as　it　is　by　outward　circumstances　…　the　complex　changes　in　configuration　and　grouping　of　clouds；
  and　the　like　…　ought　not　to　be　ranked　higher　than　the　equally　casual　fancies　of　the　mind　which
  surrenders　itself　to　its　own　caprices。　The　wonderment　with　which　such　phenomena　are　welcomed
  is　a　most　abstract　frame　of　mind；　from　which　one　should　advance　to　a　closer　insight　into　the　inner
  harmony　and　uniformity　of　nature。
  ？
  Of　contingency　in　respect　of　the　Will　it　is　especially　important　to　form　a　proper　estimate。　The
  Freedom　of　the　Will　is　an　expression　that　often　means　mere　free　choice；　or　the　will　in　the　form　of
  contingency。　Freedom　of　choice；　or　the　capacity　for　determining　ourselves　towards　one　thing　or
  another；　or　is　undoubtedly　a　vital　element　in　the　will　（which　is　in　its　very　notion　free）；　but　instead　of
  being　freedom　itself；　it　is　it　is　only　in　the　first　instance　a　freedom　in　form。　The　genuinely　free　will；
  which　includes　free　choice　as　suspended；　is　conscious　to　itself　that　its　content　is　intrinsically　firm
  and　fast；　and　knows　it　at　the　same　time　to　be　thoroughly　its　own。　A　will；　on　the　contrary；　which
  remains　standing　on　the　grade　of　option；　even　supposing　it　does　decide　in　favour　of　what　is　in
  import　right　and　true；　is　always　haunted　by　the　conceit　that　it　might；　if　it　had　so　pleased；　have
  decided　in　favour　of　the　reverse　course。　When　more　narrowly　examined；　free　choice　is　seen　to　be
  a　contradiction；　to　this　extent；　that　its　form　and　content　stand　in　antithesis。　The　matter　of　choice　is
  given；　and　known　as　a　content　dependent　not　on　the　will　itself；　but　on　outward　circumstances。　In
  reference　to　such　a　given　content；　freedom　lies　only　in　the　form　of　choosing；　which；　as　it　is　only　a
  freedom　in　form；　may　consequently　be　regarded　as　freedom　only　in　supposition。　On　an　ultimate
  analysis　it　will　be　seen　that　the　same　outwardness　of　circumstances；　on　which　is　founded　the
  content　that　the　will　finds　to　its　hand；　can　alone　account　for　the　will　giving　its　decision　for　the　one
  and　not　the　other　of　the　two　alternatives。
  Although　contingency；　as　it　has　thus　been　shown；　is　only　one　aspect　in　the　whole　of　actuality；　and
  therefore　not　to　be　mistaken　for　the　whole　of　actuality；　and　therefore　not　to　be　mistaken　for
  actuality　itself；　it　has　no　less　than　the　rest　of　the　forms　of　the　idea　its　due　office　in　the　world　of
  objects。　This　is；　in　the　first　place；　seen　in　Nature。　On　the　surface　of　Nature；　so　to　speak；　Chance
  ranges　unchecked；　and　the　contingency　must　simply　be　recognised；　without　the　pretension
  sometimes　erroneously　ascribed　to　philosophy；　in　seeking　to　find　it　in　a
  could…only…be…so…and…not…otherwise。　Nor　is　contingency　less　visible　in　the　world　of　Mind。　The
  Will；　as　we　have　already　remarked；　includes　contingency　under　the　shape　of　option　or　free　choice；
  but　only　as　a　vanishing　and　abrogated　element。　In　respect　of　Mind　and　its　works；　just　as　in　the
  case　of　Nature；　we　must　guard　against　being　so　far　misled　by　a　well…meant　endeavour　after
  rational　knowledge；　as　to　try　to　exhibit　the　necessity　of　phenomena　which　are　marked　by　a
  decided　contingency；　or；　as　the　phrase　is；　to　construe　them　a　priori。　Thus　in　language　（although　it
  be；　as　it　were；　the　body　of　thought）　Chance　still　unquestionably　plays　a　decided　part；　and　the　same
  is　true　of　the　creations　of　law；　of　art；　etc。
  The　problem　of　science；　and　especially　of　philosophy；　undoubtedly　consists　in　eliciting　the
  necessity　concealed　under　the　semblance　of　contingency。　That；　however；　is　far　from　meaning　that
  the　contingent　belongs　to　our　subjective　conception　alone；　and　must　therefore　be　simply　set　aside；
  if　we　wish　to　get　at　the　truth。　All　scientific　researches　which　pursue　this　tendency　exclusively　lay
  themselves　open　to　the　charge　of　mere　jugglery　and　an　over…strained　precisionism。
  §　146
  Condition
  When　more　closely　examined；　what　the　aforesaid　outward　side　of　actuality
  implies　is　this。　Contingency；　which　is　actuality　in　its　immediacy；　is　the
  self…identical；　essentially　only　as　a　supposition　which　is　no　sooner　made　than　it　is
  revoked　and　leaves　an　existent　externality。　In　this　way；　the　external　contingency　is
  something　pre…supposed；　the　immediate　existence　of　which　is　at　the　same　time　a
  possibility；　and　has　the　vocation　to　be　suspended；　to　be　the　possibility　of
  something　else。　Now　this　possibility　is　the　Condition。
  §　146n
  The　Contingent；　as　the　immediate　actuality；　is　at　the　same　time；　the　possibility　of　somewhat　else　…
  no　longer　however；　the　abstract　possibility　which　we　had　at　first；　but　the　possibility　which　is。　And
  a　possibility　existent　is　a　Condition。　By　the　Condition　of　a　thing　we　mean　first；　an　existence；　in
  short　an　immediate；　and　secondly　the　vocation　of　this　immediate　to　be　suspended　and　subserve　the
  actualising　of　something　else。　Immediate　actuality　is　in　general　as　such　never　what　it　ought　to　be；　it
  is　a　finite　actuality　with　an　inherent　flaw；　and　its　vocation　is　to　be　consumed。　But　the　other　aspect
  of　actuality　is　its　essentiality。　This　is　primarily　the　inside　which　as　a　mere　possibility　is　no　less
  destined　to　be　suspended。　Possibility　thus　suspended　is　the　issuing　of　a　new　actuality；　of　which　the
  first　immediate　actuality　was　the　pre…supposition。　Here　we　see　the　alternation　which　is　involved　in
  the　notion　of　a　Condition。　The　Conditions　of　a　thing　seem　at　first　sight　to　involve　no　bias　any　way。
  Really　however；　an　immediate　actuality　of　this　kind　includes　in　it　the　germ　of　something　else
  altogether。　At　first；　this　something　else　is　only　a　possibility：　but　the　form　of　possibility　is　soon
  suspended　and　translated　into　actuality。　This　new　actuality　thus　issuing　is　the　very　inside　of　the
  immediate　actuality　which　uses　it　up。　Thus；　there　comes　into　being　quite　another　shape　of　things；
  and　yet　it　is　not　an　other：　for　the　first　actuality　is　only　put　as　what　it　in　essence　was。　The　conditions
  which　are　sacrificed；　which　feel　to　the　ground　and　are　spent；　only　unite　with　themselves　in　the　other
  actuality。　Such　in　general　is　the　nature　of　the　process　of　actuality。　The　actual　is　no　mere　case　of
  immediate　Being；　but；　as　essential　Being；　a　suspension　of　its　own　immediacy；　and　thereby
  mediating　itself　with　itself。
  §　147
  ＇c＇　Real　Possibility
  When　this　externality　（of　actuality）　is　thus　developed　into　a　circle　of　the　two
  categories　of　possibility　and　immediate　actuality；　showing　the　intermediation　of
  the　one　by　the　other；　it　is　what　is　called　Real　Possibility。　Being　such　a　circle；
  further；　it　is　the　totality；　and　thus　the　content；　the　actual　fact　or　affair　in　its
  all…round　definiteness。　While　in　like　manner；　if　we　look　at　the　distinction　between
  the　two　characteristics　in　this　unity；　it　realises　the　concrete　totality　of　the　form；
  the　immediate　self…translation　of　inner　into　outer；　and　of　outer　into　inner。　This
  self…movement　of　the　form　is　Activity；　carrying　into　effect　the　fact　or　affair　as　a
  real　ground　which　is　self…suspended　to　actuality；　and　carrying　into　effect　the
  contingent　actuality；　the　conditions；　i。e。　it　is　their　reflection…into…self；　and　their
  self…suspension　to　another　actuality　of　the　actual　fact。　If　all　the　conditions　are　at
  hand；　the　fact　（event）　must　be　actual；　and　the　fact　itself　is　one　of　the　conditions：
  for　being　in　the　first　place　only　inner；　it　is　in　fact　itself　only　pre…supposed。
  Developed　actuality；　as　the　coincident　alternation　of　inner　and　outer；　the
  alternation　of　their　opposite　motions　combined　into　a　single　motion；　is　Necessity。
  Necessity
  Necessity　has　been　defined；　and　rightly　so；　as　the　union　of　possibility　and
  actuality。　This　mode　of　expression；　however；　gives　a　superficial　and　therefore
  unintelligible　description　of　the　very　difficult　notion　of　necessity。　It　is　difficult
  because　it　is　the　notion　itself；　only　that　its　stages　or　factors　are　still　as　actualities；
  which　are　yet　at　the　same　time　to　be　viewed　as　forms　only；　collapsing　and
  transient。　In　the　two　following　paragraphs；　therefore；　an　exposition　of　the　factors
  which　constitute　necessity　must　be　given　at　greater　length。
  §　147n
  Blind　Necessity
  When　anything　is　said　to　be　necessary；　the　first　question　we　ask　is：　Why？　Anything　necessary
  accordingly　comes　before　us　as　something　due　to　a　supposition；　the　result　of　certain　antecedents。
  If　we　go　no　further　than　mere　derivation　from　antecedents；　however；　we　have　not　gained　a
  complete　notion　of　what　necessity　means。　What　is　merely　derivative；　is　what　it　is；　not　through　itself；
  but　through　something　else：　and　in　this　way；　it　too　is　merely　contingent。　What　is　necessary　on　the
  other　hand；　we　would　have　to　be　what　it　is　through　itself：　and　thus；　although　derivative；　it　must　still
  contain　the　antecedent　whence　it　is　derived　as　a　vanishing　element　in　itself。　Hence　we　say　of　what
  is　necessary；　'It　is'。　We　thus　hold　it　to　be　simple；　self…relation；　in　which　all　dependence　on
  something　else　is　removed。
  Necessity　is　often　said　to　be　blind。　If　that　means　that　in　the　process　of　necessit