Such　a　concrete　category　as　Actuality　includes　the　characteristics　aforesaid　and
  their　difference；　and　is　therefore　also　the　development　of　them；　in　such　a　way
  that；　as　it　has　them；　they　are　at　the　same　time　plainly　understood　to　be　a　show；　to
  be　assumed　or　imposed。
  Possibility
  ＇a＇　Viewed　as　an　identity　in　general；　Actuality　is　first　of　all　Possibility　…the
  reflection…into…self　which；　as　in　contrast　with　the　concrete　unity　of　the　actual；　is
  taken　and　made　an　abstract　and　unessential　essentiality。　Possibility　is　what　is
  essential　to　reality；　but　in　such　a　way　that　it　is　at　the　same　time　only　a　possibility。
  It　was　probably　the　import　of　Possibility　which　induced　Kant　to　regard　it　along
  with　necessity　and　actuality　as　Modalities；　'since　these　categories　do　not　in　the
  least　increase　the　notion　as　object；　but　only　express　its　relation　to　the　faculty　of
  knowledge'。　For　Possibility　is　really　the　bare　abstraction　of　reflection…into…self　…
  what　was　formerly　called　the　Inward；　only　that　it　is　now　taken　to　mean　the
  external　inward；　lifted　out　of　reality　and　with　the　being　of　a　mere　supposition；　and
  is　thus；　sure　enough；　supposed　only　as　a　bare　modality；　an　abstraction　which
  comes　short；　and；　in　more　concrete　terms；　belongs　only　to　subjective　thought。　It
  is　otherwise　with　Actuality　and　Necessity。　They　are　anything　but　a　mere　sort　and
  mode　for　something　else：　in　fact　the　very　reverse　of　that。　If　they　are　supposed；　it
  is　as　the　concrete；　but　not　merely　suppositions；　but　intrinsically　complete。
  As　Possibility　is；　in　the　first　instance；　the　mere　form　of　identity…with…self　（as
  compared　with　the　concrete　which　is　actual）；　the　rule　for　it　merely　is　that　a　thing
  must　not　be　self…contradictory。　Thus　everything　is　possible；　for　an　act　of
  abstraction　can　give　any　content　this　form　of　identity。　Everything　however　is　as
  impossible　as　it　is　possible。　In　every　content　…　which　is　and　must　be　concrete　…　the
  speciality　of　its　nature　may　be　viewed　as　a　specialised　contrariety　and　in　that　way
  as　a　contradiction。　Nothing　therefore　can　be　more　meaningless　than　to　speak　of
  such　possibility　and　impossibility。
  In　philosophy　in　particular；　there　should　never　be　a　word　said　of　showing　that　〃It
  is　possible〃；　or　〃There　is　still　another　possibility〃；　or；　to　adopt　another
  phraseology；　〃It　is　conceivable〃。　The　same　consideration　should　warn　the　writer
  of　history　against　employing　a　category　which　has　now　been　explained　to　be　on　its
  own　merits；　untrue：　but　the　subtlety　of　the　empty　understanding　finds　its　chief
  pleasure　in　the　fantastic　ingenuity　of　suggesting　possibilities　and　lots　of
  possibilities。
  §　143n
  Possible　and　Actual
  Our　picture…thought　is　at　first　disposed　to　see　in　possibility　the　richer　and　more　comprehensive；　in
  actuality　the　poorer　and　narrower　category。　Everything；　it　is　said；　is　possible；　but　everything　which
  is　possible　is　not　on　that　account　actual。　In　real　truth；　however；　if　we　deal　with　them　as　thoughts；
  actuality　is　the　more　comprehensive；　because　it　is　the　concrete　thought　which　includes　possibility
  as　an　abstract　element。　And　that　superiority　is　to　some　extent　expressed　in　our　ordinary　mode　of
  thought　when　we　speak　of　the　possible；　in　distinction　from　the　actual；　as　only　possible。　Possibility
  is　often　said　to　consist　in　a　thing's　being　thinkable。
  'Think'　however；　in　this　use　of　the　word；　only　means　to　conceive　any　content　under　the　form　of　an
  abstract　identity。　Now；　every　content　can　be　brought　under　this　form；　since　nothing　is　required
  except　to　separate　it　from　the　relation　in　which　it　stands。　Hence；　any　content；　however　absurd　and
  nonsensical；　can　be　viewed　as　possible。　It　is　possible　that　the　moon　may　fall　upon　the　Earth
  tonight；　for　the　moon　is　a　body　separate　from　the　Earth　and　may　as　well　fall　down　upon　it　as　a
  stone　thrown　into　the　air　does。　。　。　。　In　language　like　this　about　possibilities；　it　is　chiefly　the　law　of
  sufficient　ground　or　reason　which　is　manipulated　in　the　style　already　explained。　Everything；　it　is
  said；　is　possible；　for　which　you　can　state　some　ground。　The　less　education　a　man　has；　or　in　other
  words；　the　less　he　knows　of　the　specific　connection　of　the　objects　to　which　he　directs　his
  observations；　the　greater　is　his　tendency　to　launch　out　into　all　sorts　of　empty　possibilities。　An
  instance　of　this　habit　in　the　political　sphere　is　seen　in　the　pot…house　politician。　In　practical　life　too　it
  is　no　uncommon　thing　to　see　ill　will　and　indolence　slink　behind　the　category　of　possibility；　in　order
  to　escape　definite　obligations。　To　such　conduct　the　same　remarks　apply　as　were　made　in
  connection　with　the　law　of　sufficient　ground。　Reasonable　and　practical　men　refused　to　be　imposed
  upon　by　the　possible；　for　the　simple　ground　that　it　is　possible　only。　They　stick　to　the　actual　（not
  meaning　by　that　word　merely　whatever　immediately　is　now　and　here）。　Many　of　the　proverbs　of
  common　life　express　the　same　contempt　for　what　is　abstractly　possible。　'A　bird　in　the　hand　is
  worth　two　in　the　bush'。
  Everything　is　Possible　？
  After　all；　there　is　as　good　reason　for　taking　everything　to　be　impossible　as　to　be　possible：　for　every
  content　（a　content　is　always　concrete）　includes　not　only　diverse　but　even　opposite　characteristics。
  Nothing　is　so　impossible　for　instance；　as　this；　that　I　am：　for　'I'　is　at　the　same　time　simple
  self…relation　and；　as　undoubtedly；　relation　to　something　else。　The　same　may　be　seen　in　every　other
  fact　in　the　natural　or　spiritual　world。　Matter；　it　may　be　said；　is　impossible：　for　it　is　the　unity　of
  attraction　and　repulsion。　The　same　is　true　of　life；　law；　freedom　。　。　。
  Generally　speaking；　it　is　the　empty　understanding　which　haunts　these　empty　forms：　and　the
  business　of　philosophy　in　the　matter　is　to　show　how　null　and　meaningless　they　are。　Whether　a　thing
  is　possible　or　impossible；　depends　altogether　on　the　subject…matter：　that　is；　on　the　sum　total　of　the
  elements　in　actuality；　which；　as　it　opens　itself　out；　discloses　itself　to　be　necessity。
  ？
  §　144
  ＇b＇　Contingency　（accidents）
  But　the　Actual　in　its　distinction　from　possibility　（which　is　reflection…into…self）　is
  only　the　outward　concrete；　the　unessential　immediate。　In　other　words；　to　such
  extent　as　the　actual　is　primarily　the　simple　merely　immediate　unity　of　Inward　and
  Outward；　it　is　obviously　made　an　unessential　outward；　and　thus　at　the　same　time
  it　is　merely　inward；　the　abstraction　of　reflection…into…self。　Hence　it　is　itself
  characterised　as　a　merely　possible。　When　thus　valued　at　the　rate　of　a　mere
  possibility；　the　actual　is　a　Contingent　or　Accidental；　and；　conversely；　possibility
  is　mere　Accident　itself　or　Chance。
  §　145
  Possibility　and　Contingency
  Possibility　and　Contingency　are　the　two　factors　of　Actuality　…　Inward　and
  Outward；　put　as　mere　forms　which　constitute　the　externality　of　the　actual。　They
  have　their　reflection…into…self　on　the　body　of　actual　fact；　or　content；　with　its
  intrinsic　definitiveness　which　gives　essential　ground　of　their　characterisation。　The
  finitude　of　the　contingent　and　the　possible　lies；　therefore；　as　we　now　see；　in　the
  distinction　of　the　form…determination　from　the　content：　and；　therefore；　it　depends
  on　the　content　alone　whether　anything　is　contingent　and　possible。
  §　145n
  Free　Will
  As　possibility　is　the　mere　inside　of　actuality；　it　is　for　that　reason　a　mere　outside　actuality；　in　other
  words；　Contingency。　The　contingent；　roughly　speaking；　is　what　has　the　ground　of　its　being　not　in
  itself　but　in　somewhat　else。　Such　is　the　aspect　under　which　actuality　first　comes　before
  consciousness；　and　which　is　often　mistaken　for　actuality　itself。　But　the　contingent　is　only　one　side
  of　the　actual　…　the　side　namely；　of　reflection　on　somewhat　else。　It　is　the　actual；　in　the　signification　of
  something　merely　possible。　Accordingly　we　consider　the　contingent　to　be　what　may　or　may　not
  be；　what　may　be　in　one　way　or　another；　whose　being　or　not…being；　and　whose　being　in　this　way　or
  otherwise；　depends　not　upon　itself　but　on　something　else。
  To　overcome　this　contingency　is；　roughly　speaking；　the　problem　of　science　on　the　one　hand；　as　in
  the　range　of　practice；　on　the　other；　the　end　of　action　is　to　rise　above　the　contingency　of　the　will；　or
  above　caprice。　It　has　however　often　happened；　most　of　all　in　modern　times；　that　contingency　has
  been　unwarrantably　elevated；　and　has　a　value　attached　to　it；　both　in　nature　and　in　the　world　of　the
  mind；　to　which　it　has　no　just　claim。　Frequently；　Nature；　to　take　it　first；　has　been　chiefly　admired　for
  the　richness　and　variety　of　its　structures。　Apart　however　from　what　disclosure　it　contains　of　the
  Idea；　this　richness　gratifies　none　of　the　higher　interests　of　Reason；　and　its　vast　variety　of　structures；
  organic　and　inorganic；　affords　us　only　the　spectacle　of　a　contingency　losing　itself　in　vagueness。　At
  any　rate；　the　chequered　scene　presented　by　the　several　varieties　of　animals　and　plants；　conditioned
  as　it　is　by