self…conscious　agent；　and　the　natural　world。　But　this　schism；　though　it　forms　a　necessary　element　in
  the　very　notion　of　spirit；　is　not　the　final　goal　of　man。　It　is　to　this　state　of　inward　breach　that　the
  whole　finite　action　of　thought　and　will　belongs。　In　that　finite　sphere　man　pursues　ends　of　his　own
  and　draws　from　himself　the　material　of　his　conduct。　While　he　pursues　these　aims　to　the　uttermost；
  while　his　knowledge　and　his　will　seek　himself；　his　own　narrow　self　apart　from　the　universal；　he　is
  evil；　and　his　evil　is　to　be　subjective。
  We　seem　at　first　to　have　a　double　evil　here：　but　both　are　really　the　same。　Man　in　so　far　as　he　is
  spirit　is　not　the　creature　of　nature：　and　when　he　behaves　as　such；　and　follows　the　cravings　of
  appetite；　he　wills　to　be　so。　The　natural　wickedness　of　man　is　therefore　unlike　the　natural　life　of
  animals。　A　mere　natural　life　may　be　more　exactly　defined　by　saying　that　the　natural　man　as　such　is
  an　individual：　for　nature　in　every　part　is　in　the　bonds　of　individualism。　Thus　when　man　wills　to　be　a
  creature　of　nature；　he　wills　in　the　same　degree　to　be　an　individual　simply。　Yet　against　such
  impulsive　and　appetitive　action；　due　to　the　individualism　of　nature；　there　also　steps　in　the　law　or
  general　principle。　This　law　may　either　be　an　external　force；　or　have　the　form　of　divine　authority。　So
  long　as　he　continues　in　his　natural　state；　man　is　in　bondage　to　the　law。　It　is　true　that　among　the
  instincts　and　affections　of　man；　there　are　social　or　benevolent　inclinations；　love；　sympathy；　and
  others；　reaching　beyond　his　selfish　isolation。　But　so　long　as　these　tendencies　are　instinctive；　their
  virtual　universality　of　scope　and　purport　is　vitiated　by　the　subjective　form　which　always　allows　free
  play　to　self…seeking　and　random　action。
  The　concrete　formations　of　consciousness
  §　25
  The　term　'Objective　Thoughts'　indicates　the　truth　…　the　truth　which　is　to　be　the
  absolute　object　of　philosophy；　and　not　merely　the　goal　at　which　it　aims。　But　the
  very　expression　cannot　fail　to　suggest　an　opposition；　to　characterise　and
  appreciate　which　is　the　main　motive　of　the　philosophical　attitude　of　the　present
  time；　and　which　forms　the　real　problem　of　the　question　about　truth　and　our
  means　of　ascertaining　it。　If　the　thought…forms　are　vitiated　by　a　fixed　antithesis；　i。e。
  if　they　are　only　of　a　finite　character；　they　are　unsuitable　for　the　self…centred
  universe　of　truth；　and　truth　can　find　no　adequate　receptacle　in　thought。　Such
  thought；　which　can　produce　only　limited　and　partial　categories　and　proceed　by
  their　means；　is　what　in　the　stricter　sense　of　the　word　is　termed　Understanding。
  The　finitude；　further；　of　these　categories　lies　in　two　points。　Firstly；　they　are　only
  subjective；　and　the　antithesis　of　an　objective　permanently　clings　to　them。
  Secondly；　they　are　always　of　restricted　content；　and　so　persist　in　antithesis　to　one
  another　and　still　more　to　the　Absolute。　In　order　more　fully　to　explain　the　position
  and　import　here　attributed　to　logic；　the　attitudes　in　which　thought　is　supposed　to
  stand　to　objectivity　will　next　be　examined　by　way　of　further　introduction。
  In　my　Phenomenology　of　the　Spirit；　which　on　that　account　was　at　its　publication
  described　as　the　first　part　of　the　System　of　Philosophy；　the　method　adopted　was
  to　begin　with　the　first　and　simplest　phase　of　mind；　immediate　consciousness；　and
  to　show　how　that　stage　gradually　of　necessity　worked　onward　to　the　philosophical
  point　of　view；　the　necessity　of　that　view　being　proved　by　the　process。　But　in
  these　circumstances　it　was　impossible　to　restrict　the　quest　to　the　mere　form　of
  consciousness。　For　the　stage　of　philosophical　knowledge　is　the　richest　in　material
  and　organisation；　and　therefore；　as　it　came　before　us　in　the　shape　of　a　result；　it
  presupposed　the　existence　of　the　concrete　formations　of　consciousness；　such　as
  individual　and　social　morality；　art　and　religion。　In　the　development　of
  consciousness；　which　at　first　sight　appears　limited　to　the　point　of　form　merely；
  there　is　thus　at　the　same　time　included　the　development　of　the　matter　or　of　the
  objects　discussed　in　the　special　branches　of　philosophy。　But　the　latter　process
  must；　so　to　speak；　go　on　behind　consciousness；　since　those　facts　are　the　essential
  nucleus　which　is　raised　into　consciousness。　The　exposition　accordingly　is　rendered
  more　intricate；　because　so　much　that　properly　belongs　to　the　concrete　branches　is
  prematurely　dragged　into　the　introduction。　The　survey　which　follows　in　the
  present　work　has　even　more　the　inconvenience　of　being　only　historical　and
  inferential　in　its　method。　But　it　tries　especially　to　show　how　the　questions　men
  have　proposed；　outside　the　school；　on　the　nature　of　Knowledge；　Faith；　and　the
  like…questions　which　they　imagine　to　have　no　connection　with　abstract　thoughts　…
  are　really　reducible　to　the　simple　categories；　which　first　get　cleared　up　in　Logic。
  III。　First　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
  §26
  The　first　of　these　attitudes　of　thought　is　seen　in　the　method　which　has　no　doubts
  and　no　sense　of　the　contradiction　in　thought；　or　of　the　hostility　of　thought　against
  itself。　It　entertains　an　unquestioning　belief　that　reflection　is　the　means　of
  ascertaining　the　truth；　and　of　bringing　the　objects　before　the　mind　as　they　really
  are。　And　in　this　belief　it　advances　straight　upon　its　objects；　takes　the　materials
  furnished　by　sense　and　perception；　and　reproduces　them　from　itself　as　facts　of
  thought；　and　then；　believing　this　result　to　be　the　truth；　the　method　is　content。
  Philosophy　in　its　earliest　stages；　all　the　sciences；　and　even　the　daily　action　and
  movement　of　consciousness；　live　in　this　faith。
  §27
  This　method　of　thought　has　never　become　aware　of　the　antithesis　of　subjective
  and　objective：　and　to　that　extent　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　its　statements　from
  possessing　a　genuinely　philosophical　and　speculative　character；　though　it　is　just　as
  possible　that　they　may　never　get　beyond　finite　categories；　or　the　stage　where　the
  antithesis　is　still　unresolved。　In　the　present　introduction　the　main　question　for　us　is
  to　observe　this　attitude　of　thought　in　its　extreme　form；　and　we　shall　accordingly
  first　of　all　examine　its　second　and　inferior　aspect　as　a　philosophic　system。　One　of
  the　clearest　instances　of　it；　and　one　lying　nearest　to　ourselves；　may　be　found　in
  the　Metaphysic　of　the　Past　as　it　subsisted　among　us　previous　to　the　philosophy　of
  Kant。　It　is　however　only　in　reference　to　the　history　of　philosophy　that　this
  Metaphysic　can　be　said　to　belong　to　the　past：　the　thing　is　always　and　at　all　places
  to　be　found；　as　the　view　which　the　abstract　understanding　takes　of　the　objects　of
  reason。　And　it　is　in　this　point　that　the　real　and　immediate　good　lies　in　a　closer
  examination　of　its　main　scope　and　its　modis　operandi。
  §28
  This　metaphysical　system　took　the　laws　and　forms　of　thought　to　be　the
  fundamental　laws　and　forms　of　things。　It　assumed　that　to　think　a　thing　was　the
  means　of　finding　its　very　self　and　nature：　and　to　that　extent　it　occupied　higher
  ground　than　the　Critical　Philosophy　which　succeeded　it。　But　in　the　first　instance
  （1）　these　terms　of　thought　were　cut　off　from　their　connection；　their　solidarity；
  each　was　believed　valid　by　itself　and　capable　of　serving　as　a　predicate　of　the
  truth。　It　was　the　general　assumption　of　this　metaphysic　that　a　knowledge　of　the
  Absolute　was　gained　by　assigning　predicates　to　it。　It　neither　inquired　what　the
  terms　of　the　understanding　specially　meant　or　what　they　were　worth；　no…r　did　it
  test　the　method　which　characterises　the　Absolute　by　the　assignment　of　predicates。
  As　an　example　of　such　predicates　may　be　taken：　Existence；　in　the　proposition；
  'God　has　existence'；　Finitude　or　Infinity；　as　in　the　question；　'Is　the　world　finite　or
  infinite？'；　Simple　and　Complex；　in　the　proposition；　'The　Soul　is　simple'　or　again；
  'The　thing　is　a　unity；　a　whole'；　etc。　Nobody　asked　whether　such　predicates　had
  any　intrinsic　and　independent　truth；　or　if　the　propositional　form　could　be　a　form
  of　truth。
  §28n
  The　Metaphysic　of　the　past　assumed；　as　unsophisticated　belief　always　does；　that　thought
  apprehends　the　very　self　of　things；　and　that　things；　to　become　what　they　truly　are；　require　to　be
  thought。　For　Nature　and　the　human　soul　are　a　very　Proteus　in　their　perpetual　transformations；　and
  it　soon　occurs　to　the　observer　that　the　first　crude　impression　of　things　is　not　their　essential　being。
  This　is　a　point　of　view　the　very　reverse　of　the　result　arrived　at　by　the　Critical　Philosophy；　a　result；
  of　which　it　may　be　said；　that　it　bade　man　go　and　feed　on　mere　husks　and　chaff。
  We　must　look　more　closely　into　the　procedure　of　that　old　metaphysic。　In　the　first　place　it　never
  went　beyond　the　province　of　the　analytic　understanding。　Without　preliminary　inquiry　it　adopted　the
  abstract　categories　of　thought　and　let　them　rank　as　predicates　of　truth。　But　in　using　the　term
  thought　we　must　not　forget　the　difference　between　finite　or　discursive　thinking　and　the　thinking
  which　is　infinite　and　rationa