or　receive　another　content　than　its　own。　It　is　itself　the　absolute　form；　and　so　is　all
  specific　character；　but　as　that　character　is　in　its　truth。　Although　it　be　abstract
  therefore；　it　is　the　concrete；　concrete　altogether；　the　subject　as　such。　The
  absolutely　concrete　is　the　mind　（see　end　of　§　159）　…　the　notion　when　it　exists　as
  notion　distinguishing　itself　from　its　objectivity；　which　notwithstanding　the
  distinction　still　continues　to　be　its　own。　Everything　else　which　is　concrete；
  however　rich　it　be；　is　not　so　intensely　identical　with　itself　and　therefore　not　so
  concrete　on　its　own　part　…　least　of　all　what　is　commonly　supposed　to　be　concrete；
  but　is　only　a　congeries　held　together　by　external　influence。　What　are　called
  notions；　and　in　fact　specific　notions；　such　as　man；　house；　animal；　etc。；　are　simply
  denotations　and　abstract　representations。　These　abstractions　retain　out　of　all　the
  functions　of　the　notion　only　that　of　universality；　they　leave　particularity　and
  individuality　out　of　account　and　have　no　development　in　these　directions。　By　so
  doing　they　just　miss　the　notion。
  §　165
  It　is　the　element　of　Individuality　which　first　explicitly　differentiates　the　elements
  of　the　notion。　Individuality　is　the　negative　reflection　of　the　notion　into　itself；　and　it
  is　in　that　way　at　first　the　free　differentiating　of　it　as　the　first　negation；　by　which
  the　specific　character　of　the　notion　is　realised；　but　under　the　form　of　particularity。
  That　is　to　say；　the　different　elements　are　in　the　first　place　only　qualified　as　the
  several　elements　of　the　notion；　and；　secondly；　their　identity　is　no　less　explicitly
  stated；　the　one　being　said　to　be　the　other。　This　realised　particularity　of　the　notion
  is　the　Judgment。
  The　ordinary　classification　of　notions；　as　clear；　distinct；　and　adequate；　is　no　part
  of　the　notion；　it　belongs　to　psychology。　Notions；　in　fact；　are　here　synonymous
  with　mental　representations；　a　clear　notion　is　an　abstract　simple　representation：　a
  distinct　notion　is　one　where；　in　addition　to　the　simplicity；　there　is　one　'mark'　or
  character　emphasised　as　a　sign　for　subjective　cognition。　There　is　no　more　striking
  mark　of　the　formalism　and　decay　of　Logic　than　the　favourite　category　of　the
  'mark'。　The　adequate　notion　comes　nearer　the　notion　proper；　or　even　the　Idea：
  but　after　all　it　expresses　only　the　formal　circumstance　that　a　notion　or
  representation　agrees　with　its　object；　that　is；　with　an　external　thing。　The　division
  into　what　are　called　subordinate　and　coordinate　notions　implies　a　mechanical
  distinction　of　universal　from　particular　which　allows　only　a　mere　correlation　of
  them　in　external　comparison。　Again；　an　enumeration　of　such　kinds　as　contrary
  and　contradictory；　affirmative　and　negative　notions；　etc。；　is　only　a　chance…directed
  gleaning　of　logical　forms　which　properly　belong　to　the　sphere　of　Being　or　Essence
  （where　they　have　been　already　examined）　and　which　have　nothing　to　do　with　the
  specific　notional　character　as　such。　The　true　distinctions　in　the　notion；　universal；
  particular；　and　individual；　may　be　said　also　to　constitute　species　of　it；　but　only
  when　they　are　kept　severed　from　each　other　by　external　reflection。　The　immanent
  differentiating　and　specifying　of　the　notion　come　to　sight　in　the　judgment：　for　to
  judge　is　to　specify　the　notion。
  （b）　The　Judgment
  §　166
  The　Judgment　is　the　notion　in　its　particularity；　as　a　connection　which　is　also　a
  distinguishing　of　its　functions；　which　are　put　as　independent　and　yet　as　identical
  with　themselves　not　with　one　another。
  One's　first　impression　about　the　Judgment　is　the　independence　of　the　two
  extremes；　the　subject　and　the　predicate。　The　former　we　take　to　be　a　thing　or　term
  per　se；　and　the　predicate　a　general　term　outside　the　said　subject　and　somewhere
  in　our　heads。　The　next　point　is　for　us　to　bring　the　latter　into　combination　with　the
  former；　and　in　this　way　frame　a　Judgment。　The　copula　'is'；　however；　enunciates
  the　predicate　of　the　subject；　and　so　that　external　subjective　e　subsumption　is　again
  put　in　abeyance；　and　the　Judgment　taken　as　a　determination　of　the　object　itself。
  The　etymological　meaning　of　the　Judgment　（　Urtheil）　in　German　goes　deeper；　as
  it　were　declaring　the　unity　of　the　notion　to　be　primary；　and　its　distinction　to　be　the
  original　partition。　And　that　is　what　the　Judgment　really　is。
  In　its　abstract　terms　a　Judgment　is　expressible　in　the　proposition：　'The　individual　is
  the　universal。'　These　are　the　terms　under　which　the　subject　and　the　predicate　first
  confront　each　other；　when　the　functions　of　the　notion　are　taken　in　their　immediate
  character　or　first　abstraction。　（Propositions　such　as；　'The　particular　is　the
  universal'；　and　'The　individual　is　the　particular'；　belong　to　the　further
  specialisation　of　the　judgment。）　It　shows　a　strange　want　of　observation　in　the
  logic…books；　that　in　none　of　them　is　the　fact　stated；　that　in　every　judgment　there　is
  still　a　statement　made；　as；　the　individual　is　the　universal；　or　still　more　definitely；
  The　subject　is　the　predicate　（e。g。　God　is　absolute　spirit）。　No　doubt　there　is　also　a
  distinction　between　terms　like　individual　and　universal；　subject　and　predicate：　but
  it　is　none　the　less　the　universal　fact；　that　every　judgment　states　them　to　be
  identical。
  The　copula　'is'　springs　from　the　nature　of　the　notion；　to　be　self…identical　even　in
  parting　with　its　own。　The　individual　and　universal　are　its　constituents；　and
  therefore　characters　which　cannot　be　isolated。　The　earlier　categories　（of
  reflection）　in　their　correlations　also　refer　to　one　another：　but　their　interconnection
  is　only　'having'　anal　not　'being'；　i。e。　it　is　not　the　identity　which　is　realised　as
  identity　or　universality。　In　the　judgment；　therefore；　for　the　first　time　there　is　seen
  the　genuine　particularity　of　the　notion：　for　it　is　the　speciality　or　distinguishing　of
  the　latter；　without　thereby　losing　universality。
  §　166n
  Judgments　are　generally　looked　upon　as　combinations　of　notions；　and；　be　it　added；　of
  heterogeneous　notions。　This　theory　of　judgment　is　correct；　so　far　as　it　implies　that　it　is　the　notion
  which　forms　the　presupposition　of　the　judgment；　and　which　in　the　judgment　comes　up　under　the
  form　of　difference。　But　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　false　to　speak　of　notions　differing　in　kind。　The
  notion；　although　concrete；　is　still　as　a　notion　essentially　one；　and　the　functions　which　it　contains　are
  not　different　kinds　of　it。　It　is　equally　false　to　speak　of　a　combination　of　the　two　sides　in　the
  judgment；　if　we　understand　the　term　'combination'　to　imply　the　independent　existence　of　the
  combining　members　apart　from　the　combination。　The　same　external　view　of　their　nature　is　more
  forcibly　apparent　when　judge　moments　are　described　as　produced　by　the　ascription　of　a　predicate
  to　the　subject。
  Language　like　this　looks　upon　the　subject　as　self…subsistent　outside；　and　the　predicate　as　found
  somewhere　in　our　head。　Such　a　conception　of　the　relation　between　subject　and　predicate　however
  is　at　once　contradicted　by　the　copula　'is'。　By　saying　'This　rose　is　red'；　or　'This　picture　is　beautiful'；
  we　declare；　that　it　is　not　we　who　from　outside　attach　beauty　to　the　picture　or　redness　to　the　rose；
  but　that　these　are　the　characteristics　proper　to　these　objects。　An　additional　fault　in　the　way　in
  which　Formal　Logic　conceives　the　judgment　is；　that　it　makes　the　judgment　look　as　if　it　were
  something　merely　contingent；　and　does　not　offer　any　proof　for　the　advance　from　notion　on　to
  judgment。　For　the　notion　does　not；　as　understanding　supposes；　stand　still　in　its　own　immobility。　It
  is　rather　an　infinite　form；　of　boundless　activity；　as　it　were　the　punctum　sapiens　of　all　vitality；　and
  thereby　self…differentiating。
  This　disruption　of　the　notion　into　the　difference　of　its　constituent　functions　…　a　disruption　imposed
  by　the　native　act　of　the　notion　…　is　the　judgment。　A　judgment　therefore　means　the　particularising　of
  the　notion。　No　doubt　the　notion　is　implicitly　the　particular。　But　in　the　notion　as　notion　the　particular
  is　not　yet　explicit；　and　still　remains　in　transparent　unity　with　the　universal。
  Thus；　for　example；　as　we　remarked　before　（§　160n）；　the　germ　of　a　plant　contains　its　particular；
  such　as　root；　branches；　leaves；　etc。：　but　these　details　are　at　first　present　only　potentially；　and　are
  not　realised　till　the　germ　uncloses。　This　unclosing　is；　as　it　were；　the　judgment　of　the　plant。　The
  illustration　may　also　serve　to　show　how　neither　the　notion　nor　the　judgment　are　merely　found　in　our
  head；　or　merely　framed　by　us。　The　notion　is　the　very　heart　of　things；　and　makes　them　what　they
  are。　To　form　a　notion　of　an　object　means　therefore　to　become　aware　of　its　notion：　and　when　we
  proceed　to　a　criticism　or　judgment　of　the　object；　we　are　not　performing　a　subjective　act；　and
  merely　ascribing　this　or　that　predicate　to　the　object。　We　are；　on　the　contrary；　observing　the　object
  in　the　specific　character　imposed　by　its　notion。
  §　167
  The　Judgment　is　usually　taken　in　a　subjective　sense　as　an　operation　and　a　form；
  occurring　merely　in　self…con