d；　Thomas；　and　McPherson；　our　general　plans；　which　I　inferred　from　the　purport　of　our　conversation　here　and　at　Cincinnati。
  First；　I　am　pushing　stores　to　the　front　with　all　possible　dispatch；　and　am　completing　the　army　organization　according　to　the　orders　from　Washington；　which　are　ample　and　perfectly　satisfactory。
  It　will　take　us　all　of　April　to　get　in　our　furloughed　veterans；　to　bring　up　A。　J。　Smith's　command；　and　to　collect　provisions　and　cattle　on　the　line　of　the　Tennessee。　　Each　of　the　armies　will　guard；　by　detachments　of　its　own；　its　rear　communications。
  At　the　signal　to　be　given　by　you；　Schofield；　leaving　a　select　garrison　at　Knoxville　and　London；　with　twelve　thousand　men　will　drop　down　to　the　Hiawassee；　and　march　against　Johnston's　right　by　the　old　Federal　road。　　Stoneman；　now　in　Kentucky；　organizing　the　cavalry　forces　of　the　Army　of　the　Ohio；　will　operate　with　Schofield　on　his　left　frontit　may　be；　pushing　a　select　body　of　about　two　thousand　cavalry　by　Ducktown　or　Elijah　toward　Athena；　Georgia。
  Thomas　will　aim　to　have　forty…five　thousand　men　of　all　arms；　and　move　straight　against　Johnston；　wherever　he　may　be；　fighting　him　cautiously；　persistently；　and　to　the　best　advantage。　　He　will　have　two　divisions　of　cavalry；　to　take　advantage　of　any　offering。
  McPherson　will　have　nine　divisions　of　the　Army　of　the　Tennessee；　if　A。　J。　Smith　gets　here；　in　which　case　he　will　have　full　thirty　thousand　of　the　best　men　in　America。　　He　will　cross　the　Tennessee　at　Decatur　and　Whitesburg；　march　toward　Rome；　and　feel　for　Thomas。　If　Johnston　falls　behind　the　Coosa；　then　McPherson　will　push　for　Rome；　and　if　Johnston　falls　behind　the　Chattahoochee；　as　I　believe　he　will；　then　McPherson　will　cross　over　and　join　Thomas。
  McPherson　has　no　cavalry；　but　I　have　taken　one　of　Thomas's　divisions；　viz。；　Garrard's；　six　thousand　strong；　which　is　now　at　Colombia；　mounting；　equipping；　and　preparing。　　I　design　this　division　to　operate　on　McPheraon's　right；　rear；　or　front；　according　as　the　enemy　appears。　　But　the　moment　I　detect　Johnston　falling　behind　the　Chattahoochee；　I　propose　to　cast　off　the　effective　part　of　this　cavalry　division；　after　crossing　the　Coosa；　straight　for　Opelika；　West　Point；　Columbus；　or　Wetumpka；　to　break　up　the　road　between　Montgomery　and　Georgia。　　If　Garrard　can　do　this　work　well；　he　can　return　to　the　Union　army；　but　should　a　superior　force　interpose；　then　he　will　seek　safety　at　Pensacola　and　join　Banks；　or；　after　rest；　will　act　against　any　force　that　he　can　find　east　of　Mobile；　till　such　time　as　he　can　reach　me。
  Should　Johnston　fall　behind　the　Chattahoochee；　I　will　feign　to　the　right；　but　pass　to　the　left　and　act　against　Atlanta　or　its　eastern　communications；　according　to　developed　facts。
  This　is　about　as　far　ahead　as　I　feel　disposed；　to　look；　but　I　will　ever　bear　in　mind　that　Johnston　is　at　all　times　to　be　kept　so　busy　that　he　cannot　in　any　event　send　any　part　of　his　command　against　you　or　Banks。
  If　Banks　can　at　the　same　time　carry　Mobile　and　open　up　the　Alabama　River；　he　will　in　a　measure　solve　the　moat　difficult　part　of　my　problem；　viz。；　〃provisions。〃　But　in　that　I　must　venture。　　Georgia　has　a　million　of　inhabitants。　　If　they　can　live；　we　should　not　starve。　　If　the　enemy　interrupt　our　communications；　I　will　be　absolved　from　all　obligations　to　subsist　on　our　own　resources；　and　will　feel　perfectly　justified　in　taking　whatever　and　wherever　we　oar　find。　I　will　inspire　my　command；　if　successful；　with　the　feeling　that　beef　and　salt　are　all　that　is　absolutely　necessary　to　life；　and　that　parched　corn　once　fed　General　Jackson's　army　on　that　very　ground。　As　ever；　your　friend　and　servant；
  W。　T。　SHERMAN；　Major…General。
  HEADQUARTERS　ARMIES　OF　THE　UNITED　STATES　CULPEPPER　COURT　HOUSE；　VIRGINIA；　April　19；　1864。
  Major…General　W。　T。　SHERMAN；　commanding　Military　Division　of　the　Mississippi。
  GENERAL：　Since　my　letter　to　you　of　April　4th　I　have　seen　no　reason　to　change　any　portion　of　the　general　plan　of　campaign；　if　the　enemy　remain　still　and　allow　us　to　take　the　initiative。　　Rain　has　continued　so　uninterruptedly　until　the　last　day　or　two　that　it　will　be　impossible　to　move；　however；　before　the　27th；　even　if　no　more　should　fall　in　the　meantime。　　I　think　Saturday；　the　30th；　will　probably　be　the　day　for　our　general　move。
  Colonel　Comstock；　who　will　take　this；　can　spend　a　day　with　you；　and　fill　up　many　little　gaps　of　information　not　given　in　any　of　my　letters。
  What　I　now　want　more　particularly　to　say　is；　that　if　the　two　main　attacks；　yours　and　the　one　from　here；　should　promise　great　success；　the　enemy　may；　in　a　fit　of　desperation；　abandon　one　part　of　their　line　of　defense；　and　throw　their　whole　strength　upon　the　other；　believing　a　single　defeat　without　any　victory　to　sustain　them　better　than　a　defeat　all　along　their　line；　and　hoping　too；　at　the　same　time；　that　the　army；　meeting　with　no　resistance；　will　rest　perfectly　satisfied　with　their　laurels；　having　penetrated　to　a　given　point　south；　thereby　enabling　them　to　throw　their　force　first　upon　one　and　then　on　the　other。
  With　the　majority　of　military　commanders　they　might　do　this。
  But　you　have　had　too　much　experience　in　traveling　light；　and　subsisting　upon　the　country；　to　be　caught　by　any　such　ruse。　　I　hope　my　experience　has　not　been　thrown　away。　　My　directions；　then；　would　be；　if　the　enemy　in　your　front　show　signs　of　joining　Lee；　follow　him　up　to　the　full　extent　of　your　ability。　　I　will　prevent　the　concentration　of　Lee　upon　your　front；　if　it　is　in　the　power　of　this　army　to　do　it。
  The　Army　of　the　Potomac　looks　well；　and；　so　far　as　I　can　judge；　officers　and　men　feel　well。　　Yours　truly；
  U。　S。　GRANT；　Lieutenant…General。
  HEADQUARTERS　MILITARY　DIVISION　OF　THE　MISSISSIPPI　NASHVILLE；　TENNESSEE；　April　24；　1864
  Lieutenant…General　U。　S。　GRANT；　Commander…in…Chief；　Culpepper；　Virginia
  GENERAL：　I　now　have；　at　the　hands　of　Colonel　Comstock；　of　your　staff；　the　letter　of　April　19th；　and　am　as　far　prepared　to　assume　the　offensive　as　possible。　　I　only　ask　as　much　time　as　you　think　proper；　to　enable　me　to　get　up　McPherson's　two　divisions　from　Cairo。　　Their　furloughs　will　expire　about　this　time；　and　some　of　them　should　now　be　in　motion　for　Clifton；　whence　they　will　march　to　Decatur；　to　join　General　Dodge。
  McPherson　is　ordered　to　assemble　the　Fifteenth　Corps　near　Larkin's；　and　to　get　the　Sixteenth　and　Seventeenth　Corps　（Dodge　and　Blair）　at　Decatur　at　the　earliest　possible　moment。　　From　these　two　points　he　will　direct　his　forces　on　Lebanon；　Summerville；　and　Lafayette；　where　he　will　act　against　Johnston；　if　he　accept　battle　at　Dalton；　or　move　in　the　direction　of　Rome；　if　the　enemy　give　up　Dalton；　and　fall　behind　the　Oostenaula　or　Etowah。　　I　see　that　there　is　some　risk　in　dividing　our　forces；　but　Thomas　and　Schofield　will　have　strength　enough　to　cover　all　the　valleys　as　far　as　Dalton；　and；　should　Johnston　turn　his　whole　force　against　McPherson；　the　latter　will　have　his　bridge　at　Larkin's；　and　the　route　to　Chattanooga　via　Willa's　Valley　and　the　Chattanooga　Creek；　open　for　retreat；　and　if　Johnston　attempt　to　leave　Dalton；　Thomas　will　have　force　enough　to　push　on　through　Dalton　to　Kingston；　which　will　checkmate　him。　　My　own　opinion　is　that　Johnston　will　be　compelled　to　hang　to　his　railroad；　the　only　possible　avenue　of　supply　to　his　army；　estimated　at　from　forty…five　to　sixty　thousand　men。
  At　Lafayette　all　our　armies　will　be　together；　and　if　Johnston　stands　at　Dalton　we　must　attack　him　in　position。　　Thomas　feels　certain　that　he　has　no　material　increase　of　force；　and　that　he　has　not　sent　away　Hardee；　or　any　part　of　his　army。　　Supplies　are　the　great　question。　　I　have　materially　increased　the　number　of　cars　daily。　　When　I　got　here；　the　average　was　from　sixty…five　to　eighty　per　day。　　Yesterday　the　report　was　one　hundred　and　ninety…three；　to…day；　one　hundred　and　thirty…four；　and　my　estimate　is　that　one　hundred　and　forty…five　cars　per　day　will　give　us　a　day's　supply　and　a　day's　accumulation。
  McPherson　is　ordered　to　carry　in　wagons　twenty　day's　rations；　and　to　rely　on　the　depot　at　Ringgold　for　the　renewal　of　his　bread。　Beeves　are　now　being　driven　on　the　hoof　to　the　front；　and　the　commissary；　Colonel　Beckwith；　seems　fully　alive　to　the　importance　of　the　whole　matter。
  Our　weakest　point　will　be　from　the　direction　of　Decatur；　and　I　will　be　forced　to　risk　something　from　that　quarter；　depending　on　the　fact　that　the　enemy　has　no　force　available　with　which　to　threaten　our　communications　from　that　direction。
  Colonel　Comstock　will　explain　to　you　personally　much　that　I　cannot　commit　to　paper。　　I　am；　with　great　respect；
  W。　T。　SHERMAN；　Major…General。
  On　the　28th　of　April　I　removed　my　headquarters　to　Chattanooga；　and　prepared　for　taking　the　field　in　person。　　General　Grant　had　first　indicated　the　30th　of　April　as　the　day　for　the　simultaneous　advance；　but　subsequently　changed　the　day　to　May　5th。　　McPhersons　troops　were　brought　forward　rapidly　to　Chattanooga；　partly　by　rail　and　partly　by　marching。　　Thomas's　troops　were　already　in　position　（his　advance　being　out　as　far　as　Ringgold…eighteen　miles）；　and　Schofield　was　marching　down　by　Cleveland　to　Red　Clay　and　Catoosa　Springs。　　On　the　4th　of　May；　Thomas　was　in　person　at　Ringgold；　his　left　at　Catoosa；　and　his　right　at　Leet's　Tan…yard。　　Sc