ey；　and　believe　that　he　was　hit　by　a　shot　of　the　second　volley。　　It　has　been　asserted　that　I　fired　the　gun　which　killed　General　Polk；　and　that　I　knew　it　was　directed　against　that　general。　　The　fact　is；　at　that　distance　we　could　not　even　tell　that　the　group　were　officers　at　all；　I　was　on　horseback；　a　couple　of　hundred　yards　off；　before　my　orders　to　fire　were　executed；　had　no　idea　that　our　shot　had　taken　effect；　and　continued　my　ride　down　along　the　line　to　Schofield's　extreme　flank；　returning　late　in　the　evening　to　my　head…quarters　at　Big　Shanty；　where　I　occupied　an　abandoned　house。　In　a　cotton…field　back　of　that　house　was　our　signal…station；　on　the　roof　of　an　old　gin…house。　　The　signal…officer　reported　that　by　studying　the　enemy's　signals　he　had　learned　the　key；　and　that　he　could　read　their　signals。　　He　explained　to　me　that　he　had　translated　a　signal　about　noon；　from　Pine　Mountain　to　Marietta；　〃Send　an　ambulance　for　General　Polk's　body；〃　and　later　in　the　day　another；　〃Why　don't　you　send　an　ambulance　for　General　Polk？〃　　From　this　we　inferred　that　General　Polk　had　been　killed；　but　how　or　where　we　knew　not；　and　this　inference　was　confirmed　later　in　the　same　day　by　the　report　of　some　prisoners　who　had　been　captured。
  On　the　15th　we　advanced　our　general　lines；　intending　to　attack　at　any　weak　point　discovered　between　Kenesaw　and　Pine　Mountain；　but　Pine　Mountain　was　found　to　be　abandoned；　and　Johnston　had　contracted　his　front　somewhat；　on　a　direct　line；　connecting　Kenesaw　with　Lost　Mountain。　　Thomas　and　Schofield　thereby　gained　about　two　miles　of　most　difficult；　country；　and　McPherson's　left　lapped　well　around　the　north　end　of　Kenesaw。　　We　captured　a　good　many　prisoners；　among　them　a　whole　infantry　regiment；　the　Fourteenth　Alabama；　three　hundred　and　twenty　strong。
  On　the　16th　the　general　movement　was　continued；　when　Lost　Mountain　was　abandoned　by　the　enemy。　　Our　right　naturally　swung　round；　so　as　to　threaten　the　railroad　below　Marietta；　but　Johnston　had　still　further　contracted　and　strengthened　his　lines；　covering　Marietta　and　all　the　roads　below。
  On　the　17th　and　18th　the　rain　again　fell　in　torrents；　making　army　movements　impossible；　but　we　devoted　the　time　to　strengthening　our　positions；　more　especially　the　left　and　centre；　with　a　view　gradually　to　draw　from　the　left　to　add　to　the　right；　and　we　had　to　hold　our　lines　on　the　left　extremely　strong；　to　guard　against　a　sally　from　Kenesaw　against　our　depot　at　Big　Shanty。　　Garrard's　division　of　cavalry　was　kept　busy　on　our　left；　McPherson　had　gradually　extended　to　his　right；　enabling　Thomas　to　do　the　same　still　farther；　but　the　enemy's　position　was　so　very　strong；　and　everywhere　it　was　covered　by　intrenchments；　that　we　found　it　as　dangerous　to　assault　as　a　permanent　fort。　　We　in　like　manner　covered　our　lines　of　battle　by　similar　works；　and　even　our　skirmishers　learned　to　cover　their　bodies　by　the　simplest　and　best　forms　of　defensive　works；　such　as　rails　or　logs；　piled　in　the　form　of　a　simple　lunette；　covered　on　the　outside　with　earth　thrown　up　at　night。
  The　enemy　and　ourselves　used　the　same　form　of　rifle…trench；　varied　according　to　the　nature　of　the　ground；　viz。：　the　trees　and　bushes　were　cut　away　for　a　hundred　yards　or　more　in　front；　serving　as　an　abatis　or　entanglement；　the　parapets　varied　from　four　to　six　feet　high；　the　dirt　taken　from　a　ditch　outside　and　from　a　covered　way　inside；　and　this　parapet　was　surmounted　by　a　〃head…log；〃　composed　of　the　trunk　of　a　tree　from　twelve　to　twenty　inches　at　the　butt；　lying　along　the　interior　crest　of　the　parapet　and　resting　in　notches　cut　in　other　trunks　which　extended　back；　forming　an　inclined　plane；　in　case　the　head…log　should　be　knocked　inward　by　a　cannon…shot。　　The　men　of　both　armies　became　extremely　skillful　in　the　construction　of　these　works；　because　each　man　realized　their　value　and　importance　to　himself；　so　that　it　required　no　orders　for　their　construction。　　As　soon　as　a　regiment　or　brigade　gained　a　position　within　easy　distance　for　a　sally；　it　would　set　to　work　with　a　will；　and　would　construct　such　a　parapet　in　a　single　night；　but　I　endeavored　to　spare　the　soldiers　this　hard　labor　by　authorizing　each　division　commander　to　organize　out　of　the　freedmen　who　escaped　to　us　a　pioneer　corps　of　two　hundred　men；　who　were　fed　out　of　the　regular　army　supplies；　and　I　promised　them　ten　dollars　a　month；　under　an　existing　act　of　Congress。　　These　pioneer　detachments　became　very　useful　to　us　during　the　rest　of　the　war；　for　they　could　work　at　night　while　our　men　slept；　they　in　turn　were　not　expected　to　fight；　and　could　therefore　sleep　by　day。　　Our　enemies　used　their　slaves　for　a　similar　purpose；　but　usually　kept　them　out　of　the　range　of　fire　by　employing　them　to　fortify　and　strengthen　the　position　to　their　rear　next　to　be　occupied　in　their　general　retrograde。　　During　this　campaign　hundreds　if　not　thousands　of　miles　of　similar　intrenchments　were　built　by　both　armies；　and；　as　a　rule；　whichever　party　attacked　got　the　worst　of　it。
  On　the　19th　of　June　the　rebel　army　again　fell　back　on　its　flanks；　to　such　an　extent　that　for　a　time　I　supposed　it　had　retreated　to　the　Chattahoochee　River；　fifteen　miles　distant；　but　as　we　pressed　forward　we　were　soon　undeceived；　for　we　found　it　still　more　concentrated；　covering　Marietta　and　the　railroad。　　These　successive　contractions　of　the　enemy's　line　encouraged　us　and　discouraged　him；　but　were　doubtless　justified　by　sound　reasons。　　On　the　20th　Johnston's　position　was　unusually　strong。　　Kenesaw　Mountain　was　his　salient；　his　two　flanks　were　refused　and　covered　by　parapets　and　by　Noonday　and　Nose's　Creeks。　　His　left　flank　was　his　weak　point；　so　long　as　he　acted　on　the　〃defensive；〃　whereas；　had　he　designed　to　contract　the　extent　of　his　line　for　the　purpose　of　getting　in　reserve　a　force　with　which　to　strike　〃offensively〃　from　his　right；　he　would　have　done　a　wise　act；　and　I　was　compelled　to　presume　that　such　was　his　object：　We　were　also　so　far　from　Nashville　and　Chattanooga　that　we　were　naturally　sensitive　for　the　safety　of　our　railroad　and　depots；　so　that　the　left　（MePherson）　was　held　very　strong。
  About　this　time　came　reports　that　a　large　cavalry　force　of　the　enemy　had　passed　around　our　left　flank；　evidently　to　strike　this　very　railroad　somewhere　below　Chattanooga。　　I　therefore　reenforced　the　cavalry　stationed　from　Resaca　to　Casaville；　and　ordered　forward　from　Huntsville；　Alabama；　the　infantry　division　of　General　John　E。　Smith；　to　hold　Kingston　securely。
  While　we　were　thus　engaged　about　Kenesaw；　General　Grant　had　his　hands　full　with　Lee；　in　Virginia。　　General　Halleck　was　the　chief　of　staff　at　Washington；　and　to　him　I　communicated　almost　daily。　　I　find　from　my　letter…book　that　on　the　21st　of　June　I　reported　to　him　tersely　and　truly　the　condition　of　facts　on　that　day：　〃This　is　the　nineteenth　day　of　rain；　and　the　prospect　of　fair　weather　is　as　far　off　as　ever。　　The　roads　are　impassable；　the　fields　and　woods　become　quagmire's　after　a　few　wagons　have　crossed　over。　　Yet　we　are　at　work　all　the　time。　　The　left　flank　is　across　Noonday　Creek；　and　the　right　is　across　Nose's　Creek。　　The　enemy　still　holds　Kenesaw；　a　conical　mountain；　with　Marietta　behind　it；　and　has　his　flanks　retired；　to　cover　that　town　and　the　railroad　behind。　　I　am　all　ready　to　attack　the　moment　the　weather　and　roads　will　permit　troops　and　artillery　to　move　with　any　thing　like　life。〃
  The　weather　has　a　wonderful　effect　on　troops：　in　action　and　on　the　march；　rain　is　favorable；　but　in　the　woods；　where　all　is　blind　and　uncertain；　it　seems　almost　impossible　for　an　army　covering　ten　miles　of　front　to　act　in　concert　during　wet　and　stormy　weather。　Still　I　pressed　operations　with　the　utmost　earnestness；　aiming　always　to　keep　our　fortified　lines　in　absolute　contact　with　the　enemy；　while　with　the　surplus　force　we　felt　forward；　from　one　flank　or　the　other；　for　his　line　of　communication　and　retreat。　　On　the　22d　of　June　I　rode　the　whole　line；　and　ordered　General　Thomas　in　person　to　advance　his　extreme　right　corps　（Hooker's）；　and　instructed　General　Schofield；　by　letter；　to　keep　his　entire　army；　viz。；　the　Twenty…third　Corps；　as　a　strong　right　flank　in　close　support　of　Hooker's　deployed　line。　　During　this　day　the　sun　came　out；　with　some　promise　of　clear　weather；　and　I　had　got　back　to　my　bivouac　about　dark；　when　a　signal　message　was　received；　dated…
  KULP　HOUSE；　5。30　P。M。
  General　SHERMAN：　We　have　repulsed　two　heavy　attacks；　and　feel　confident；　our　only　apprehension　being　from　our　extreme　right　flank。　　Three　entire　corps　are　in　front　of　us。
  Major…General　HOOKER。
  Hooker's　corps　（the　Twentieth）　belonged　to　Thomas's　army；　Thomas's　headquarters　were　two　miles　nearer　to　Hooker　than　mine；　and　Hooker；　being　an　old　army　officer；　knew　that　he　should　have　reported　this　fact　to　Thomas　and　not　to　me；　I　was；　moreover；　specially　disturbed　by　the　assertion　in　his　report　that　he　was　uneasy　about　his　right　flank；　when　Schofield　had　been　specially　ordered　to　protect　that。　I　first　inquired　of　my　adjutant；　Dayton；　if　he　were　certain　that　General　Schofield　had　received　his　orders；　and　he　answered　that　the　envelope　in　which　he　had　sent　them　was　receipted　by　General　Schofield　himself。　　I　knew；　therefore；　that　General　Schofield　must　be　near　by；　in　close　support　of　Hooker's　right　flank。　　General　Thomas