A　second　corollary　which　results　from　holding　immediacy　of　consciousness　to　be
  the　criterion　of　truth　is　that　all　superstition　or　idolatry　is　allowed　to　be　truth；　and
  that　an　apology　is　prepared　for　any　contents　of　the　will；　however　wrong　and
  immoral。　It　is　because　he　believes　in　them；　and　not　from　the　reasoning　and
  syllogism　of　what　is　termed　mediate　knowledge；　that　the　Hindu　finds　God　in　the
  cow；　the　monkey；　the　Brahmin；　or　the　Lama。　But；　the　natural　desires　and
  affections　spontaneously　carry　and　deposit　their　interests　in　consciousness；　where
  also　immoral　aims　make　themselves　naturally　at　home：　the　good　or　bad　character
  would　thus　express　the　definite　being　of　the　will；　which　would　be　known；　and
  that　most　immediately；　in　the　interests　and　aims。
  §73
  Thirdly　and　lastly；　the　immediate　consciousness　of　God　goes　no　further　than　to
  tell　us　that　he　is：　to　tell　us　what　he　is　would　be　an　act　of　cognition；　involving
  mediation。　So　that　God　as　an　object　of　religion　is　expressly　narrowed　down　to　the
  indeterminate　supersensible；　God　in　general：　and　the　significance　of　religion　is
  reduced　to　a　minimum。
  If　it　were　really　needful　to　win　back　and　secure　the　bare　belief　that　there　is　a　God；
  or　even　to　create　it；　we　might　well　wonder　at　the　poverty　of　the　age　which　can
  see　a　gain　in　the　merest　pittance　of　religious　consciousness；　and　which　in　its
  church　has　sunk　so　low　as　to　worship　at　the　altar　that　stood　in　Athens　long　ago；
  dedicated　to　the　'Unknown　God'。
  §74
  We　have　still　briefly　to　indicate　the　general　nature　of　the　form　of　immediacy。　For
  it　is　the　essential　one…sidedness　of　the　category　which　makes　whatever　comes
  under　it　one…sided　and；　for　that　reason；　finite。　And；　first；　it　makes　the　universal　no
  better　than　an　abstraction　external　to　the　particulars；　and　God　a　being　without
  determinate　quality。　But　God　can　only　be　called　a　spirit　when　he　is　known　to　be
  at　once　the　beginning　and　end；　as　well　as　the　mean；　in　the　process　of　mediation。
  Without　this　unification　of　elements　he　is　neither　concrete；　nor　living；　nor　a　spirit。
  Thus　the　knowledge　of　God　as　a　spirit　necessarily　implies　mediation。　The　form　of
  immediacy；　secondly；　invests　the　particular　with　the　character　of　independent　or
  self…centred　being。　But　such　predicates　contradict　the　very　essence　of　the
  particular…which　is　to　be　referred　to　something　else　outside。　They　thus　invest　the
  finite　with　the　character　of　an　absolute。　But；　besides；　the　form　of　immediacy　is
  altogether　abstract：　it　has　no　preference　for　one　set　of　contents　more　than
  another；　but　is　equally　susceptible　of　all：　it　may　as　well　sanction　what　is　idolatrous
  and　immoral　as　the　reverse。　Only　when　we　discern　that　the　content…the　particular
  …　is　not　self…subsistent；　but　derivative　from　something　else；　are　its　finitude　and
  untruth　shown　in　their　proper　light。　Such　discernment；　where　the　content　we
  discern　carries　with　it　the　ground　of　its　dependent　nature；　is　a　knowledge　which
  involves　mediation。　The　only　content　which　can　be　held　to　be　the　truth　is　one　not
  mediated　with　something　else；　not　limited　by　other　things：　or；　otherwise
  expressed；　it　is　one　mediated　by　itself；　where　mediation　and　immediate
  reference…to…self　coincide。　The　understanding　that　fancies　it　has　got　clear　of　finite
  knowledge；　the　identity　of　the　analytical　metaphysicians　and　the　old　'rationalists'；
  abruptly　takes　again　as　principle　and　criterion　of　truth　that　immediacy　which；　as
  an　abstract　reference…to…self；　is　the　same　as　abstract　identity。　Abstract　thought
  （the　scientific　form　used　by　'reflective'　metaphysic）　and　abstract　intuition　（the
  form　used　by　immediate　knowledge）　are　one　and　the　same。
  §74n
  The　stereotyped　opposition　between　the　form　of　immediacy　and　that　of　mediation　gives　to　the
  former　a　half…ness　and　inadequacy　that　affects　every　content　which　is　brought　under　it。　Immediacy
  means；　upon　the　whole；　an　abstract　reference…to…self；　that　is；　an　abstract　identity　or　abstract
  universality。　Accordingly　the　essential　and　real　universal；　when　taken　merely　in　its　immediacy；　is　a
  mere　abstract　universal；　and　from　this　point　of　view　God　is　conceived　as　a　being　altogether　without
  determinate　quality。　To　call　God　spirit　is　in　that　case　only　a　phrase：　for　the　consciousness　and
  self…consciousness　which　spirit　implies　are　impossible　without　a　distinguishing　of　it　from　itself　and
  from　something　else；　i。e。　without　mediation。
  §75
  It　was　impossible　for　us　to　criticise　this；　the　third　attitude　which　thought　has　been
  made　to　take　towards　objective　truth；　in　any　other　mode　than　what　is　naturally
  indicated　and　admitted　in　the　doctrine　itself。　The　theory　asserts　that　immediate
  knowledge　is　a　fact。　It　has　been　shown　to　be　untrue　in　fact　to　say　that　there　is　an
  immediate　knowledge；　a　knowledge　without　mediation　either　by　means　of
  something　else　or　in　itself。　It　has　also　been　explained　to　be　false　in　fact　to　say　that
  thought　advances　through　finite　and　conditioned　categories　only；　which　are
  always　mediated　by　a　something　else；　and　to　forget　that　in　the　very　act　of
  mediation　the　mediation　itself　vanishes。　And　to　show　that；　in　point　of　fact；　there　is
  a　knowledge　which　advances　neither　by　unmixed　immediacy　nor　by　unmixed
  mediation；　we　can　point　to　the　example　of　Logic　and　the　whole　of　philosophy。
  §76
  If　we　view　the　maxims　of　immediate　knowledge　in　connection　with　the　uncritical
  metaphysic　of　the　past　from　which　we　started；　we　shall　learn　from　the
  comparison　the　reactionary　nature　of　the　school　of　Jacobi。　His　doctrine　is　a　return
  to　the　modern　starting…point　of　this　metaphysic　in　the　Cartesian　philosophy。　Both
  Jacobi　and　Descartes　maintain　the　following　three　points：
  （1）　The　simple　inseparability　of　the　thought　and　being　of　the　thinker。　Cogito；　ergo
  sum　is　the　same　doctrine　as　that　the　being；　reality；　and　existence　of　the　'Ego'　is
  immediately　revealed　to　me　in　consciousness。　（Descartes；　in　fact；　is　careful　to
  state　that　by　thought　he　means　consciousness　in　general。　Princip。　Phil。　i。　9。）　This
  inseparability　is　the　absolutely　first　and　most　certain　knowledge；　not　mediated　or
  demonstrated。
  （2）　The　inseparability　of　existence　from　the　conception　of　God：　the　former　is
  necessarily　implied　in　the　latter；　or　the　conception　never　can　be　without　the
  attribute　of　existence；　which　is　thus　necessary　and　eternal。。
  Descartes；　Princip。　Phil。　i。　15：　'The　reader　will　be　more　disposed　to　believe　that　there　exists　a
  being　supremely　perfect；　if　he　notes　that　in　the　case　of　nothing　else　is　there　found　in　him　an
  idea；　in　which　he　notices　necessary　existence　to　be　contained　in　the　same　way。　He　will　see　that
  that　idea　exhibits　a　true　and　unchangeable　nature　…a　nature　which　cannot　but　exist；　since
  necessary　existence　is　contained　in　it。'　A　remark　which　immediately　follows；　and　which　sounds
  like　mediation　or　demonstration；　does　not　really　prejudice　the　original　principle。
  In　Spinoza　we　come　upon　the　same　statement　that　the　essence　or　abstract　conception　of　God
  implies　existence。　The　first　of　Spinoza's　definitions；　that　of　the　Causa　Sui　（or　Self…Cause）；
  explains　it　to　be　'that　of　which　the　essence　involves　existence；　or　that　whose　nature　cannot　be
  conceived　except　as　existing'。　The　inseparability　of　the　notion　from　being　is　the　main　point　and
  fundamental　hypothesis　in　his　system。　But　what　notion　is　thus　inseparable　from　being？　Not　the
  notion　of　finite　things；　for　they　are　so　constituted　as　to　have　a　contingent　and　a　created
  existence。　Spinoza's　eleventh　proposition；　which　follows　with　a　proof　that　God　exists
  necessarily；　and　his　twentieth；　showing　that　God's　existence　and　his　essence　are　one　and　the
  same；　are　really　superfluous；　and　the　proof　is　more　in　form　than　in　reality。　To　say　that　God　is
  Substance；　the　only　Substance；　and　that；　as　Substance　is　Causa　Sui；　God　therefore　exists
  necessarily；　is　merely　stating　that　God　is　that　of　which　the　notion　and　the　being　are　inseparable。
  （3）　The　immediate　consciousness　of　the　existence　of　external　things。　By　this
  nothing　more　is　meant　than　sense…consciousness。　To　have　such　a　thing　is　the
  slightest　of　all　cognitions：　and　the　only　thing　worth　knowing　about　it　is　that　such
  immediate　knowledge　of　the　being　of　things　external　is　error　and　delusion；　that　the
  sensible　world　as　such　is　altogether　void　of　truth；　that　the　being　of　these　external
  things　is　accidental　and　passes　away　as　a　show；　and　that　their　very　nature　is　to
  have　only　an　existence　which　is　separable　from　their　essence　and　notion。
  §77
  There　is　however　a　distinction　between　the　two　points　of　view：
  （1）　The　Cartesian　philosophy；　from　these　unproved　postulates；　which　it　assumes
  to　be　unprovable；　proceeds　to　wider　and　wider　details　of　knowledge；　and　thus
  gave　rise　to　the　sciences　of　modern　times。　The　modern　theory　（of　Jacobi）；　on　the
  contrary；　（§　62）　has　come　to　what　is　intrinsically　a　most　important　conclusion
  that　cognition；　proceeding　as　it　m