degrades　Reason　to　a　finite　and　conditioned　thing；　to　identify　it　with　a　mere　stepping　beyond　the
  finite　and　conditioned　range　of　understanding。　The　real　infinite；　far　from　being　a　mere
  transcendence　of　the　finite；　always　involves　the　absorption　of　the　finite　into　its　own　fuller　nature。　In
  the　same　way　Kant　restored　the　Idea　to　its　proper　dignity：　vindicating　it　for　Reason；　as　a　thing
  distinct　from　abstract　analytic　determinations　or　from　the　merely　sensible　conceptions　which
  usually　appropriate　to　themselves　the　name　of　ideas。　But　as　respects　the　Idea　also；　he　never　got
  beyond　its　negative　aspect；　as　what　ought　to　be　but　is　not。
  The　view　that　the　objects　of　immediate　consciousness；　which　constitute　the　body　of　experience；
  are　mere　appearances　（phenomena）　was　another　important　result　of　the　Kantian　philosophy。
  Common　Sense；　that　mixture　of　sense　and　understanding；　believes　the　objects　of　which　it　has
  knowledge　to　be　severally　independent　and　self…supporting；　and　when　it　becomes　evident　that　they
  tend　towards　and　limit　one　another；　the　interdependence　of　one　upon　another　is　reckoned
  something　foreign　to　them　and　to　their　true　nature。　The　very　opposite　is　the　truth。　The　things
  immediately　known　are　mere　appearances　…　in　other　words；　the　ground　of　their　being　is　not　in
  themselves　but　in　something　else。　But　then　comes　the　important　step　of　defining　what　this
  something　else　is。　According　to　Kant；　the　things　that　we　know　about　are　to　us　appearances　only；
  and　we　can　never　know　their　essential　nature；　which　belongs　to　another　world　we　cannot
  approach。
  Plain　minds　have　not　unreasonably　taken　exception　to　this　subjective　idealism；　with　its　reduction　of
  the　facts　of　consciousness　to　a　purely　personal　world；　created　by　ourselves　alone。　For　the　true
  statement　of　the　case　is　rather　as　follows。　The　things　of　which　we　have　direct　consciousness　are
  mere　phenomena；　not　for　us　only；　but　in　their　own　nature；　and　the　true　and　proper　case　of　these
  things；　finite　as　they　are；　is　to　have　their　existence　founded　not　in　themselves　but　in　the　universal
  divine　Idea。　This　view　of　things；　it　is　true；　is　as　idealist　as　Kant's；　but　in　contradistinction　to　the
  subjective　idealism　of　the　Critical　philosophy　should　be　termed　absolute　idealism。　Absolute
  idealism；　however；　though　it　is　far　in　advance　of　vulgar　realism；　is　by　no　means　merely　restricted　to
  philosophy。　It　lies　at　the　root　of　all　religion；　for　religion　too　believes　the　actual　world　we　see；　the
  sum　total　of　existence；　to　be　created　and　governed　by　God。
  §　46
  But　it　is　not　enough　simply　to　indicate　the　existence　of　the　object　of　Reason。
  Curiosity　impels　us　to　seek　for　knowledge　of　this　identity；　this　empty
  thing…in…itself。　Now　knowledge　means　such　an　acquaintance　with　the　object　as
  apprehends　its　distinct　and　special　subject…matter。　But　such　subject…matter
  involves　a　complex　interconnection　in　the　object　itself；　and　supplies　a　ground　of
  connection　with　many　other　objects。　In　the　present　case；　to　express　the　nature　of
  the　features　of　the　Infinite　or　Thing…in…itself；　Reason　would　have　nothing　except
  the　categories：　and　in　any　endeavour　so　to　employ　them　Reason　becomes
  over…soaring　or　'transcendent'。
  Here　begins　the　second　stage　of　the　Criticism　of　Reason　which；　as　an　independent
  piece　of　work；　is　more　valuable　than　the　first。　The　first　part；　as　has　been
  explained　above；　teaches　that　the　categories　originate　in　the　unity　of
  self…consciousness；　that　any　knowledge　which　is　gained　by　their　means　has
  nothing　objective　in　it；　and　that　the　very　objectivity　claimed　for　them　is　only
  subjective。　So　far　as　this　goes；　the　Kantian　Criticism　presents　that　'common'　type
  of　idealism　known　as　Subjective　Idealism。　It　asks　no　questions　about　the　meaning
  or　scope　of　the　categories；　but　simply　considers　the　abstract　form　of　subjectivity
  and　objectivity；　and　that　even　in　such　a　partial　way　that　the　former　aspect；　that　of
  subjectivity；　is　retained　as　a　final　and　purely　affirmative　term　of　thought。　In　the
  second　part；　however；　when　Kant　examines　the　application；　as　it　is　called；　which
  Reason　makes　of　the　categories　in　order　to　know　its　objects；　the　content　of　the
  categories；　at　least　in　some　points　of　view；　comes　in　for　discussion：　or；　at　any
  rate；　an　opportunity　presented　itself　for　a　discussion　of　the　question。　It　is　worth
  while　to　see　what　decision　Kant　arrives　at　on　the　subject　of　metaphysic；　as　this
  application　of　the　categories　to　the　unconditioned　is　called。　His　method　of
  procedure　we　shall　here　briefly　state　and　criticise。
  §47
  ＇a＇　The　first　of　the　unconditioned　entities　which　Kant　examines　is　the　Soul　（see
  above；　§　34）。　'In　my　consciousness'；　he　says；　'I　always　find　that　I　（1）　am　the
  determining　subject；　（2）　am　singular　or　abstractly　simple；　（3）　am　identical；　or　one
  and　the　same；　in　all　the　variety　of　what　I　am　conscious　of；　（4）　distinguish　myself
  as　thinking　from　all　the　things　outside　me。'
  Now　the　method　of　the　old　metaphysic；　as　Kant　correctly　states　it；　consisted　in
  substituting　for　these　statements　of　experience　the　corresponding　categories　or
  metaphysical　terms。　Thus　arise　these　four　new　propositions：　（a）　the　Soul　is　a
  substance；　（b）　it　is　a　simple　substance；　（c）　it　is　numerically　identical　at　the　various
  periods　of　existence；　（d）　it　stands　in　relation　to　space。
  Kant　discusses　this　translation；　and　draws　attention　to　the　Paralogism　or　mistake
  of　confounding　one　kind　of　truth　with　another。　He　points　out　that　empirical
  attributes　have　here　been　replaced　by　categories；　and　shows　that　we　are　not
  entitled　to　argue　from　the　former　to　the　latter；　or　to　put　the　latter　in　place　of　the
  former。
  This　criticism　obviously　but　repeats　the　observation　of　Hume　（§　39）　that　the
  categories　as　a　whole　ideas　of　universality　and　necessity　are　entirely　absent　from
  sensation；　and　that　the　empirical　fact　both　in　form　and　contents　differs　from　its
  intellectual　formulation。
  If　the　purely　empirical　fact　were　held　to　constitute　the　credentials　of　the　thought；
  then　no　doubt　it　would　be　indispensable　to　be　able　precisely　to　identify　the　'idea'
  in　the　'impression'。
  And　in　order　to　make　out；　in　his　criticism　of　the　metaphysical　psychology；　that　the
  soul　cannot　be　described　as　substantial；　simple；　self…same；　and　as　maintaining　its
  independence　in　intercourse　with　the　material　world；　Kant　argues　from　the　single
  ground　that　the　several　attributes　of　the　soul；　which　consciousness　lets　us　feel　in
  experience；　are　not　exactly　the　same　attributes　as　result　from　the　action　of
  thought　thereon。　But　we　have　seen　above　that　according　to　Kant　all　knowledge；
  even　experience；　consists　in　thinking　our　impressions　in　other　words；　in
  transforming　into　intellectual　categories　the　attributes　primarily　belonging　to
  sensation。
  Unquestionably　one　good　result　of　the　Kantian　criticism　was　that　it　emancipated
  mental　philosophy　from　the　'soul…thing'；　from　the　categories；　and；　consequently；
  from　questions　about　the　simplicity；　complexity；　materiality；　etc。；　of　the　soul。　But
  even　for　the　common　sense　of　ordinary　men；　the　true　point　of　view；　from　which
  the　inadmissibility　of　these　forms　best　appears；　will　be　not　that　they　are　thoughts；
  but　that　thoughts　of　such　a　stamp　neither　can　nor　do　retain　truth。
  §47
  If　thought　and　phenomenon　do　not　perfectly　correspond　to　one　another；　we　are
  free　at　least　to　choose　which　of　the　two　shall　be　held　the　defaulter。　The　Kantian
  idealism；　where　it　touches　on　the　world　of　Reason；　throws　the　blame　on　the
  thoughts；　saying　that　the　thoughts　are　defective；　as　not　being　exactly　fitted　to　the
  sensations　and　to　a　mode　of　mind　wholly　restricted　within　the　range　of　sensation；
  in　which　as　such　there　are　no　traces　of　the　presence　of　these　thoughts。　But　as　to
  the　actual　content　of　the　thought；　no　question　is　raised。
  §47n
  Paralogisms　are　a　species　of　unsound　syllogism；　the　especial　vice　of　which　consists　in　employing
  one　and　the　same　word　in　the　two　premises　with　a　different　meaning。　According　to　Kant　the
  method　adopted　by　the　rational　psychology　of　the　old　metaphysicians；　when　they　assumed　that　the
  qualities　of　the　phenomenal　soul；　as　given　in　experience；　formed　part　of　its　own　real　essence；　was
  based　upon　such　a　Paralogism。　Nor　can　it　be　denied　that　predicates　like　simplicity；　permanence；
  etc。；　are　inapplicable　to　the　soul。　But　their　unfitness　is　not　due　to　the　ground　assigned　by　Kant；　that
  Reason；　by　applying　them；　would　exceed　its　appointed　bounds。　The　true　ground　is　that　this　style　of
  abstract　terms　is　not　good　enough　for　the　soul；　which　is　very　much　more　than　a　mere　simple　or
  unchangeable　sort　of　thing。　And　thus；　for　example；　while　the　soul　may　be　admitted　to　be　simple
  selfsameness；　it　is　at　the　same　time　active　and　institutes　distinctions　in　its　own　nature。　But　whatever
  is　merely　or　abstractly　simple　is　as　such　also　a　mere　dead　thing。　By　his　polemic　against　the
  metaphysic　of　the　past　Kant　discarded　those　predicates　from　the　soul　or　mind。　He　did　well；　but
  when　he　came　to　state　his　reasons；　his　failure　is　apparent。