predicate　outflanks　the　subject；　subsuming　it　under
  itself：　and　hence　on　its　side　is　wider　than　the　subject。　The　specific　content　of　the
  predicate　（§　19）　alone　constitutes　the　identity　of　the　two。
  The　Judgment　（continued）　…The　Syllogism
  Transition　to　the　Object
  §　193
  This　'realisation'　of　the　Notion　…　a　realisation　in　which　the　universal　is　this　one
  totality　withdrawn　back　into　itself　（of　which　different　members　are　no　less　the
  whole；　and　which　has　given　itself　a　character　of　'immediate'　unity　by　merging　the
  mediation）　…　this　realisation　of　the　notion　is　the　Object。
  This　transition　from　the　Subject；　the　notion　in　general；　and　especially　the
  syllogism；　to　the　Object；　may；　at　the　first　glance；　appear　strange；　particularly　if　we
  look　only　at　the　Syllogism　of　Understanding；　and　suppose　syllogising　to　be　only
  an　act　of　consciousness；　。。。　whether　our　usual　conception　of　what　is　called　an
  'object'　approximately　corresponds　to　the　object　as　here　described。　By　'object'　is
  commonly　understood　not　an　abstract　being；　or　an　existing　thing　merely；　or　any
  sort　of　actuality；　but　something　independent；　concrete；　and　self…complete；　this
  completeness　being　the　totality　of　the　notion。　That　the　object　is　also　an　object　to
  us　and　is　external　to　something　else；　will　be　more　precisely　seen　when　it　puts　itself
  in　contrast　with　the　subjective。　At　present；　as　that　into　which　the　notion　has
  passed　from　its　mediation；　it　is　only　immediate　object　and　nothing　more；　just　as
  the　notion　is　not　describable　as　subjective；　previous　to　the　subsequent　contrast
  with　objectivity。　？
  Further；　the　Object　in　general　is　the　one　total；　in　itself　still　unspecified；　the
  Objective　World　as　a　whole；　God；　the　Absolute　Object。　The　object；　however；　has
  also　difference　attaching　to　it：　it　falls　into　pieces；　indefinite　in　their　multiplicity
  （making　an　objective　world）；　and　each　of　these　individualised　parts　is　also　an
  object；　an　intrinsically　concrete；　complete；　and　independent　existence。
  Objectivity　has　been　compared　with　being；　existence；　and　actuality；　and　so　too　the
  transition　to　existence　and　actuality　（not　to　being；　for　it　is　the　primary　and　quite
  abstract　immediate）　may　be　compared　with　the　transition　to　objectivity。　The
  ground　from　which　existence　proceeds；　and　the　reflective　correlation　which　is
  merged　in　actuality；　are　nothing　but　the　as　yet　imperfectly　realised　notion。　They
  are　only　abstract　aspects　of　it　—　the　ground　being　its　merely　essence…bred　unity；
  and　the　correlation　only　the　connection　of　real　sides　which　are　supposed　to　have
  only　self…reflected　being。　The　notion　is　the　unity　of　the　two；　and　the　object　is　not
  a　merely　essence…like；　but　inherently　universal　unity；　not　only　containing　real
  distinctions；　but　containing　them　as　totalities　in　itself。
  It　is　evident　that　in　all　these　transitions　there　is　a　further　purpose　than　merely　to
  show　the　indissoluble　connection　between　the　notion　or　thought　and　being。　It　has
  been　more　than　once　remarked　that　being　is　nothing　more　than　simple
  self…relation；　and　this　meagre　category　is　certainly　implied　in　the　notion；　or　even　in
  thought。　But　the；　meaning　of　these　transitions　is　not　to　accept　characteristics　or
  categories；　as　only　implied　—　a　fault　which　mars　even　the　Ontological　argument
  for　God's　existence；　when　it　is　stated　that　being　is　one　among　realities。　What　such
  a　transition　does；　is　to　take　the　notion；　as　it　ought　to　be　primarily　characterised
  per　se　as　a　notion；　with　which　this　remote　abstraction　of　being；　or　even　of
  objectivity；　has　as　yet　nothing　to　do；　and　looking　at　its　specific　character　as　a
  notional　character　alone；　to　see　when　and　whether　it　passes　over　into　a　form
  which　is　different　from　the　character　as　it　belongs　to　the　notion　and　appears　in　it。
  If　the　Object；　the　product　of　this　transition；　be　brought　into　relation　with　the
  notion；　which；　so　far　as　its　special　form　is　concerned；　has　vanished　in　it；　we　may
  give　a　correct　expression　to　the　result；　by　saying　that　notion　（or；　if　it　be　preferred；
  subjectivity）　and　object　are　implicitly　the　same。　But　it　is　equally　correct　to　say
  that　they　are　different。　In　short；　the　two　modes　of　expression　are　equally　correct
  and　incorrect。　The　true　state　of　the　case　can　be　presented　in　no　expressions　of
  this　find。　The　'implicit'　is　an　abstraction；　still　more　partial　and　inadequate　than　the
  notion　itself；　of　which　the　inadequacy　is　on　the　whole　suspended；　by　suspending
  itself　to　the　object　with　its　opposite　inadequacy。　Hence　that　implicitness　also
  must；　by　its　negation；　give　itself　t