CRITIAS：　　Certainly　not；　I　think。
  SOCRATES：　　And　will　not　hearing　be　useful　for　virtue；　if　virtue　is　taught
  by　hearing　and　we　use　the　sense　of　hearing　in　giving　instruction？
  CRITIAS：　　Yes。
  SOCRATES：　　And　since　medicine　frees　the　sick　man　from　his　disease；　that　art
  too　may　sometimes　appear　useful　in　the　acquisition　of　virtue；　e。g。　when
  hearing　is　procured　by　the　aid　of　medicine。
  CRITIAS：　　Very　likely。
  SOCRATES：　　But　if；　again；　we　obtain　by　wealth　the　aid　of　medicine；　shall　we
  not　regard　wealth　as　useful　for　virtue？
  CRITIAS：　　True。
  SOCRATES：　　And　also　the　instruments　by　which　wealth　is　procured？
  CRITIAS：　　Certainly。
  SOCRATES：　　Then　you　think　that　a　man　may　gain　wealth　by　bad　and　disgraceful
  means；　and；　having　obtained　the　aid　of　medicine　which　enables　him　to
  acquire　the　power　of　hearing；　may　use　that　very　faculty　for　the　acquisition
  of　virtue？
  CRITIAS：　　Yes；　I　do。
  SOCRATES：　　But　can　that　which　is　evil　be　useful　for　virtue？
  CRITIAS：　　No。
  SOCRATES：　　It　is　not　therefore　necessary　that　the　means　by　which　we　obtain
  what　is　useful　for　a　certain　object　should　always　be　useful　for　the　same
  object：　　for　it　seems　that　bad　actions　may　sometimes　serve　good　purposes？
  The　matter　will　be　still　plainer　if　we　look　at　it　in　this　way：If　things
  are　useful　towards　the　several　ends　for　which　they　exist；　which　ends　would
  not　come　into　existence　without　them；　how　would　you　regard　them？　　Can
  ignorance；　for　instance；　be　useful　for　knowledge；　or　disease　for　health；　or
  vice　for　virtue？
  CRITIAS：　　Never。
  SOCRATES：　　And　yet　we　have　already　agreedhave　we　not？that　there　can　be
  no　knowledge　where　there　has　not　previously　been　ignorance；　nor　health
  where　there　has　not　been　disease；　nor　virtue　where　there　has　not　been　vice？
  CRITIAS：　　I　think　that　we　have。
  SOCRATES：　　But　then　it　would　seem　that　the　antecedents　without　which　a
  thing　cannot　exist　are　not　necessarily　useful　to　it。　　Otherwise　ignorance
  would　appear　useful　for　knowledge；　disease　for　health；　and　vice　for　virtue。
  Critias　still　showed　great　reluctance　to　accept　any　argument　which　went　to
  prove　that　all　these　things　were　useless。　　I　saw　that　it　was　as　difficult
  to　persuade　him　as　（according　to　the　proverb）　it　is　to　boil　a　stone；　so　I
  said：　　Let　us　bid　'good…bye'　to　the　discussion；　since　we　cannot　agree
  whether　these　things　are　useful　and　a　part　of　wealth　or　not。　　But　what
  shall　we　say　to　another　question：　　Which　is　the　happier　and　better　man；he
  who　requires　the　greatest　quantity　of　necessaries　for　body　and　diet；　or　he
  who　requires　only　the　fewest　and　least？　　The　answer　will　perhaps　become
  more　obvious　if　we　suppose　some　one；　comparing　the　man　himself　at　different
  times；　to　consider　whether　his　condition　is　better　when　he　is　sick　or　when
  he　is　well？
  CRITIAS：　　That　is　not　a　question　which　needs　much　consideration。
  SOCRATES：　　Probably；　I　said；　every　one　can　understand　that　health　is　a
  better　condition　than　disease。　　But　when　have　we　the　greatest　and　the　most
  various　needs；　when　we　are　sick　or　when　we　are　well？
  CRITIAS：　　When　we　are　sick。
  SOCRATES：　　And　when　we　are　in　the　worst　state　we　have　the　greatest　and　most
  especial　need　and　desire　of　bodily　pleasures？
  CRITIAS：　　True。
  SOCRATES：　　And　seeing　that　a　man　is　best　off　when　he　is　least　in　need　of
  such　things；　does　not　the　same　reasoning　apply　to　the　case　of　any　two
  persons；　of　whom　one　has　many　and　great　wants　and　desires；　and　the　other
  few　and　moderate？　　For　instance；　some　men　are　gamblers；　some　drunkards；　and
  some　gluttons：　　and　gambling　and　the　love　of　drink　and　greediness　are　all
  desires？
  CRITIAS：　　Certainly。
  SOCRATES：　　But　desires　are　only　the　lack　of　something：　　and　those　who　have
  the　greatest　desires　are　in　a　worse　condition　than　those　who　have　none　or
  very　slight　ones？
  CRITIAS：　　Certainly　I　consider　that　those　who　have　such　wants　are　bad；　and
  that　the　greater　their　wants　the　worse　they　are。
  SOCRATES：　　And　do　we　think　it　possible　that　a　thing　should　be　useful　for　a
  purpose　unless　we　have　need　of　it　for　that　purpose？
  CRITIAS：　　No。
  SOCRATES：　　Then　if　these　things　are　useful　for　supplying　the　needs　of　the
  body；　we　must　want　them　for　that　purpose？
  CRITIAS：　　That　is　my　opinion。
  SOCRATES：　　And　he　to　whom　the　greatest　number　of　things　are　useful　for　his
  purpose；　will　also　want　the　greatest　number　of　means　of　accomplishing　it；
  supposing　that　we　necessarily　feel　the　want　of　all　useful　things？
  CRITIAS：　　It　seems　so。
  SOCRATES：　　The　argument　proves　then　that　he　who　has　great　riches　has
  likewise　need　of　many　things　for　the　supply　of　the　wants　of　the　body；　for
  wealth　appears　useful　towards　that　end。　　And　the　richest　must　be　in　the
  worst　condition；　since　they　seem　to　be　most　in　want　of　such　things。
  End