indispensableness。　Or　rather；　instead　of　being　indispensable；　they　would　not　exist
  at　all。
  §3
  The　Content；　of　whatever　kind　it　be；　with　which　our　consciousness　is　taken　up；　is
  what　constitutes　the　qualitative　character　of　our　feelings；　perceptions；　fancies；　and
  ideas；　of　our　aims　and　duties；　and　of　our　thoughts　and　notions。　From　this　point　of
  view；　feeling；　perception；　etc。；　are　the　forms　assumed　by　these　contents。　The
  contents　remain　one　and　the　same；　whether　they　are　felt；　seen；　represented；　or
  willed；　and　whether　they　are　merely　felt；　or　felt　with　an　admixture　of　thoughts；　or
  merely　and　simply　thought。　In　any　one　of　these　forms；　or　in　the　admixture　of
  several；　the　contents　confront　consciousness；　or　are　its　object。　But　when　they　are
  thus　objects　of　consciousness；　the　modes　of　the　several　forms　ally　themselves
  with　the　contents；　and　each　form　of　them　appears　in　consequence　to　give　rise　to　a
  special　object。　Thus　what　is　the　same　at　bottom　may　look　like　a　different　sort　of
  fact。
  The　several　modes　of　feeling；　perception；　desire；　and　will；　so　far　as　we　are　aware
  of　them；　are　in　general　called　ideas　（mental　representations）：　and　it　may　be
  roughly　said　that　philosophy　puts　thoughts；　categories；　or；　in　more　precise
  language；　adequate　notions；　in　the　place　of　the　generalised　images　we　ordinarily
  call　ideas。　Mental　impressions　such　as　these　may　be　regarded　as　the　metaphors　of
  thoughts　and　notions。　But　to　have　these　figurate　conceptions　does　not　imply　that
  we　appreciate　their　intellectual　significance；　the　thoughts　and　rational　notions　to
  which　they　correspond。　Conversely；　it　is　one　thing　to　have　thoughts　and　intelligent
  notions；　and　another　to　know　what　impressions；　perceptions；　and　feelings
  correspond　to　them。
  This　difference　will　to　some　extent　explain　what　people　call　the　unintelligibility　of
  philosophy。　Their　difficulty　lies　partly　in　an　incapacity　…　which　in　itself　is　nothing
  but　want　of　habit　…　for　abstract　thinking；　i。e。　in　an　inability　to　get　hold　of　pure
  thoughts　and　move　about　in　them。　In　our　ordinary　state　of　mind；　the　thoughts　are
  clothed　upon　and　made　one　with　the　sensuous　or　spiritual　material　of　the　hour；
  and　in　reflection；　meditation；　and　general　reasoning；　we　introduce　a　blend　of
  thoughts　into　feelings；　percepts；　and　mental　images。　（Thus；　in　propositions　where
  the　subject…matter　is　due　to　the　senses　…　e。g。　'This　leaf　is　green'　…　we　have　such
  categories　introduced；　as　being　and　individuality。）　But　it　is　a　very　different　thing　to
  make　the　thoughts　pure　and　simple　our　object。
  But　their　complaint　that　philosophy　is　unintelligible　is　as　much　due　to　another
  reason；　and　that　is　an　impatient　wish　to　have　before　them　as　a　mental　picture　that
  which　is　in　the　mind　as　a　thought　or　notion。　When　people　are　asked　to　apprehend
  some　notion；　they　often　complain　that　they　do　not　know　what　they　have　to　think。
  But　the　fact　is　that　in　a　notion　there　is　nothing　further　to　be　thought　than　the
  notion　itself。　What　the　phrase　reveals　is　a　hankering　after　an　image　with　which　we
  are　already　familiar。　The　mind；　denied　the　use　of　its　familiar　ideas；　feels　the
  ground　where　it　once　stood　firm　and　at　home　taken　away　from　beneath　it；　and；
  when　transported　into　the　region　of　pure　thought；　cannot　tell　where　in　the　world　it
  is。
  One　consequence　of　this　weakness　is　that　authors；　preachers；　and　orators　are
  found　most　intelligible；　when　they　speak　of　things　which　their　readers　or　hearers
  already　know　by　rote　…　things　which　the　latter　are　conversant　with；　and　which
  require　no　explanation。
  §4
  The　philosopher　then　has　to　reckon　with　popular　modes　of　thought；　and　with　the
  objects　of　religion。　In　dealing　with　the　ordinary　modes　of　mind；　he　will　first　of　all；
  as　we　saw；　have　to　prove　and　almost　to　awaken　the　need　for　his　peculiar　method
  of　knowledge。　In　dealing　with　the　objects　of　religion；　and　with　truth　as　a　whole；
  he　will　have　to　show　that　philosophy　is　capable　of　apprehending　them　from　its
  own　resources；　and　should　a　difference　from　religious　conceptions　come　to　light；
  he　will　have　to　justify　the　points　in　which　it　diverges。
  §5
  To　give　the　reader　a　preliminary　explanation　of　the　distinction　thus　made；　and　to
  let　him　see　at　the　same　moment　that　the　real　import　of　our　consciousness　is
  retained；　and　even　for　the　first　time　put　in　its　proper　light；　when　translated　into　the
  form　of　thought　and　the　notion　of　reason；　it　may　be　well　to　recall　another　of　these
  old　unreasoned　beliefs。　And　that　is　the　conviction　that　to　get　at　the　truth　of　any
  object　or　event；　even　of　feelings；　perceptions；　opinions；　and　mental　ideas；　we
  must　think　it　over。　Now　in　any　case　to　think　things　over　is　at　least　to　transform
  feelings；　ordinary　ideas；　etc。　into　thoughts。
  Nature　has　given　every　one　a　faculty　of　thought。　But　thought　is　all　that　philosophy
  claims　as　the　form　proper　to　her　business：　and　thus　the　inadequate　view　which
  ignores　the　distinction　stated　in　§3　leads　to　a　new　delusion；　the　reverse　of　the
  complaint　previously　mentioned　about　the　unintelligibility　of　philosophy。　In　other
  words；　this　science　must　often　submit　to　the　slight　of　hearing　even　people　who
  have　never　taken　any　trouble　with　it　talking　as　if　they　thoroughly　understood　all
  about　it。　With　no　preparation　beyond　an　ordinary　education　they　do　not　hesitate；
  especially　under　the　influence　of　religious　sentiment；　to　philosophise　and　to
  criticise　philosophy。　Everybody　allows　that　to　know　any　other　science　you　must
  have　first　studied　it；　and　that　you　can　only　claim　to　express　a　judgement　upon　it　in
  virtue　of　such　knowledge。　Everybody　allows　that　to　make　a　shoe　you　must　have
  learned　and　practised　the　craft　of　the　shoemaker；　though　every　man　has　a　model
  in　his　own　foot；　and　possesses　in　his　hands　the　natural　endowments　for　the
  operations　required。　For　philosophy　alone；　it　seems　to　be　imagined；　such　study；
  care；　and　application　are　not　in　the　least　requisite。
  This　comfortable　view　of　what　is　required　for　a　philosopher　has　recently　received
  corroboration　through　the　theory　of　immediate　or　intuitive　knowledge。
  §6
  So　much　for　the　form　of　philosophical　knowledge。　It　is　no　less　desirable；　on　the
  other　hand；　that　philosophy　should　understand　that　its　content　is　no　other　than
  actuality；　that　core　of　truth　which；　originally　produced　and　producing　itself　within
  the　precincts　of　the　mental　life；　has　become　the　world；　the　inward　and　outward
  world；　of　consciousness。　At　first　we　become　aware　of　these　contents　in　what　we
  call　Experience。　But　even　Experience；　as　it　surveys　the　wide　range　of　inward　and
  outward　existence；　has　sense　enough　to　distinguish　the　mere　appearance；　which　is
  transient　and　meaningless；　from　what　in　itself　really　deserves　the　name　of
  actuality。　As　it　is　only　in　form　that　philosophy　is　distinguished　from　other　modes
  of　attaining　an　acquaintance　with　this　same　sum　of　being；　it　must　necessarily　be　in
  harmony　with　actuality　and　experience。　In　fact；　this　harmony　may　be　viewed　as　at
  least　an　extrinsic　means　of　testing　the　truth　of　a　philosophy。　Similarly　it　may　be
  held　the　highest　and　final　aim　of　philosophic　science　to　bring　about；　through　the
  ascertainment　of　this　harmony；　a　reconciliation　of　the　self…conscious　reason　with
  the　reason　which　is　in　the　world　…　in　other　words；　with　actuality。
  In　the　Preface　to　my　Philosophy　of　Right；　p。　xxvii；　are　found　the　propositions：
  What　is　reasonable　is　actual
  and
  What　is　actual　is　reasonable。
  These　simple　statements　have　given　rise　to　expressions　of　surprise　and　hostility；
  even　in　quarters　where　it　would　be　reckoned　an　insult　to　presume　absence　of
  philosophy；　and　still　more　of　religion。　Religion　at　least　need　not　be　brought　in
  evidence；　its　doctrines　of　the　divine　governments　of　the　world　affirm　these
  propositions　too　decidedly。　For　their　philosophic　sense；　we　must　presuppose
  intelligence　enough　to　know；　not　only　that　God　is　actual；　that　He　is　the　supreme
  actuality；　that　He　alone　is　truly　actual；　but　also；　as　regards　the　logical　bearings　of
  the　question；　that　existence　is　in　part　mere　appearance；　and　only　in　part　actuality。
  In　common　life；　any　freak　of　fancy；　any　error；　evil　and　everything　of　the　nature
  of　evil；　as　well　as　every　degenerate　and　transitory　existence　whatever；　gets　in　a
  casual　way　the　name　of　actuality。　But　even　our　ordinary　feelings　are　enough　to
  forbid　a　casual　（fortuitous）　existence　getting　the　emphatic　name　of　an　actual；　for
  by　fortuitous　we　mean　an　existence　which　has　no　greater　value　than　that　of
  something　possible；　which　may　as　well　not　be　as　be。　As　for　the　term　Actuality；
  these　critics　would　have　done　well　to　consider　the　sense　in　which　I　employ　it。　In　a
  detailed　Logic　I　had　treated　among　other　things　of　actuality；　and　accurately
  distinguished　it　not　only　from　the　fortuitous；　which；　after　all；　has　existence；　but
  even　from　the　cognate　categories　of　existence　and　the　other　modifications　of
  being。
  The　actuality　of　the　rational　stands　opposed　by　the　popular　fancy　that　Ideas　and
  ideals　are　nothing　but　chimeras；　and　philosophy　a　mere　system　of　such
  phant