when　he　came　to　state　his　reasons；　his　failure　is　apparent。
  §　48
  ＇b＇　The　second　unconditioned　object　is　the　World　（§　35）。　In　the　attempt　which
  reason　makes　to　comprehend　the　unconditioned　nature　of　the　World；　it　falls　into
  what　are　called　Antinomies。　In　other　words　it　maintains　two　opposite　propositions
  about　the　same　object；　and　in　such　a　way　that　each　of　them　has　to　be　maintained
  with　equal　necessity。　From　this　it　follows　that　the　body　of　cosmical　fact；　the
  specific　statements　descriptive　of　which　run　into　contradiction；　cannot　be　a
  self…subsistent　reality；　but　only　an　appearance。　The　explanation　offered　by　Kant
  alleges　that　the　contradiction　does　not　affect　the　object　in　its　own　proper　essence；
  but　attaches　only　to　the　Reason　which　seeks　to　comprehend　it。
  In　this　way　the　suggestion　was　broached　that　the　contradiction　is　occasioned　by
  the　subject…matter　itself；　or　by　the　intrinsic　quality　of　the　categories。　And　to　offer
  the　idea　that　the　contradiction　introduced　into　the　world　of　Reason　by　the
  categories　of　Understanding　is　inevitable　and　essential　was　to　make　one　of　the
  most　important　steps　in　the　progress　of　Modern　Philosophy。　But　the　more
  important　the　issue　thus　raised　the　more　trivial　was　the　solution。　Its　only　motive
  was　an　excess　of　tenderness　for　the　things　of　the　world。　The　blemish　of
  contradiction；　it　seems；　could　not　be　allowed　to　mar　the　essence　of　the　world；　but
  there　could　be　no　objection　to　attach　it　to　the　thinking　Reason；　to　the　essence　of
  mind。　Probably　nobody　will　feel　disposed　to　deny　that　the　phenomenal　world
  presents　contradictions　to　the　observing　mind；　meaning　by　'phenomenal'　the
  world　as　it　presents　itself　to　the　senses　and　understanding；　to　the　subjective　mind。
  But　if　a　comparison　is　instituted　between　the　essence　of　the　world　and　the
  essence　of　the　mind；　it　does　seem　strange　to　hear　how　calmly　and　confidently　the
  modest　dogma　has　been　advanced　by　one；　and　repeated　by　others；　that　thought　or
  Reason；　and　not　the　World；　is　the　seat　of　contradiction。　It　is　no　escape　to　turn
  round　and　explain　that　Reason　falls　into　contradiction　only　by　applying　the
  categories。　For　this　application　of　the　categories　is　maintained　to　be　necessary；
  and　Reason　is　not　supposed　to　be　equipped　with　any　other　forms　but　the
  categories　for　the　purpose　of　cognition。　But　cognition　is　determining　and
  determinate　thinking：　so　that；　if　Reason　be　mere　empty　indeterminate　thinking；　it
  thinks　nothing。　And　if　in　the　end　Reason　be　reduced　to　mere　identity　without
  diversity　（see　next　§）；　it　will　in　the　end　also　win　a　happy　release　from
  contradiction　at　the　slight　sacrifice　of　all　its　facets　and　contents。
  It　may　also　be　noted　that　his　failure　to　make　a　more　thorough　study　of　Antinomy
  was　one　of　the　reasons　why　Kant　enumerated　only　four　Antinomies。　These　four
  attracted　his　notice；　because；　as　may　be　seen　in　his　discussion　of　the　so…called
  Paralogisms　of　Reason；　he　assumed　the　list　of　the　categories　as　a　basis　of　his
  argument。　Employing　what　has　subsequently　become　a　favourite　fashion；　he
  simply　put　the　object　under　a　rubric　otherwise　ready　to　hand；　instead　of　deducing
  its　characteristics　from　its　notion。　Further　deficiencies　in　the　treatment　of　the
  Antinomies　I　have　pointed　out；　as　occasion　offered；　in　my　Science　of　Logic。　Here
  it　will　be　sufficient　to　say　that　the　Antinomies　are　not　confined　to　the　four　special
  objects　taken　from　Cosmology：　they　appear　in　all　objects　of　every　kind；　in　all
  conceptions；　notions；　and　Ideas。　To　be　aware　of　this　and　to　know　objects　in　this
  property　of　theirs　makes　a　vital　part　in　a　philosophical　theory。　For　the　property
  thus　indicated　is　what　we　shall　afterwards　describe　as　the　Dialectical　influence　in
  Logic。
  §48n
  The　principles　of　the　metaphysical　philosophy　gave　rise　to　the　belief　that；　when　cognition　lapsed
  into　contradictions；　it　was　a　mere　accidental　aberration；　due　to　some　subjective　mistake　in
  argument　and　inference。　According　to　Kant；　however；　thought　has　a　natural　tendency　to　issue　in
  contradictions　or　antinomies；　whenever　it　seeks　to　apprehend　the　infinite。　We　have　in　the　latter
  part　of　the　above　paragraph　referred　to　the　philosophical　importance　of　the　antinomies　of　reason；
  and　shown　how　the　recognition　of　their　existence　helped　largely　to　get　rid　of　the　rigid　dogmatism　of
  the　metaphysic　of　understanding；　and　to　direct　attention　to　the　Dialectical　movement　of　thought。
  But　here　too　Kant；　as　we　must　add；　never　got　beyond　the　negative　result　that　the　thing…in…itself　is
  unknowable；　and　never　penetrated　to　the　discovery　of　what　the　antinomies　really　and　positively
  mean。　That　true　and　positive　meaning　of　the　antinomies　is　this：　that　every　actual　thing　involves　a
  coexistence　of　opposed　elements。　Consequently　to　know；　or；　in　other　words；　to　comprehend　an
  object　is　equivalent　to　being　conscious　of　it　as　a　concrete　unity　of　opposed　determinations。　The
  old　metaphysic；　as　we　have　already　seen；　when　it　studied　the　objects　of　which　it　sought　a
  metaphysical　knowledge；　went　to　work　by　applying　categories　abstractly　and　to　the　exclusion　of
  their　opposites。
  Kant；　on　the　other　hand；　tried　to　prove　that　the　statements　issuing　through　this　method　could　be
  met　by　other　statements　of　contrary　import　with　equal　warrant　and　equal　necessity。　In　the
  enumeration　of　these　antinomies　he　narrowed　his　ground　to　the　cosmology　of　the　old　metaphysical
  system；　and　in　his　discussion　made　out　four　antinomies；　a　number　which　rests　upon　the　list　of　the
  categories。　The　first　antinomy　is　on　the　question：　Whether　we　are　or　are　not　to　think　the　world
  limited　in　space　and　time。　In　the　second　antinomy　we　have　a　discussion　of　the　dilemma：　Matter
  must　be　conceived　either　as　endlessly　divisible；　or　as　consisting　of　atoms。　The　third　antinomy　bears
  upon　the　antithesis　of　freedom　and　necessity；　to　such　extent　as　it　is　embraced　in　the　question；
  Whether　everything　in　the　world　must　be　supposed　subject　to　the　condition　of　causality；　or　if　we
  can　also　assume　free　beings；　in　other　words　absolute　initial　points　of　action；　in　the　world。　Finally；
  the　fourth　antinomy　is　the　dilemma：　Either　the　world　as　a　whole　has　a　cause　or　it　is　uncaused。
  The　method　which　Kant　follows　in　discussing　these　antinomies　is　as　follows。　He　puts　the　two
  propositions　implied　in　the　dilemma　over　against　each　other　as　thesis　and　antithesis；　and　seeks　to
  prove　both：　that　is　to　say　he　tries　to　exhibit　them　as　inevitably　issuing　from　reflection　on　the
  question。　He　particularly　protests　against　the　charge　of　being　a　special　pleader　and　of　grounding
  his　reasoning　on　illusions。　Speaking　honestly；　however；　the　arguments　which　Kant　offers　for　his
  thesis　and　antithesis　are　mere　shams　of　demonstration。　The　thing　to　be　proved　is　invariably　implied
  in　the　assumption　he　starts　from；　and　the　speciousness　of　his　proofs　is　only　due　to　his　prolix　and
  apagogic　mode　of　procedure。　Yet　it　was；　and　still　is；　a　great　achievement　for　the　Critical
  Philosophy　when　it　exhibited　these　antinomies：　for　in　this　way　it　gave　some　expression　（at　first
  certainly　subjective　and　unexplained）　to　the　actual　unity　of　those　categories　which　are　kept
  persistently　separate　by　the　understanding。　The　first　of　the　cosmological　antinomies；　for　example；
  implies　a　recognition　of　the　doctrine　that　space　and　time　present　a　discrete　as　well　as　a　continuous
  aspect：　whereas　the　old　metaphysic；　laying　exclusive　emphasis　on　the　continuity；　had　been　led　to
  treat　the　world　as　unlimited　in　space　and　time。　It　is　quite　correct　to　say　that　we　can　go　beyond
  every　definite　space　and　beyond　every　definite　time：　but　it　is　no　less　correct　that　space　and　time
  are　real　and　actual　only　when　they　are　defined　or　specialised　into　'here'　and　'now'　…　a　specialisation
  which　is　involved　in　the　very　notion　of　them。　The　same　observations　apply　to　the　rest　of　the
  antinomies。　Take；　for　example；　the　antinomy　of　freedom　and　necessity。　The　main　gist　of　it　is　that
  freedom　and　necessity　as　understood　by　abstract　thinkers　are　not　independently　real；　as　these
  thinkers　suppose；　but　merely　ideal　factors　（moments）　of　the　true　freedom　and　the　true　necessity；
  and　that　to　abstract　and　isolate　either　conception　is　to　make　it　false。
  §　49
  ＇c＇　The　third　object　of　the　Reason　is　God　（§　36）：　he　also　must　be　known　and
  defined　in　terms　of　thought。　But　in　comparison　with　an　unalloyed　identity；　every
  defining　term　as　such　seems　to　the　understanding　to　be　only　a　limit　and　a
  negation：　every　reality　accordingly　must　be　taken　as　limitless；　i。e。　undefined。
  Accordingly　God；　when　he　is　defined　to　be　the　sum　of　all　realities；　the　most　real
  of　beings；　turns　into　a　mere　abstract。　And　the　only　term　under　which　that　most
  real　of　real　things　can　be　defined　is　that　of　Being　itself　the　height　of　abstraction。
  These　are　two　elements；　abstract　identity；　on　one　hand；　which　is　spoken　of　in　this
  place　as　the　notion；　and　Being　on　the　other　which　Reason　seeks　to　unify。　And
  their　union　is　the　Ideal　of　Reason。
  §　50
  。。。　The　organic　structures；　and　the　evidence　they　afford　of　mutual　adaptation；
  belong　to　a　higher　province；　the　provi