by　Kant　with　the　negative　faculty　of　the　infinite；　and　as　it　has　no　positive　content　of　its　own；　it　is
  restricted　to　the　function　of　detecting　the　finitude　of　experiential　knowledge。　To　the　practical
  reason；　on　the　contrary；　he　has　expressly　allowed　a　positive　infinity；　by　ascribing　to　the　will　the
  power　of　modifying　itself　in　universal　modes；　i。e。　by　thought。　Such　a　power　the　will　undoubtedly
  has：　and　it　is　well　to　remember　that　man　is　free　only　in　so　far　as　he　possesses　it　and　avails　himself
  of　it　in　his　conduct。　But　a　recognition　of　the　existence　of　this　power　is　not　enough　and　does　not
  avail　to　tell　us　what　are　the　contents　of　the　will　or　practical　reason。　Hence　to　say　that　a　man　must
  make　the　Good　the　content　of　his　will　raises　the　question；　what　that　content　is；　and　what　are　the
  means　of　ascertaining　what　good　is。　Nor　does　one　get　over　the　difficulty　by　the　principle　that　the
  will　must　be　consistent　with　itself；　or　by　the　precept　to　do　duty　for　the　sake　of　duty。
  §　55
  （c）　The　Reflective　Power　of　Judgement　is　invested　by　Kant　with　the　function　of
  an　Intuitive　Understanding。　That　is　to　say；　whereas　the　particulars　had　hitherto
  appeared；　so　far　as　the　universal　or　abstract　identity　was　concerned；　adventitious
  and　incapable　of　being　deduced　from　it；　the　Intuitive　Understanding　apprehends
  the　particulars　as　moulded　and　formed　by　the　universal　itself。　Experience　presents
  such　universalised　particulars　in　the　products　of　Art　and　of　organic　nature。
  The　capital　feature　in　Kant's　Criticism　of　the　Judgement　is；　that　in　it　he　gave　a
  representation　and　a　name；　if　not　even　an　intellectual　expression；　to　the　Idea。
  Such　a　representation；　as　an　Intuitive　Understanding；　or　an　inner　adaptation；
  suggests　a　universal　which　is　at　the　same　time　apprehended　as　essentially　a
  concrete　unity。　It　is　in　these　apercus　alone　that　the　Kantian　philosophy　rises　to　the
  speculative　height。　Schiller；　and　others；　have　found　in　the　idea　of　artistic　beauty；
  where　thought　and　sensuous　conception　have　grown　together　into　one；　a　way　of
  escape　from　the　abstract　and　separatist　understanding。　Others　have　found　the
  same　relief　in　the　perception　and　consciousness　of　life　and　of　living　things；
  whether　that　life　be　natural　or　intellectual。　The　work　of　Art；　as　well　as　the　living
  individual；　is；　it　must　be　owned；　of　limited　content。　But　in　the　postulated　harmony
  of　nature　（or　necessity）　and　free　purpose　in　the　final　purpose　of　the　world
  conceived　as　realised；　Kant　has　put　before　us　the　Idea；　comprehensive　even　in　its
  content。　Yet　what　may　be　called　the　laziness　of　thought；　when　dealing　with　the
  supreme　Idea；　finds　a　too　easy　mode　of　evasion　in　the　'ought　to　be'：　instead　of　the
  actual　realisation　of　the　ultimate　end；　it　clings　hard　to　the　disjunction　of　the　notion
  from　reality。　Yet　if　thought　will　not　think　the　ideal　realised；　the　senses　and　the
  intuition　can　at　any　rate　see　it　in　the　present　reality　of　living　organisms　and　of　the
  beautiful　in　Art。　And　consequently　Kant's　remarks　on　these　objects　were　well
  adapted　to　lead　the　mind　on　to　grasp　and　think　the　concrete　Idea。
  §　56
  We　are　thus　led　to　conceive　a　different　relation　between　the　universal　of
  understanding　and　the　particular　of　perception；　than　that　on　which　the　theory…of
  the　Theoretical　and　Practical　Reason　is　founded。　But　while　this　is　so；　it　is　not
  supplemented　by　a　recognition　that　the　former　is　the　genuine　relation　and　the　very
  truth。　Instead　of　that；　the　unity　（of　universal　with　particular）　is　accepted　only　as　it
  exists　in　finite　phenomena；　and　is　adduced　only　as　a　fact　of　experience。　Such
  experience；　at　first　only　personal；　may　come　from　two　sources。　It　may　spring
  from　Genius；　the　faculty　which　produces　'aesthetic　ideas'；　meaning　by　aesthetic
  ideas；　the　picture…thoughts　of　the　free　imagination　which　subserve　an　idea　and
  suggest　thoughts；　although　their　content　is　not　expressed　in　a　notional　form；　and
  even　admits　of　no　such　expression。　It　may　also　be　due　to　Taste；　the　feeling　of
  congruity　between　the　free　play　of　intuition　or　imagination　and　the　uniformity　of
  understanding。
  §　57
  The　principle　by　which　the　Reflective　faculty　of　Judgement　regulates　and　arranges
  the　products　of　animated　nature　is　described　as　the　End　or　final　cause　the　notion
  in　action；　the　universal　at　once　determining　and　determinate　in　itself。　At　the　same
  time　Kant　is　careful　to　discard　the　conception　of　external　or　finite　adaptation；　in
  which　the　End　is　only　an　adventitious　form　for　the　means　and　material　in　which　it
  is　realised。　In　the　living　organism；　on　the　contrary；　the　final　cause　is　a　moulding
  principle　and　an　energy　immanent　in　the　matter；　and　every　member　is　in　its　turn　a
  means　as　well　as　an　end。
  §　58
  Such　an　Idea　evidently　radically　transforms　the　relation　which　the　understanding
  institutes　between　means　and　ends；　between　subjectivity　and　objectivity。　And　yet
  in　the　face　of　this　unification；　the　End　or　design　is　subsequently　explained　to　be　a
  cause　which　exists　and　acts　subjectively；　i。e。　as　our　idea　only：　and　teleology　is
  accordingly　explained　to　be　only　a　principle　of　criticism；　purely　personal　to　our
  understanding。
  After　the　Critical　philosophy　had　settled　that　Reason　can　know　phenomena　only；
  there　would　still　have　been　an　option　for　animated　nature　between　two　equally
  subjective　modes　of　thought。　Even　according　to　Kant's　own　exposition；　there
  would　have　been　an　obligation　to　admit；　in　the　case　of　natural　productions；　a
  knowledge　not　confined　to　the　categories　of　quality；　cause　and　effect；
  composition；　constituents；　and　so　on。　The　principle　of　inward　adaptation　or
  design；　had　it　been　kept　to　and　carried　out　in　scientific　application；　would　have　led
  to　a　different　and　a　higher　method　of　observing　nature。
  §　59
  If　we　adopt　this　principle；　the　Idea；　when　all　limitations　were　removed　from　it；
  would　appear　as　follows。　The　universality　moulded　by　Reason；　and　described　as
  the　absolute　and　final　end　or　the　Good；　would　be　realised　in　the　world；　and
  realised　moreover　by　means　of　a　third　thing；　the　power　which　proposes　this　End
  as　well　as　realises　it　that　is；　God。　Thus　in　him；　who　is　the　absolute　truth；　those
  oppositions　of　universal　and　individual；　subjective　and　objective；　are　solved　and
  explained　to　be　neither　self…subsistent　nor　true。
  §　60
  But　Good　which　is　thus　put　forward　as　the　final　cause　of　the　world　has　been
  already　described　as　only　our　good；　the　moral　law　of　our　Practical　Reason。　This
  being　so；　the　unity　in　question　goes　no　further　than　make　the　state　of　the　world
  and　the　course　of　its　events　harmonise　with　our　moral　standards。　Besides；　even
  with　this　limitation；　the　final　cause；　or　Good；　is　a　vague　abstraction；　and　the　same
  vagueness　attaches　to　what　is　to　be　Duty。　But；　further；　this　harmony　is　met　by　the
  revival　and　reassertion　of　the　antithesis；　which　it　by　its　own　principle　had　nullified。
  The　harmony　is　then　described　as　merely　subjective；　something　which　merely
  ought　to　be；　and　which　at　the　same　time　is　not　real　a　mere　article　of　faith；
  possessing　a　subjective　certainty；　but　without　truth；　or　that　objectivity　which　is
  proper　to　the　Idea。　This　contradiction　may　seem　to　be　disguised　by　adjourning　the
  realisation　of　the　Idea　to　a　future；　to　a　time　when　the　Idea　will　also　be。　But　a
  sensuous　condition　like　time　is　the　reverse　of　a　reconciliation　of　the　discrepancy；
  and　an　infinite　progression　which　is　the　corresponding　image　adopted　by　the
  understanding　on　the　very　face　of　it　only　repeats　and　re…enacts　the　contradiction。
  A　general　remark　may　still　be　offered　on　the　result　to　which　the　Critical
  philosophy　led　as　to　the　nature　of　knowledge；　a　result　which　has　grown　one　of　the
  current　'idols'　or　axiomatic　beliefs　of　the　day。　In　every　dualistic　system；　and
  especially　in　that　of　Kant；　the　fundamental　defect　makes　itself　visible　in　the
  inconsistency　of　unifying　at　one　moment　what　a　moment　before　had　been
  explained　to　be　independent　and　therefore　incapable　of　unification。　And　then；　at
  the　very　moment　after　unification　has　been　alleged　to　be　the　truth；　we　suddenly
  come　upon　the　doctrine　that　the　two　elements；　which；　in　their　true　status　of
  unification；　had　been　refused　all　independent　subsistence；　are　only　true　and　actual
  in　their　state　of　separation。　Philosophising　of　this　kind　wants　the　little　penetration
  needed　to　discover；　that　this　shuffling　only　evidences　how　unsatisfactory　each　one
  of　the　two　terms　is。　Arid　it　fails　simply　because　it　is　incapable　of　bringing　two
  thoughts　together。　（And　in　point　of　form　there　are　never　more　than　two。）　It　argues
  an　utter　want　of　consistency　to　say；　on　the　one　hand；　that　the　understanding　only
  knows　phenomena；　and；　on　the　other；　assert　the　absolute　character　of　this
  knowledge；　by　such　statements　as　'Cognition　can　go　no　further'；　'Here　is　the
  natural　and　absolute　limit　of　human　knowledge。'　But　'natural'　is　the　wrong　word
  here。　The　things　of　nature　are　limited　and　are　natural　things　only　to　such　extent　as
  they　are　not　aware　of　t