for　the　mind　（§　63）。　From　a　formal　point　of　view；　there　is　a　peculiar　interest　in
  the　maxim　that　the　being　of　God　is　immediately　and　inseparably　bound　up　with
  the　thought　of　God；　that　objectivity　is　bound　up　with　the　subjectivity　which　the
  thought　originally　presents。　Not　content　with　that；　the　philosophy　of　immediate
  knowledge　goes　so　far　in　its　one…sided　view；　as　to　affirm　that　the　attribute　of
  existence；　even　in　perception；　is　quite　as　inseparably　connected　with　the
  conception　we　have　of　our　own　bodies　and　of　external　things；　as　it　is　with　the
  thought　of　God。　Now　it　is　the　endeavour　of　philosophy　to　prove　such　a　unity；　to
  show　that　it　lies　in　the　very　nature　of　thought　and　subjectivity；　to　be　inseparable
  from　being　and　objectivity。　In　these　circumstances　therefore；　philosophy；
  whatever　estimate　may　be　formed　of　the　character　of　these　proofs；　must　in　any
  case　be　glad　to　see　it　shown　and　maintained　that　its　maxims　are　facts　of
  consciousness；　and　thus　in　harmony　with　experience。　The　difference　between
  philosophy　and　the　asseverations　of　immediate　knowledge　rather　centres　in　the
  exclusive　attitude　which　immediate　knowledge　adopts；　when　it　sets　itself　up
  against　philosophy。
  And　yet　it　was　as　a　self…evident　or　immediate　truth　that　the　cogito；　ergo　sum　of
  Descartes；　the　maxim　on　which　may　be　said　to　hinge　the　whole　interest　of
  Modern　Philosophy；　was　first　stated　by　its　author。　The　man　who　calls　this　a
  syllogism；　must　know　little　more　about　a　syllogism　than　that　the　word　'ergo'
  occurs　in　it。　Where　shall　we　look　for　the　middle　term？　And　a　middle　term　is　a
  much　more　essential　point　of　a　syllogism　than　the　word　'ergo'。　If　we　try　to　justify
  the　name；　by　calling　the　combination　of　ideas　in　Descartes　an　'immediate'
  syllogism；　this　superfluous　variety　of　syllogism　is　a　mere　name　for　an　utterly
  unmediated　synthesis　of　distinct　terms　of　thought。　That　being　so；　the　synthesis　of
  being　with　our　ideas；　as　stated　in　the　maxim　of　immediate　knowledge；　has　no
  more　and　no　less　claim　to　the　title　of　syllogism　than　the　axiom　of　Descartes　has。
  From　Hotho's　'Dissertation　on　the　Cartesian　Philosophy'　（published　1826）；　I
  borrow　the　quotation　in　which　Descartes　himself　distinctly　declares　that　the
  maxim　cogito；　ergo　sum　is　no　syllogism。　The　passages　are　Respons。　ad　II
  Object。；　De　Methodo　iv；　Ep。　i。　118。　From　the　first　passage　I　quote　the　words
  more　immediately　to　the　point。　Descartes　says：　'That　we　are　thinking　beings　is　a
  certain　primary　notion；　which　is　deduced　from　no　syllogism'；　and　goes　on：　'nor；
  when　one　says；　I　think；　therefore　I　am　or　exist；　does　he　deduce　existence　from
  thought　by　means　of　a　syllogism'。　Descartes　knew　what　it　implied　in　a　syllogism；
  and　so　he　adds　that；　in　order　to　make　the　maxim　admit　of　a　deduction　by
  syllogism；　we　should　have　to　add　the　major　premise：　'Everything　which　thinks；　is
  or　exists'。　Of　course；　he　remarks；　this　major　premise　itself　has　to　be　deduced
  from　the　original　statement。
  The　language　of　Descartes　on　the　maxim　that　the　'I'　which　thinks　must　also　at　the
  same　time　be；　his　saying　that　this　connection　is　given　and　implied　in　the　simple
  perception　of　consciousness　that　this　connection　is　the　absolute　first；　the　principle；
  the　most　certain　and　evident　of　all　things；　so　that　no　scepticism　can　be　conceived
  so　monstrous　as　not　to　admit　it…all　this　language　is　so　vivid　and　distinct；　that　the
  modern　statements　of　Jacobi　and　others　on　this　immediate　connection　can　only
  pass　for　needless　repetitions。
  §65
  The　theory　of　which　we　are　speaking　is　not　satisfied　when　it　has　shown　that
  mediate　knowledge　taken　separately　is　an　adequate　vehicle　of　truth。　Its　distinctive
  doctrine　is　that　immediate　knowledge　alone；　to　the　total　exclusion　of　mediation；
  can　possess　a　content　which　is　true。　This　exclusiveness　is　enough　to　show　that　the
  theory　is　a　relapse　into　the　metaphysical　understanding；　with　its　pass…words
  'either…or'。　And　thus　it　is　really　a　relapse　into　the　habit　of　external　mediation；　the
  gist　of　which　consists　in　clinging　to　those　narrow　and　one…sided　categories　of　the
  finite；　which　it　falsely　imagined　itself　to　have　left　for　ever　behind。　This　point；
  however；　we　shall　not　at　present　discuss　in　detail。　An　exclusively　immediate
  knowledge　is　asserted　as　a　fact　only；　and　in　the　present　Introduction　we　can　only
  study　it　from　this　external　point　of　view。　The　real　significance　of　such　knowledge
  will　be　explained　when　we　come　to　the　logical　question　of　the　opposition　between
  mediate　and　immediate。　But　it　is　characteristic　of　the　view　before　us　to　decline　lo
  examine　the　nature　of　the　fact；　that　is；　the　notion　of　it；　for　such　an　examination
  would　itself　be　a　step　towards　mediation　and　even　towards　knowledge。　The
  genuine　discussion　on　logical　ground；　therefore；　must　be　deferred　till　we　come　to
  the　proper　province　of　Logic　itself。
  The　whole　of　the　second　part　of　Logic；　the　Doctrine　of　Essential　Being；　is　a
  discussion　of　the　intrinsic　and　self…affirming　unity　of　immediacy　and　mediation。
  §66
  Beyond　this　point　then　we　need　not　go：　immediate　knowledge　is　to　be　accepted　as
  a　fact。　Under　these　circumstances　examination　is　directed　to　the　field　of
  experience；　to　a　psychological　phenomenon。　If　that　be　so；　we　need　only　note；　as
  the　commonest　of　experiences；　that　truths　which　we　well　know　to　be　results　of
  complicated　and　highly　mediated　trains　of　thought　present　themselves
  immediately　and　without　effort　to　the　mind　of　any　man　who　is　familiar　with　the
  subject。　The　mathematician；　like　everyone　who　has　mastered　a　particular　science；
  meets　any　problem　with　ready…made　solutions　which　presuppose　most
  complicated　analyses：　and　every　educated　man　has　a　number　of　general　views
  and　maxims　which　he　can　muster　without　trouble；　but　which　can　only　have
  sprung　from　frequent　reflection　and　long　experience。　The　facility　we　attain　in　any
  sort　of　knowledge；　art；　or　technical　expertness；　consists　in　having　the　particular
  knowledge　or　kind　of　action　present　to　our　mind　in　any　case　that　occurs；　even；
  we　may　say；　immediate　in　our　very　limbs；　in　an　outgoing　activity。　In　all　these
  instances；　immediacy　of　knowledge　is　so　far　from　excluding　mediation；　that　the
  two　things　are　linked　together　…　immediate　knowledge　being　actually　the　product
  and　result　of　mediated　knowledge。
  It　is　no　less　obvious　that　immediate　existence　is　bound　up　with　its　mediation。　The
  seed　and　the　parents　are　immediate　and　initial　existences　in　respect　of　the
  offspring　which　they　generate。　But　the　seed　and　the　parents；　though　they　exist
  and　are　therefore　immediate；　are　yet　in　their　turn　generated；　and　the　child；　without
  prejudice　to　the　mediation　of　its　existence；　is　immediate；　because　it　is。　The　fact
  that　I　am　in　Berlin；　my　immediate　presence　here；　is　mediated　by　my　having　made
  the　journey　hither。
  §67
  One　thing　may　be　observed　with　reference　to　the　immediate　knowledge　of　God；
  of　legal　and　ethical　principles　（including　under　the　head　of　immediate　knowledge
  what　is　otherwise　termed　Instinct；　Implanted　or　Innate　Ideas；　Common　Sense；
  Natural　Reason；　or　whatever　form；　in　short；　we　give　to　the　original　spontaneity）。
  It　is　a　matter　of　general　experience　that　education　or　development　is　required　to
  bring　out　into　consciousness　what　is　therein　contained。　It　was　so　even　with　the
  Platonic　reminiscence；　and　the　Christian　rite　of　baptism；　although　a　sacrament；
  involves　the　additional　obligation　of　a　Christian　upbringing。　In　short；　religion　and
  morals；　however　much　they　may　be　faith　or　immediate　knowledge；　are　still　on
  every　side　conditioned　by　the　mediating　process　which　is　termed　development；
  education；　training。
  The　adherents；　no　less　than　the　assailants；　of　the　doctrine　of　Innate　Ideas　have
  been　guilty　throughout　of　the　like　exclusiveness　and　narrowness　as　is　here　noted。
  They　have　drawn　a　hard　and　fast　line　between　the　essential　and　immediate　union
  （as　it　may　be　described）　of　certain　universal　principles　with　the　soul；　and　another
  union　which　has　to　be　brought　about　in　an　external　fashion；　and　through　the
  channel　of　given　objects　and　conceptions。　There　is　one　objection；　borrowed　from
  experience；　which　was　raised　against　the　doctrine　of　Innate　Ideas。　All　men；　it　was
  said；　must　have　these　ideas；　they　must　have；　for　example；　the　maxim　of
  contradiction　present　in　the　mind…they　must　be　aware　of　it；　for　this　maxim　and
  others　like　it　were　included　in　the　class　of　Innate　Ideas。　The　objection　may　be　set
  down　to　misconception；　for　the　principles　in　question；　though　innate；　need　not　on
  that　account　have　the　form　of　ideas　or　conceptions　of　something　we　are　aware　of。
  Still；　the　objection　completely　meets　and　overthrows　the　crude　theory　of
  immediate　knowledge；　which　expressly　maintains　its　formulae　in　so　far　as　they　are
  in　consciousness。　Another　point　calls　for　notice。　'We　may　suppose　it　admitted　by
  the　intuitive　school；　that　the　special　case　of　religious　faith　involves　supplementing
  by　a　Christian　or　religious　education　and　development。　In　that　case　it　is　acting
  capriciously　when　it　seeks　to　ignore　this　admission　when　speaking　about　faith；　or
  it　betrays　a　want　of　reflection