§　125n
  In　the　Thing　all　the　characteristics　of　reflection　recur　as　existent。　Thus　the　thing；　in　its　initial　aspect；
  as　the　thing…by…itself；　is　the　selfsame　or　identical。　But　identity；　it　was　proved；　is　not　found　without
  difference：　so　the　properties；　which　the　thing　has；　are　the　existent　difference　in　the　form　of
  diversity。　In　the　case　of　diversity　of　variety　each　diverse　member　exhibited　an　indifference　to　every
  other；　and　they　had　no　other　relation　to　each　other；　save　what　was　given　by　a　comparison　external
  to　them。　But　now　in　the　thing　we　have　a　bond　which　keeps　the　various　properties　in　union。
  Property；　besides；　should　not　be　confused　with　quality。　No　doubt；　we　also　say；　a　thing　has
  qualities。　But　the　phraseology　is　a　misplaced　one：　'having'　hints　at　an　independence；　foreign　to　the
  'somewhat'；　which　is　still　directly　identical　with　its　quality。　Somewhat　is　what　it　is　only　by　its　quality：
  whereas；　though　the　thing　indeed　exists　only　as　it　has　its　properties；　it　is　not　confined　to　this　or　that
  definite　property；　and　can　therefore　lose　it；　without　ceasing　to　be　what　it　is。
  §　126
  Matters
  ＇b＇　Even　in　the　ground；　however；　the　reflection…on…something…else　is　directly
  convertible　with　reflection…on…self。　And　hence　the　properties　are　not　merely
  different　from　each　other；　they　are　also　self…identical；　independent；　and　relieved
  from　their　attachment　to　the　thing。　Still；　as　they　are　the　characters　of　the　thing
  distinguished　from　one　another　（as　reflected…into…self）；　they　are　not　themselves
  things；　if　things　be　concrete；　but　only　existences　reflected　into　themselves　as
  abstract　characters。　They　are　what　are　called　Matters。
  Nor　is　the　name　'things'　given　to　Matters；　such　as　magnetic　and　electric　matters。
  They　are　qualities　proper；　a　reflected　Being…One　with　their　Being…they　are　the
  character　that　has　reached　immediacy；　existence：　they　are　'entities'。
  §　126n
  To　elevate　the　properties；　which　the　Thing　has；　to　the　independent　position　of　matters；　or　materials
  of　which　it　consists；　is　a　proceeding　based　upon　the　notion　of　a　Thing：　and　for　that　reason　is　also
  found　in　experience。　Thought　and　experience　however　alike　protest　against　concluding　from　the
  fact　that　certain　properties　of　a　thing；　such　as　colour；　or　smell；　may　be　represented　as　particular
  colouring　or　odorific　matters；　that　we　are　then　at　the　end　of　the　inquiry；　and　that　nothing　more　is
  needed　to　penetrate　to　the　true　secret　of　things　than　a　disintegration　of　them　into　their　component
  materials。　This　disintegration　into　independent　matters　is　properly　restricted　to　inorganic　nature
  only。　The　chemist　is　in　the　right；　therefore；　when；　for　example；　he　analyses　common　salt　or　gypsum
  into　its　elements；　and　finds　that　the　former　consists　of　muriatic　acid　and　soda；　the　latter　of　sulphuric
  acid　and　calcium。　So　too　the　geologist　does　well　to　regard　granite　as　a　compound　of　quartz；
  felspar；　and　mica。　These　matters；　again；　of　which　the　thing　consists；　are　themselves　partly　things；
  which　in　that　way　may　be　once　more　reduced　to　more　abstract　matters。　Sulphuric　acid；　for
  example；　is　a　compound　of　sulphur　and　oxygen。　Such　matters　or　bodies　can　as　a　matter　of　fact　be
  exhibited　as　subsisting　by　themselves：　but　frequently　we　find　other　properties　of　things；　entirely
  wanting　this　self…subsistence；　also　regarded　as　particular　matters。　Thus　we　hear　caloric；　and
  electrical　or　magnetic　matters　spoken　of。　Such　matters　are　at　the　best　figments　of　understanding。
  And　we　see　here　the　usual　procedure　of　the　abstract　reflection　of　understanding。　Capriciously
  adopting　single　categories；　whose　value　entirely　depends　on　their　place　in　the　gradual　evolution　of
  the　logical　idea；　it　employs　them　in　the　pretended　interests　of　explanation；　but　in　the　face　of　plain；
  unprejudiced　perception　and　experience；　so　as　to　trace　back　to　them　every　object　investigated。
  Nor　is　this　all。　The　theory；　which　makes　things　consist　of　independent　matters；　is　frequently　applied
  in　a　region　where　it　has　neither　meaning　nor　force。　For　within　the　limits　of　nature　even；　wherever
  there　is　organic　life；　this　category　is　obviously　inadequate。　An　animal　may　be　said　to　consist　of
  bones；　muscles；　nerves；　etc。：　but　evidently　we　are　here　using　the　term　'consist'　in　a　very　different
  sense　from　its　use　when　we　spoke　of　the　piece　of　granite　as　consisting　of　the　above…mentioned
  elements。　The　elements　of　granite　are　utterly　indifferent　to　their　combination：　they　could　subsist　as
  well　without　it。　The　different　parts　and　members　of　an　organic　body　on　the　contrary　subsist　only　in
  their　union：　they　cease　to　exist　as　such；　when　they　are　separated　from　each　other。
  §　127
  Thus　Matter　is　the　mere　abstract　or　indeterminate　reflection…into…something…else；
  or　reflection…into…self　at　the　same　time　as　determinate；　it　is　consequently
  Thinghood　which　then　and　there　is　the　subsistence　of　the　thing。　By　this　means　the
  thing　has　on　the　part　of　the　matters　its　reflection…into…self　（the　reverse　of　§　125）；
  it　subsists　not　on　its　own　part；　but　consists　of　the　matters；　and　is　only　a　superficial
  association　between　them；　an　external　combination　of　them。
  §　128
  Form
  ＇c＇　Matter；　being　the　immediate　unity　of　existence　with　itself；　is　also　indifferent
  towards　specific　character。　Hence　the　numerous　diverse　matters　coalesce　into　the
  one　Matter；　or　into　existence　under　the　reflective　characteristic　of　identity。　In
  contrast　to　this　one　Matter　these　distinct　properties　and　their　external　relation
  which　they　have　to　one　another　in　the　thing；　constitute　the　Form　…the　reflective
  category　of　difference；　but　a　difference　which　exists　and　is　a　totality。
  This　one　featureless　Matter　is　also　the　same　as　the　Thing…in…itself　was：　only　the
  latter　is　intrinsically　quite　abstract；　while　the　former　essentially　implies　relation　to
  something　else；　and　in　the　first　place　to　the　Form。
  §　128n
  The　various　matters　of　which　the　thing　consists　are　potentially　the　same　as　one　another。　Thus　we
  get　one　Matter　in　general　to　which　the　difference　is　expressly　attached　externally　and　as　a　bare
  form。　This　theory　which　holds　things　all　round　to　have　one　and　the　same　matter　at　bottom；　and
  merely　to　differ　externally　in　respect　of　form；　is　much　in　vogue　with　the　reflective　understanding。
  Matter　in　that　case　counts　for　naturally　indeterminate；　but　susceptible　of　any　determination；　while
  at　the　same　time　it　is　perfectly　permanent；　and　continues　the　same　amid　all　change　and　alteration。
  And　in　finite　things　at　least　this　disregard　of　matter　f　or　any　determinate　form　is　certainly　exhibited。
  For　example；　it　matters　not　to　a　block　of　marble；　whether　it　receive　the　form　of　this　or　that　statue
  or　even　the　form　of　a　pillar。　Be　it　noted　however　that　a　block　of　marble　can　disregard　form　only
  relatively；　that　is；　in　reference　to　the　sculptor：　it　is　by　no　means　purely　formless。　And　so　the
  mineralogist　considers　the　relatively　formless　marble　as　a　special　formation　of　rock；　differing　from
  other　equally　special　formations；　such　as　sandstone　or　porphyry。　Therefore　we　say　it　is　an
  abstraction　of　the　understanding　which　isolates　matter　into　a　certain　natural　formlessness。　For
  properly　speaking　the　thought　of　matter　includes　the　principle　of　form　throughout；　and　no　formless
  matter　therefore　appears；　anywhere　even　in　experience　as　existing。　Still　the　conception　of　matter
  as　original　and　pre…existent；　and　as　naturally　formless；　is　a　very　ancient　one；　it　meets　us　even
  among　the　Greeks；　at　first　in　the　mythical　shape　of　Chaos；　which　is　supposed　to　represent　the
  unformed　substratum　of　the　existing　world。　Such　a　conception　must　of　necessity　tend　to　make　God
  not　the　Creator　of　the　world；　but　a　mere　world…moulder　or　demiurge。　A　deeper　insight　into　nature
  reveals　God　as　creating　the　world　out　of　nothing。　And　that　teaches　two　things。　On　the　one　hand　it
  enunciates　that　matter；　as　such；　has　no　independent　subsistence；　and　on　the　other　that　the　form
  does　not　supervene　upon　matter　from　without；　but　as　a　totality　involves　the　principle　of　matter　in
  itself。　This　free　and　infinite　form　will　hereafter　come　before　us　as　the　notion。
  §　129
  Thus　the　Thing　suffers　a　disruption　into　Matter　and　Form。　Each　of　these　is　the
  totality　of　thinghood　and　subsists　for　itself。　But　Matter；　which　is　meant　to　be　the
  positive　and　indeterminate　existence；　contains；　as　an　existence；
  reflection…on…another；　every　whit　as　much　as　it　contains　self…enclosed　being。
  Accordingly　as　uniting　these　characteristics；　it　is　itself　the　totality　of　Form。　But
  Form；　being　a　complete　whole　of　characteristics；　ipso　facto　involves
  reflection…into…self；　in　other　words；　as　self…relating　Form　it　has　the　very　function
  attributed　to　Matter。　Both　are　at　bottom　the　same。　Invest　them　with　this　unity；
  and　you　have　the　relation　of　Matter　and　Form；　which　are　also　no　less　distinct。
  The　Theory　of　〃Matters〃