preliminary　chapters　any　deduction　or　proof　would　be　impossible；　and　the
  statements　may　be　taken　as　matters　in　evidence。　In　other　words；　every　man；
  when　he　thinks　and　considers　his　thoughts；　will　discover　by　the　experience　of　his
  consciousness　that　they　possess　the　character　of　universality　as　well　as　the　other
  aspects　of　thought　to　be　afterwards　enumerated。　We　assume　of　course　that　his
  powers　of　attention　and　abstraction　have　undergone　'a　previous　training；　enabling
  him　to　observe　correctly　the　evidence　of　his　consciousness　and　his　conceptions。
  This　introductory　exposition　has　already　alluded　to　the　distinction　between　Sense；
  Conception；　and　Thought。　As　the　distinction　is　of　capital　importance　for
  understanding　the　nature　and　kinds　of　knowledge；　it　will　help　to　explain　matters　if
  we　here　call　attention　to　it。　For　the　explanation　of　Sense；　the　readiest　method
  certainly　is　to　refer　to　its　external　source　…　the　organs　of　sense。　But　to　name　the
  organ　does　not　help　much　to　explain　what　is　apprehended　by　it。　The　real
  distinction　between　sense　and　thought　lies　in　this　…　that　the　essential　feature　of　the
  sensible　is　individuality；　and　as　the　individual　（which；　reduced　to　its　simplest
  terms；　is　the　atom）　is　also　a　member　of　a　group；　sensible　existence　presents　a
  number　of　mutually　exclusive　units　…　of　units；　to　speak　in　more　definite　and
  abstract　formulae；　which　exist　side　by　side　with；　and　after；　one　another。
  Conception　or　picture…thinking　works　with　materials　from　the　same　sensuous
  source。　But　these　materials　when　conceived　are　expressly　characterised　as　in　me
  and　therefore　mine；　and　secondly；　as　universal；　or　simple；　because　only　referred
  to　self。　Nor　is　sense　the　only　source　of　materialised　conception。　There　are
  conceptions　constituted　by　materials　emanating　from　self…conscious　thought；　such
  as　those　of　law；　morality；　religion；　and　even　of　thought　itself；　and　it　requires　some
  effort　to　detect　wherein　lies　the　difference　between　such　conceptions　and
  thoughts　having　the　same　import。　For　it　is　a　thought　of　which　such　conception　is
  the　vehicle；　and　there　is　no　want　of　the　form　of　universality；　without　which　no
  content　could　be　in　me；　or　be　a　conception　at　all。　Yet　here　also　the　peculiarity　of
  conception　is；　generally　speaking；　to　be　sought　in　the　individualism　or　isolation　of
  its　contents。　True　it　is　that；　for　example；　law　and　legal　provisions　do　not　exist　in　a
  sensible　space；　mutually　excluding　one　another。　Nor　as　regards　time；　though　they
  appear　to　some　extent　in　succession；　are　their　contents　themselves　conceived　as
  affected　by　time；　or　as　transient　and　changeable　in　it。　The　fault　in　conception　lies
  deeper。　These　ideas；　though　implicitly　possessing　the　organic　unity　of　mind；　stand
  isolated　here　and　there　on　the　broad　ground　of　conception；　with　its　inward　and
  abstract　generality。　Thus　cut　adrift；　each　is　simple；　unrelated：　Right；　Duty；　God。
  Conception　in　these　circumstances　either　rests　satisfied　with　declaring　that　Right　is
  Right；　God　is　God；　or　in　a　higher　grade　of　culture　it　proceeds　to　enunciate　the
  attributes：　as；　for　instance；　God　is　the　Creator　of　the　world；　omniscient；　almighty；
  etc。　In　this　way　several　isolated；　simple　predicates　are　strung　together：　but　in　spite
  of　the　link　supplied　by　their　subject；　the　predicates　never　get　beyond　mere
  contiguity。　In　this　point　Conception　coincides　with　Understanding：　the　only
  distinction　being　that　the　latter　introduces　relations　of　universal　and　particular；　of
  cause　and　effect；　etc。；　and　in　this　way　supplies　a　necessary　connection　to　the
  isolated　ideas　of　conception；　which　last　has　left　them　side　by　side　in　its　vague
  mental　spaces；　connected　only　by　a　bare　'and'。
  The　difference　between　conception　and　thought　is　of　special　individuality　and
  mutual　exclusion　of　the　members。　It　is　well　to　remember　that　these　very　attributes
  of　sense　are　thoughts　and　general　terms。　It　will　be　shown　in　the　Logic　that　thought
  （and　the　universal）　is　not　a　mere　opposite　of　sense：　it　lets　nothing　escape　it；　but；
  outflanking　its　other；　is　at　once　that　other　and　itself。　Now　language　is　the　work　of
  thought：　and　hence　all　that　is　expressed　in　language　must　be　universal。　What　I
  only　mean　or　suppose　is　mine：　it　belongs　to　me　…　this　particular　individual。　But
  language　expresses　nothing　but　universality；　and　so　I　cannot　say　what　I　merely
  mean。　And　the　unutterable　…　feeling　or　sensation　…　far　from　being　the　highest　truth；
  is　the　most　unimportant　and　untrue。　If　I　say　'the　individual'；　'this　individual'；
  'here'；　'now'；　all　these　are　universal　terms。　Everything　and　anything　is　an
  individual；　a　'this'；　and　if　it　be　sensible；　is　here　and　now。　Similarly　when　I　say　'I'；　I
  mean　my　single　self　to　the　exclusion　of　all　others；　but　what　I　say；　viz。　'I'；　is　just
  every　'I'；　which　in　like　manner　excludes　all　others　from　itself。　In　an　awkward
  expression　which　Kant　used；　he　said　that　I　accompany　all　my　conceptions　…
  sensations；　too；　desires；　actions；　etc。　'I'　is　in　essence　and　act　the　universal：　and
  such　partnership　is　a　form；　though　an　external　form；　of　universality。　All　other　men
  have　it　in　common　with　me　to　be　'I'；　just　as　it　is　common　to　all　my　sensations　and
  conceptions　to　be　mine。　But　'I'；　in　the　abstract；　as　such；　is　the　mere　act　of
  self…concentration　or　self…relation；　in　which　we　make　abstraction　from　all
  conception　and　feeling；　from　every　state　of　mind　and　every　peculiarity　of　nature；
  talent；　and　experience。　To　this　extent；　'I'　is　the　existence　of　a　wholly　abstract
  universality；　a　principle　of　abstract　freedom。
  Hence　thought；　viewed　as　a　subject；　is　what　is　expressed　by　the　word　'I'；　and
  since　I　am　at　the　same　time　in　all　my　sensations；　conceptions；　and　states　of
  consciousness；　thought　is　everywhere　present；　and　is　a　category　that　runs　through
  all　these　modifications。
  Thought　regarded　as　an　activity
  §20n
  Our　first　impression　when　we　use　the　term　'thought'　is　of　a　subjective　activity　…　one　among　many
  similar　faculties；　such　as　memory；　imagination；　and　will。　Were　thought　merely　an　activity　of　the
  subject…mind　and　treated　under　that　aspect　by　Logic；　Logic　would　resemble　the　other　sciences　in
  possessing　a　well…marked　object。　It　might　in　that　case　seem　arbitrary　to　devote　a　special　science
  to　thought；　while　will；　imagination；　and　the　rest　were　denied　the　same　privilege。　The　selection　of
  one　faculty　however　might　even　in　this　view　be　very　well　grounded　on　a　certain　authority
  acknowledged　to　belong　to　thought；　and　on　its　claim　to　be　regarded　as　the　true　nature　of　man；　in
  which　consists　his　distinction　from　the　brutes。　Nor　is　it　unimportant　to　study　thought　even　as　a
  subjective　energy。　A　detailed　analysis　of　its　nature　would　exhibit　rules　and　laws；　a　knowledge　of
  which　is　derived　from　experience。　A　treatment　of　the　laws　of　thought；　from　this　point　of　view；　used
  once　to　form　the　body　of　logical　science。　Of　that　science　Aristotle　was　the　founder。　He　succeeded
  in　assigning　to　thought　what　properly　belongs　to　it。　Our　thought　is　extremely　concrete；　but　in　its
  composite　contents　we　must　distinguish　the　part　that　properly　belongs　to　thought；　or　to　the
  abstract　mode　of　its　action。　A　subtle　spiritual　bond；　consisting　in　the　agency　of　thought；　is　what
  gives　unity　to　all　these　contents；　and　it　was　this　bond；　the　form　as　form；　that　Aristotle　noted　and
  described。　Up　to　the　present　day；　the　logic　of　Aristotle　continues　to　be　the　received　system。　It　has
  indeed　been　spun　out　to　greater　length；　especially　by　the　labours　of　the　medieval　Schoolmen　who；
  without　making　any　material　additions；　merely　refined　in　details。　The　moderns　also　have　left　their
  mark　upon　this　logic；　partly　by　omitting　many　points　of　logical　doctrine　due　to　Aristotle　and　the
  Schoolmen；　and　partly　by　foisting　in　a　quantity　of　psychological　matter。　The　purport　of　the　science
  is　to　become　acquainted　with　the　procedure　of　finite　thought：　and；　if　it　is　adapted　to　its
  presupposed　object；　the　science　is　entitled　to　be　styled　correct。　The　study　of　this　formal　logic
  undoubtedly　has　its　uses。　It　sharpens　the　wits；　as　the　phrase　goes；　and　teaches　us　to　collect　our
  thoughts　and　to　abstract　…　whereas　in　common　consciousness　we　have　to　deal　with　sensuous
  conceptions　which　cross　and　perplex　one　another。　Abstraction　moreover　implies　the　concentration
  of　the　mind　on　a　single　point；　and　thus　induces　the　habit　of　attending　to　our　inward　selves。　An
  acquaintance　with　the　forms　of　finite　thought　may　be　made　a　means　of　training　the　mind　for　the
  empirical　sciences；　since　their　method　is　regulated　by　these　forms：　and　in　this　sense　logic　has　been
  designated　Instrumental。　It　is　true；　we　may　be　still　more　liberal；　and　say：　Logic　is　to　be　studied　not
  for　its　utility；　but　for　its　own　sake；　the　superexcellent　is　not　to　be　sought　for　the　sake　of　mere　utility。
  In　one　sense　this　is　quite　correct；　but　it　may　be　replied　that　the　superexcellent　is　also　the　most
  useful；　because　it　is　the　all…sustaining　principle　which；　having　a　subsistence　of　its　own；　may
  therefore　serve　as　the　vehicle　of　special　ends　which　it　furthers　and　secures。　And　thus；　special　ends；
  though　they　have　no　right　to　be　set　first；　are　still　fostered　by　the　presence　of　the　highest　good。
  Relig